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Abstract
The EU’s rebuff of Turkey’s application for accession represents more than a missed oppor-
tunity to strengthen and deepen the relationship between these two related spheres. Indeed, the
lack of finesse–the unnecessarily impolitic form of the rejection–propels Turkey in the opposite
direction. The old assumption that relations with Europe were of primary importance is “subject to
increasingly critical examination.” Acknowledging that Turkey may not be ready for accession in
the next wave, the EU should have pursued some less antagonizing route. The premature decision
to begin negotiations with Cyprus only intensifies the conflict.
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[T] he law of any polity is a construct embedded in a specific
social and political culture and its transmutation to other
polities is not easily achieved.'
INTRODUCTION
Long-heralded are the pitfalls of comparing one legal con-
struct with another, and few modem illustrations so effectively
prove this maxim as the current controversy over the accession
of the Republic of Turkey to the European Union (or "EU" or
"Union"). Forming the literal bridge between Europe and Asia
Minor,2 Turkey represents both a connection and a separation
between western and eastern worlds in a complex context that
blurs and qualifies meaningful comparisons. Amid a myriad of
interacting forces, the Luxembourg Summit's stark rejection of
Turkey has propelled this strategic country away from Europe.
The EU declaration that, of twelve applicants, only Turkey would
be excluded from the formal launch of accession negotiations,
which ignited indignation from Turkish leaders.3 At this pivotal
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1. J.H.H. Weiler &Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its Discontents,
17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 354, 354 (1997). See David Kennedy, Turning a Market Democ-
racy: A Tale of Two Architectures, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 373 (1991) (giving comparative
discussion of emerging European "architectural" responses to "new world order").
2. David Gotleib et al., Conference On Comparative Law-Recent Developments in Euro-
pean, American, and Turkish Law: "Team Kansas" Goes to Turkey, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 671,
703 (1996). "Istanbul ... straddles the Bosphorus as the bridge between Europe and
Asia and gateway between Mediterranean and Black Seas. As a result, Turkey is where
Western and Eastern cultures meet, interact, and must come to some resolution, a pro-
cess that has not always proven peaceful." Id. For an expanded discussion of the bridge
metaphor from both sides of the Europe-Asia Minor divide, including cultural, political,
economic, and strategic considerations, see Ian 0. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and
the West After the Cold War, in TuRKEY's NEW GEOPOLITICS: FROM THE BALKANS TO WEST-
ERN CHINA 100-01 (Graham Fuller & Ian Lesser eds. 1993).
3. Edward Mortimer, Pyrrhic Victory, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1997, at 20; Turkey and the
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time of advancing evolutions in Europe's new political and eco-
nomic structures,4 a more creative and constructive policy at
Luxembourg would have produced a less dangerous result.
"Since the West needs a friendly, co-operative partner at the east-
ern end of the Mediterranean as much as ever[,] ... the Luxem-
bourg rebuff seems astonishingly ill-judged."'
The post-modem evolution of Europe presents a dynamic
time in political history-the rise of a new international law, with
a move away from state sovereignty and toward cooperation in
international institutions, from ideology to liberal democratic
pluralism, from conflict of empires to interdependence of states,
from conflict to cooperation, and from war to peace.6 The val-
ues of pluralism become clearer as events unfold toward the new
century.
The EU's slow, but inexorable, march toward the next
round of Member State accessions has generated widespread en-
thusiasm in Eastern and Central Europe.7 Yet, the laborious pro-
EU Not so Fast, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 1997, at 74; Leyla Boulton, Ecevit Expected To Form
Coalition with Nationalists, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at 3. The decision "humiliated Tur-
key by ranking its membership application beneath that of the newer Eastern European
applicants." Boulton, supra. For original terms of the Luxembourg Council decision,
see Conclusions of the Presidency (Luxembourg European Council, Dec. 1997), E.U.
BULL., no. 12.97, at pts. 1.5-6 (1997), also in <http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/
en/9712/i1005.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
4. Literally volumes have been written about the historic changes resulting from
the decline of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin wall, and the completion of the
European Union's (or "EU" or "Union") internal market. One of the more recent and
relevant interpretations of Europe's new political and economic structures is MICHAEL
EMERSON, REDRAWING THE MAP OF EUROPE 1 (1998).
5. See The Luxembourg Rebuff, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 1997, at 17 ("Amends should be
made as quickly as possible."). Unfortunately, as is more fully developed below, they
have not. Id.
6. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 376. (stating that this is electrifying combination and
historic break permitting both disciplinary continuity and renewal); Josef Joffe, Three
Unwritten Rules that Undermined NATO's War, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,July 26, 1999, at 8. It is
hoped that the "war" in Kosovo and its chaotic aftermath in 1999 will ultimately repre-
sent an anomaly, as the "first and last" North Atlantic Treaty Organization (or "NATO")
war. Joffe, supra.
7. Peter Norman, Union Finds Unity of Purpose, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1999, at 3 ("EU
membership is more than ever a goal for Associate and other nations in eastern, cen-
tral, and southern Europe."). Both economic and political motives have fueled interest
in joining the European Community (or "EC" or "Community"), with many states view-
ing the Community as an engine for economic development, a vote of confirmation for
the emerging democracies with the stamp of EU membership (and to discount remem-
brances of past dictatorships), and a remedy for the feelings of exclusion from the
mainstream-especially Turkey. Id. JOHN REDMOND, THE NEXT MEDITERRANEAN EN-
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cess has also magnified attention and intensified controversy on
a wide range of issues across the continent, representing "the
EU's biggest challenge ever,"' and pointedly posing an indeli-
cate dilemma over the proposed accessions of Turkey and its
flash-point protagonist, Cyprus.9 Today's escalated tension mag-
nifies the centuries-old political, religious, and cultural conflict
between EU-member Greece and EU-applicant Turkey.'0 As it
has for millennia, the Aegean Sea sets the stage for international
confrontation, including the possibility of armed conflict.11 Cy-
prus-a tiny12 but controversial island nation divided by a U.N.
LARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrITY: TURaE, CYPRUS AND MALTA 3-4 (1993). In
particular, Turkey's ambition to join the EU "has taken on added urgency in light of
recent geopolitical changes and the accelerating pace of European unification."
Gotieib, supra note 2, at 703.
8. 2 LYKKE Fiis, THE END OF THE BEGINNING OF EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 1 (EioP,
1998). Enlargement implicates significant economic and political issues: reform of EU
institutions and policy, the Common Agriculture Policy, the Cohesion Funds, the free
movement of workers, etc. Id. at 9. For a full analytical review of current trends in
European integration and EU enlargement, see Helen E. Hartnell, Subregional
Coalesecence in European Regional Intergration, 16 Wis. INT'L LJ. 115 (1997). Recent
trends suggest a coalescence of sub-regional cooperation, counterbalancing the power-
ful regional initiatives such as the EU producing a more fair, balanced approach to
European integration. Hartnell, supra.
9. The military, ethnic, and religious division of Cyprus comprises a conflict as
resolute and intractable as any in history, including those in Ireland and Palestine. See,
e.g., Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus, the "Warlike Isle:" Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis,
18 STAN. L. REV. 1021 (1966).
10. JOHN NEwHOUSE, EUROPE ADrITr 252 (1997). Conflict in the Aegean, and es-
pecially Cyprus, has "deep and tangled roots." Id. Greece and Turkey trade litanies of
accusations: abuses in the Balkans; Aegean maritime and airspace violations; aggres-
sion in Cyprus; mistreatment of Muslims or Orthodox religious minorities. See Loucas
Tsilas, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1589, 1590
(1997); Kandemir Nuzhet, Turkey-Greece Relations, 19 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1851, 1852
(1996); Stephen Kinzer, In Snatching a Fugitive Rebel, Ankara Wins Opportunities on Several
Fronts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at A6. The recent discovery that Greek diplomats
sheltered Turkey's most notorious fugitive, Kurdish terrorist Abdullah Ocalan, illus-
trates the conflict anew. Id.
11. Current Aegean antagonisms and continued intransigence could produce "in-
tra-alliance armed conflict." Michael Schmidt, Aegean Angst: A Historical and Legal Anal-
ysis of the Greek-Turkish Dispute, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 15, 20 (1996).
12. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 1024. "It is hard to believe that a territory so small and
with so few people could so disturb the peace of the world." Id. Cyprus occupies 3572
square miles. Suzanne Palmer, The Republic of Northern Cyprus: Should the United States
Recognize It as an Independent State, 4 B.U. L. REV. 423, 423-24 (1986) (stating that Cy-
prus sits 44 miles off Turkey's coast and 600 miles from Greek mainland); DAVID
MUNRO, OxFoRD DIcrIONAR-Y OF TH4E WORLD 270 (1995). Cyprus is approximately the
size of the island of Hawaii with 4050 square miles. MUNRO, supra.
2000] THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY IN EUROPE
Buffer Zone13-was promised to start accession negotiations in
1998.14 Turkeym-a massive peninsular ally and bridge to the
West-was rudely relegated to the end of the accession line,' 5
with no expectation of serious consideration for years. 6 The re-
jection was made more egregious because. of the active roles
played in the decision by former ally Germany and arch-enemy
Greece.' 7 The potential radiation of this destructive, multi-
layered conflict looms perilously: Greeks against Turks, Chris-
tians against Muslims, Asians against Europeans.'
Well-known are the intransigent struggles between Israel
and Palestine, and Northern Ireland and Ireland.' 9 Politics, reli-
gion, and history have spilled together to generate deep and
seemingly intractable conflicts between distinct communities.21
13. Letter from Nicosia: On Civilization's Fault Line, ECONOMIST, June 20, 1998, at 99.
The armed standoff in Cyprus presents the world's only remaining divided capital city,
Nicosia. Id.
14. Conclusions of the Presidency, supra note 3, at pt. 1.11; see Fiuts, supra note 8,
at 8 ("The original five plus Cyprus would be invited to the actual negotiating table, the
remaining five would speed up their negotiation preparation.").
15. The language of the Conclusions of the Luxembourg Presidency expressly an-
nounces that 11 of the 12 applicants advance to the accession process, while no men-
tion is made of Turkey until a subsequent section of the document that unveils a special
strategy to help prepare it for accession at some later time. Conclusions of the Presi-
dency, supra note 3, at pts. 1.10, 1.31.
16. Or, perhaps, ever. See Mortimer, supra note 3, at 20 (considering Turkey's
exclusion at Luxembourg and that "it is not surprising that Turks believe the EU has no
serious intention of admitting them-ever. And they are probably right.").
17. John Barham, Little Anger at EU in Ankara's Teahouses, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1999,
at 3. Many Turks accuse Germany of "betraying a historic friendship." Id.; see Unsafe at
Many Speeds, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 1997, at 73. ("Germany and Greece led the drive to
exclude the ... Turks from even the slow lane to membership.").
18. Widening the European Union-but Not Too Fast, ECoNOMIST, Nov. 7, 1998, at 51.
The ancient conflict between Greece and Turkey erupts anew in the controversial cir-
cumstances surrounding EU accession: Greece insists on the inclusion of Cyprus in the
"first wave .... even though the island is, in practical fact, not one country but two.";
Letter from Nicosia, supra note 13, at 99. Cyprus is a divided island with armed camps
separated by a U.N. buffer zone. It is hardly ready for accession, and then Greece
vetoes Turkey's application and even blocks delivery of EU aid grants to Turkey.
19. Media coverage has broadcast widely and vividly the school bus killings, subway
bombings, ambush assassinations, and other violent acts of vengeance. See, e.g.,
Deborah Sontag, Israeli Jeep Blocks a Bomber from School Bus Carrying 40, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 1998, at Al. ("A jeep carrying Israeli soldiers intercepted a Palestinian suicide
bomber as he was about to ram a car packed with explosives into a school bus carrying
children from this Jewish settlement today.").
20. David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus, 31 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 141, 142 (1996). A "reluctant international community" has been forced to con-
front again in recent years the inscrutable issue of "how best to accommodate conflict-
ing interests of distinct sub-national communities locked within the boundaries of a
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Yet this less-widely publicized Turkish-Greek conflict,21 as mani-
fested in Cyprus, intensifies today, threatening to slow the ex-
pansion of an historic achievement of the late twentieth century:
the otherwise peaceful and prosperity-driven integration of Eu-
rope.22
Today's advancing "European" accretion had regained mo-
mentum with the unpredictably smooth launch of the European
Monetary Union 23 and the even more unpredictable Luxem-
bourg Summit decision to greet the opening of Eastern Eu-
rope 2 4 with welcome arms and to begin negotiations with all of
the Central and Eastern Applicants.25 But the singular exclusion
single state." Id.; A Bit of Respect, Please, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 1998, at 17. Cyprus is
among the "impenetrable, hardy perennial" problems of the modern world. A Bit of
Respect, supra.
21. Wippman, supra note 20, at 142 ("Although it has received little attention of
late, the conflict in Cyprus affords an excellent case study of many of the issues to arise
in the context of contemporary efforts to settle ethnic conflicts."); NEWHOUSE, supra
note 10, at 253 (stating that more broadly and "[c ] uriously, the degree of public discus-
sion of Turkey, especially in the media, falls well short of its heavy bearing on the inter-
ests of its neighbors and a variety of other nations.").
22. William Pfaff, France and Europe Are Doing Some Things Right, INT'L HERALD
T uB.,June 20, 1998, at 6 (quoting Prof. Joseph Weiler). One scholar has compared the
evolving integration of Europe with the Roman Empire, except that the current integra-
tion is better because it was accomplished with peaceful means. Id. The freely chosen
integration of autonomous nations is "an experiment without precedent in the history
of ideas." Id.; A Wider European Union, ECoNoMIST, Nov. 7, 1998, at 17. The EU "has
brought unprecedented neighborliness and prosperity to Western Europe." For more
information, please see Prof. J.H.H. Weiler's collection of essays on European integra-
tion in J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE (1999) (advancing discussion of
evolving community).
23. Tom Buerkle, The Success of the Euro Tempts the 3 Holdouts; Interest Grows in Swe-
den, Denmark, and Britain, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 8, 1999, at 1; seeJohn Schmidt, Euro
Posts Biggest Gain Since Debut in January, INT'L HERALD TIaB., July 27, 1999, at 1, 10 (stat-
ing that euro's momentum gathered speed in July on indications of European eco-
nomic recovery).
24. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 213. Termed "The Wild East of Europe" by Michael
Emerson, he also observed that in 1999 "the dynamics of European integration are
persistent and strong." Id. The success of Europe in fact contributed to the opening of
the East. Id.; Bulent Aras, The Importance of Turkey to Relations Between Europe and the
Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 2 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 91, 92 (1997). In
the 1980s, efforts at political and economic integration in Western Europe "were highly
popular and economically successful, creating a psychological effect in the Eastern
block that contributed to the transformation in those countries. It is a widely accepted
proposition that this spillover effect played a part in the collapse of the Soviet Union."
Aras, supra.
25. The Council of Europe's ("Council") choice of the "regatta option," allowing
all applicants to start at the same time, amazed scholars and commentators. Fmis, supra
note 8, at 1, 4.
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of the Republic of Turkey, which was relegated to a special end
of the line position among applicants, "behind such paragons of
economic and democratic virtue as Slovakia and Bulgaria,"26 has
cast a pall on EU-Turkish relations.27
In 1999, relations between Turkey and the EU worsened,
even described by one commentator as "frigid," due to the con-
troversy surrounding Turkey's handling of the capture of Kurd-
ish terrorist, Abdulah Ocalan.28 Turkish leaders were offended
by Europe's sermonizing about Turkey giving Ocalan a fair trial,
while European leaders had harbored him-an admitted terror-
ist-refusing even to acknowledge that he was a terrorist.29
Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit reminded observers that Turkey
could not even discuss political maters with the EU as long as
Turkey's candidacy is not accepted."
Europe's insensitivity or indecisiveness toward Turkey could
have enormous costs as the region redefines itself, and especially
if the present equilibrium producing relative peace and prosper-
ity begins to disintegrate.31 Noted European diplomat and
scholar Michael Emerson flatly warns of two opposing scenarios
for the next twenty years: Europe's rise to a new golden age or
26. World Politics and Current Affairs, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1998, at 60.
27. See infra Part III. Following the EU's Luxembourg refusal to include Turkey on
its short, or even mid-term, list in December 1997, the Turks have refused even to talk
to the EU about accession, further stalling progress over the divided Cyprus accession
issue. Hans van den Broek, Europe's Expander, ECONOMIST, June 6, 1998, at 54.
28. Stephen Kinzer, Europe's Tie to Turkey Takes a Turn for Chillier, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
16, 1999, at 7.
29. Id. EU officials call it unrealistic to expect the EU to criticize Greece, one of its
own member states. Id.; see Robert L. Pollack, Turkey's Road to Prosperity, WALL ST. J.,
June 3, 1999, at A26 (stating that Ocalan has "effectively admitted to directing a cam-
paign of terror that has taken well over 30,000 lives."); REDMOND, supra note 7, at 46-47
(holding that hypocrisy recurs as theme in human rights and religious issues).
30. Kinzer, supra note 28, at 7. Meanwhile, the EU wanted full discussion of all
issues, including the Ocalan trial, so the dialogue became practically frozen. Id. In
contrast to the slavish enthusiasm in the eastern European applicants, the Turkish posi-
tion seems now to be one of intransigence. Id.
31. Tony Barber, Outlook for Growth in Europe Dented by Double Setback, FIN. TIMES,
May 21, 1999, at 14. This is illustrated by the conflict in Kosovo and a slowed economy
in Europe. Id. Economic indicators show slowdown in Germany (Ifo index) and the
Bundesbank sees no clear signs of expansion in the euro-zone. Id.; see, e.g., Blaine
Harden, The Teetering Balkans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1999, at Al. The Kosovo war has
been reported widely. Harden, supra.; William Ratliffe, Conflict in the Balkans, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 29, 1999, at A23. The Kosovo conflict challenges modern national bor-
ders, encourages ethnic autonomy, and sent thousands of refugees into other lands.
Indecisiveness in European leadership as the continent redefines itself is a key theme of
an insightful analysis in NEWHOUSE, supra note 10, at 3-21.
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degeneration into savage conflict.3 2 The map of Europe has
changed dramatically over the past ten years: twelve new repub-
lics have arisen from the demise of the former superpower So-
viet Union, Germany has re-united, and Czechoslovakia has split
into two parts." Amid the change, much of the future is un-
clear, especially in Southeast Europe. East-West fault lines are
taking new shape, complicated by Europe's reluctance to accept
Turkey and with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the re-
gion. 3 4
Presently, three mammoth countries must be considered
Europe's "big outsiders"-Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine-and it
is entirely unclear where their national and societal destinies
lie.35 Another prominent expert, John Newhouse, ponders
whether Russian weakness could pose a more serious threat to
peace than former Soviet power.36 Russia's current political
stalemate and its machinations over Kosovo suggest an unpre-
dictable future.37 As these enormous ambiguities threaten Euro-
pean stability, the continent is currently preoccupied with EU
concerns largely unrelated to these nations, and the "outsiders"
themselves are struggling with their own transitions in this his-
toric period of change.38
32. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 1. Emerson is a 58 year old British economist, who
worked for many years in the European Commission, authored two influential reports
on the single market and monetary union, was the EU's first ambassador to the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, and is presently in Brussels as a senior research fellow at
the Center for Economic Policy Studies. See also Dick Leonard, Eye on the EU, EUR.
MAG., Jan. 99, at 4.
33. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 213 (remaking of map has been mostly successful-
with bloody exception in Yugoslavia.)
34. See Graham E. Fuller, Conclusions: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World, in
TURKEY'S NEW GEOPOLITIcs: FROM THE BALKANS TO WESTERN CHINA 170-71 (1993) ("Is-
lamic fundamentalists favor a shift away from the pro-Western policy, and the spurning
by Europe could cause policy shifts toward more dangerous Turkish nationalism.")
35. EMERSON, supra note 4, at xix-xx.
36. NEWHOUSE, supra note 10, at 6. John Newhouse is currently a guest scholar at
the Brookings Institution and a consultant to the U.S. Department of State. See Walter
Russell Mead, Europe on the Shoals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1999, at 17.
37. Duma's Dilemma, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 1999, at 13. The Russian Parliament's
May 1999 failure to impeach Boris Yeltsin left a political stalemate. Id. Russia's media-
tion leading to the Kosovo peace accord received scalding criticism from Russian legis-
lators and others, calling it a betrayal of Yugoslavia. Michael Wines, Reception in Moscow
for Accord Is Scalding, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at A7. Subsequently, Washington was
startled by Russian troops boldly seizing the Pristina airport. Steven Erlanger, Crisis in
the Balkans: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1999, at 1.
38. EMERSON, supra note 4, at xx.
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Complicating any analysis of this evolution are the present
economic stagnation and resurgence of ethnic and national ri-
valries in eastern and southeastern Europe, as the Kosovo hor-
rors in early 1999 brutally illustrated."° Russia's intense opposi-
tion to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's ("NATO") mili-
tary action and the surge of anti-Western feeling, amid Russia's
own lessened international position and dire economic circum-
stances, combined to escalate tensions.40
This instability magnifies Turkey's value to the West,41
which causes reconsideration of the European integration para-
digm. This Article suggests that the current EU strategy is out-
dated. Fashioned pragmatically but haphazardly on an arcane
post-war model of Europe, the present perspective is too narrow,
inclusive, and self-serving. Called a "rich man's club ... of bank-
ers and busybodies... with riot on its borders, 42 the EU should
adopt a broader strategy of community building. The better way
to secure the successes of the both the EU and any viable, sus-
tainable European order is to embrace the eager people and
governments to the East, squarely resolving to forge cohesive co-
operation of a "wider European order."43 Inclusion, though
gradual in form and degree, is the key. Europe cannot wait for
the 500 million people on its periphery to meet its economic
standards before bringing them into the general community;
they constitute an inescapable part of Europe. Such a broader
39. Barber, supra note 31; Harden, supra note 31; Ratliffe, supra note 31.
40. David Hoffman, Russian Dispatch of Ships Reflects a Deep Anxiety, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 2, 1999, at 6.
41. See infra Part I.
42. Jason Goodwin, Learning from the Ottomans, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1999, at A31
(recommending that EU advance inclusion of entire Balkan region).
43. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 232. Emerson advocates abandonment of the old
European conceptual edifice, constructed from the post World War II mentality, and
the adoption of a more pan-European strategy designed to infuse systemic coherence
into European economic and political policies, emphasizing inclusiveness rather than
exclusiveness. Id. Emerson proposes a wider European Civil Society, a multi-purpose
European political entity beyond the EU, yet with the EU as its core, that reaches out to
all of Europe, coordinating political, educational, and economic cooperation in various
degrees, and stimulating synergy and ultimately prosperity of a golden age. Id. at 202-
03, 231. Partially driving the movements across Europe is the post-modern ideal of
allowing "the main functions of government to be diffused through the responsibilities
and rules of clusters of international networks." Id. at 6. "And while most individuals
express loyalty to the nation state, more and more of the governments' functions are
devolving both up and down, with supranational and regional devolution seeming both
to be profound tendencies at the same time." Id. at 214.
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strategy cannot be accomplished effectively without the keystone
to the Southeastern arch, the Republic of Turkey.
The EU's inartful rebuff of Turkey's application for acces-
sion represents more than a missed opportunity to strengthen
and deepen the relationship between these two related spheres.
Indeed, the lack of finesse-the unnecessarily impolitic form of
the rejection-propels Turkey in the opposite direction." The
old assumption that relations with Europe were of primary im-
portance is "subject to increasingly critical examination."45 Ac-
knowledging that Turkey may not be ready for accession in the
next wave, the EU should have pursued some less antagonizing
route. The premature decision to begin negotiations with Cy-
prus only intensifies the conflict.
I. TURKEY'S STRATEGIC VALUE TO THE WEST
Turkey's strategic importance to Europe and the West can
hardly be overstated.46 A key aspect of its significance lies in its
central geographical position and its influence in the develop-
ing, volatile crossroads region where Eastern Europe, Central
Asia, and the Middle East collide.47 Any Europe-Asia map and
post-1917 history text adequately illustrate the case for the Re-
public of Turkey's "undeniable importance."48 For years a
"front-line NATO state bordering the Soviet Union,"49 Turkey
44. "[F]rustration with Turkey's limited role in Europe has encouraged Turks to
turn to alternative outlets for international activism in the republics of the former So-
viet Union, the Balkans, and ... the Middle East." Lesser, supra note 2, at 99; see
Stephen Kinzer, Europeans Shut the Door on Turkey's Membership in Union, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
27, 1997, at A13 (warning that such rejection would "strengthen anti-Western factions"
and have former Prime Minister Erbakkan "[appear] more enthusiastic about improv-
ing relations with Libya, Iran, and other Muslim countries.").
45. Lesser, supra note 2, at 99.
46. See, e.g, Reginald Dale, EU Needs To Make up with Turkey, INr'L HERALD TRIB.,
May 5, 1998, at 13 ("It is hard to exaggerate the strategic importance of Turkey. A
unique secular democracy in the Muslim world, Turkey is the southeast bulwark of Eu-
rope and the Atlantic alliance in one of the planet's most dangerous neighborhoods.");
For a Turkish view of its relationship with Europe, see former President Turgut Ozal's
book, GEOFFREY LEWIs, TURKEY IN EUROPE AND EUROPE IN TuRKEY ix (Turgut Ozal ed.,
Eng. ed 1991).
47. Fuller, supra note 34, at 163 et seq.; see REDMOND, supra note 7, at 5 ("The Gulf
war and the strife in Yugoslavia have shown that the importance of the Mediterranean
[region] in strategic and military terms is undiminished.").
48. Aras, supra note 24, at 92.
49. Stephen Kinzer, A Dynamo Redefines Turks'Role in the World, N.Y. TiMEs, July 31,
1998, at A9.
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occupies the mammoth Asia Minor peninsula that directly buff-
ers Iran, Iraq, Syria, and two former Soviet states. "Only Turkey
lies either close to or at the center of most of the gravest threats
to Europe's peace and well-being."5 Furthermore, as the first
secular Islamic nation in the region-more democratic, West-
ern-oriented, and industrialized than any of its neighbors-Tur-
key represents a viable example in the region for modern liberal
government.5 1 Turkey's broad influence reaches military, eco-
nomic, religious, as well as political affairs.52
Turkey's military participation in modern European alli-
ances dates back at least to the nineteenth century, when it was
accepted as a European power in the Concert of Europe.5" Bet-
ter known is Turkey's pivotal role in Western security through
the Cold War, 4 during which Turkey served as an essential out-
post on the edge of Europe, "a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the
Middle East, and a contributor to the security of Europe. 55 Tur-
key boasts a population of sixty-five million people, including
370,000 armed soldiers, more than any other NATO country ex-
cept the United States.56
Today as this part of the world unfolds new governments
50. NEWHOUSE, supra note 10, at 252; see id. at 253 ("Turkey is directly involved
with Israel, Syria, Cyprus, Iraq, the belligerent tribes of the Balkans. ... the newly in-
dependent states of central Asia and the Caucasus and the competition with Russia and
Iran for influence in some of them.").
51. LEWIS, supra note 46, at 357 ("Turkey is the first country with a Muslim popula-
tion which has established a republican regime .... founded a secular society, become
truly democratic, and is industrializing rapidly."); DAVID BARcHARD, TURKEY AND THE
WEST 1 (1985) ("Turkey is the first Middle Eastern and Islamic country to achieve in-
dustrialization within the framework of the nation-state."); see REDMOND, supra note 7, at
19-23 (giving summary description of Turkey's modernization and westernization).
52. Fuller, supra note 34, passim.
53. Lesser, supra note 3, at 99 ("Turkey has been an active participant in European
alliance systems: with France in the sixteenth century; with Britain, France and Italy
during the Crimean War, and with the central powers during World War I.").
54. Fuller, supra note 34, at 165. It is pivotal because of its
strategic location on the southern flank of the Soviet Union, its guardianship
of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, which controlled access to the com-
munist-dominated Black sea.... its explicit commitment to the Western secur-
ity cause, demonstrated as early as the Korean War, in which Turkey fought.
Thus, geopolitics and Turkey's pro-Western orientation rapidly won Turkey a
prominent role within NATO.
Id.
55. Lesser, supra note 2, at xiii.
56. Stephen Kinzer, Once Bashful Turkey Makes Waves Abroad, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 8, 1999, at 5.
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and new international and regional coalitions, Turkey's role has
changed in form and context, but not in significance.17  "The
Gulf War thrust Turkey into the strategic forefront. With the
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the turmoil in the
Balkans, [Turkey] is now poised to play a leading role across a
vast region, from Eastern Europe to western China."" Turkey's
growing presence is magnified by "its centrality to regions of ma-
jor instability and conflagration,"5 9 from Iraq in the south to for-
mer Soviet republics in the north, and from Kosovo in the west
to Armenia in the east. The blossoming of the Turkic world has
restored Turkey to a position of foreign policy clout reminiscent
of previous centuries.6"
As suggested above, stability in the region may be most
threatened by the declining former superpower, Russia, whose
role outside of the expanding and active NATO alliance is unset-
tled.61 In spite of its cooperation agreement with the NATO alli-
ance, Russia's continuing nuclear ability and the "superpower
mentality of its foreign policy elite" breed tension over the ex-
tent of Western influence. 62 Part of the problem is a Russian
leadership vacuum in which political and military leaders have
57. Michael R. Gordon, NATO To Hit Serbsfrom Two More Sides, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
1999, at Al. The end of the Cold War has not obviated security needs in the region. Id.
In May 1999, NATO planned to launch air strikes into Kosovo from Turkish bases. Id.;
see US Planes Hit Iraqi Radar Site After Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, at A6 (explaining
that U.S. planes use bases in Southern Turkey to attack Iraqi radar sites and missile
launchers); see also Tim Weiner, U.S. Helped Turkey Find and Capture Kurd Rebel, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999, at Al (stating that United States "has an increasingly close military
and intelligence relationship with Turkey," using Incirlik base for planes and eaves-
dropping technology for region).
58. Lesser, supra note 2, at xiii.
59. Fuller, supra note 34, at 165.
60. Lesser, supra note 2, at 185. Further, Turkey maintains "significant relations
with the emerging Turkic Republics .... [and] is poised to play a vital role in future
relations between Europe and these republics .... of crucial importance to European
efforts to develop sustainable economic and political ties." Aras, supra note 24, at 92.
Significantly, Turkey's present government has shown itself unafraid to exercise that
clout, as demonstrated in a "newfound assertiveness in foreign policy." Kinzer, supra
note 56, at 5.
61. Russia's Janus-like role in the Kosovo conflict illustrates its frustration: sending
a threatening intelligence ship to the Adriatic one month, then working arduously to
negotiate the peace the next month, which in sum suggests its unease about the West
and distrust for NATO. David Hoffman, Russian Dispatch of Ships Reflects a Deep Anxiety,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 2, 1999, at 6.
62. Michael R. Gordon, Era Dawns as in Europe, Old Foes Find New Roles, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1999, at Al, AlO (adding to stresses from disputes over Iraq, Kosovo, and arms
control). Perhaps Russia's isolation fosters its criticism of the enhanced U.S. influence.
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difficulty planning effectively.63 One German foreign policy ex-
pert observes that the whole region is unstable because Russia is
"in a state of decomposition. " "
The current Russian economic decline, described by ex-
perts as a crisis in itself, adds to the uncertainty in the region,
especially as it affects the former communist countries. 65 Terror-
ist bombings, kidnappings, and other forms of violence in the
southern states of Chechnya and Georgia reveal Russia's south-
ern borderlands as "exhausted and impoverished by wars and
lawlessness since the Soviet Union broke up."6 6 The offer by the
former Soviet republic Azerbaijan-where "foreign powers [are]
competing for influence in the soon-to-be-rich lands surround-
ing the Caspian Sea"-to forge a military partnership and open
a U.S. base, emphasizes the strategic importance of the region
both economically and militarily.67 But it also reveals the volatil-
ity of the region: Azerbaijan is motivated by its fear of advanced
Russian arms flowing into nearby unfriendly Armenia.6" The
chief foreign affairs minister for Azerbaijan commented recently
that Turkish as well as U.S. military bases would be welcome in
his central Asian country.69 Suggestions from Islamic fundamen-
talist groups that Turkey withdraw from NATO only remind ob-
servers of Turkey's strategic importance.7 0
Change appears to be the only constant, as military and se-
Id. at A10. One Russian foreign policy specialist complained that Russia was being
"marginalized." Id.
63. Roger Cohen, Germany Adjusts as all Its Neighbors Turn into Friends, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1999, at A10.
64. Id.
65. Stefan Wagstyl, Outlook Gloomy for Former East Bloc, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1999, at
2. Economic growth remains slowed, with GDP "languishing at 55% of 1995 levels." Id.
66. Celestine Bohlen, Bomb in Market in Caucausus City Kills 58 and Hurts 100, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1999, at A3.
67. Stephen Kinzer, Azerbaijan Asks the U.S. To Establish Military Base, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 1999, at A9 (stating that U.S. oil companies have invested millions of dollars in
Azerbaijan, and this offer could provide United States with its first long term military
presence on territory of former Soviet Union).
68. Id. Again illustrating Turkey's centrality to unstable regions: "drawn into the
volatile new politics of the Caucasus, where Armenia and Azerbaijan are locked in a
seemingly unresolvable and potentially expandable war, where Georgian politics are
highly unstable, and where other Muslim peoples agitate to break away from the new
Russian federation." Fuller, supra note 34, at 165.
69. Kinzer, supra note 67, at A9.
70. Turkey, a Softer Islam?, ECONOMIST, May 30, 1998, at 53. The expansion of fun-
damentalist influence in the region is exemplified by the 1998 Pakistani law granting
the government "powers to impose laws based on its interpretation of the Koran, a big
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curity concerns spill over into diplomatic and political issues.
This entire part of the world is in flux, as some previously un-
thought of, seismic shifts steal the headlines from the more sub-
tle, sometimes equally significant realignments. Former Soviet
satellites, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, celebrated
new membership in NATO in March 1999, 71 while Turkey and
Israel collaborated privately to reconstruct the balance of power
in the Middle East.72 More broadly, the Western European
Union 71 (or "WEU")-Europe's previously inchoate defense col-
laboration-has now invited all Central and Eastern European
countries to become Associate Members, and EU leaders an-
nounced plans to transform it into an EU military force. 74 These
complex changes leave many neighbors with uncertainties re-
garding future relationships and alliances.
To the east, more transition unfolds. Uzbekistan an-
nounced that it is withdrawing from the mutual cooperation
agreement with Russia and the Confederation of Former Soviet
States, apparently concerned over Russia's calls for closer coop-
eration and the stationing of Russian troops in some countries.75
Later reports suggest that Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine are also contemplating withdrawal from the security alli-
step toward creating a new Islamic order." Pakistan Takes Step Toward Koranic Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at A6.
71. NATO welcomed three new members, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Po-
land on March 12, 1999, which is its 50th anniversary, even as the prospect of NATO
going to war in Kosovo was imminent. Philip Stephens, No Time To Party, FIN. TIMES
(U.S.), Mar. 12, 1999, at 12.
72. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
73. Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-De-
fence, Mar. 17, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51, [hereinafter WEU Treaty], amended by Protocol
Modifying Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for
Collective Self-Defence, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 342 [hereinafter WEU Protocol I);
Protocol on Forces of Western European Union, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 358 [here-
inafter WEU Protocol II]; Protocol on Control of Armaments, with Annexes, Oct. 23,
1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 364; Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for Con-
trol of Armaments, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 376.
74. Hartnell, supra note 8, at 226 n.21. At Cologne in June 1999, leaders an-
nounced plans to form an EU military capacity to tackle regional crises and coordinate
strategic planing and analysis capabilities, by incorporating the crisis-management capa-
bilities of the EU. Defense Co-operation Agreed, FIN. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at 3.
75. World Briefing, Uzbekistan, Russia: Dropping Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at
A8. Shortly thereafter, a massive explosion killing at least 13 people and injuring 120
was reported in Uzbekistan's capital, in an assault aimed at assassinating Uzbekistan's
president. Bombs Kill 13 at Uzbekistan's Government Offices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at 3.
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ance, considering it ineffective.7 6 Further reports project insta-
bility in giant Ukraine, as its Soviet style economy struggles to
replace its former weapons production with modern industry,
while its standard of living declines.77
To the south, the Middle East political balance unhinges
temporarily with the deaths of King Hussein and King Hassan78
and the possibility of a Palestinian resurgence. 79 Hussein's pass-
ing will "mark the end of an era, but it may also herald the be-
ginning of a traumatic changing of the guard across the Arab
world."80 Tensions in Iraq between the Sunni-dominated gov-
ernment and the Shiite majority population could heighten after
the 1999 assassination of the leading Shiite cleric and his two
sons at a Shiite holy city south of Baghdad."' Subsequently, in a
rare official acknowledgment, the Iraqi government admitted
that rioting had occurred in March 1999, and accused Iran of
instigating the disturbances.82 U.S. military planners fear a
destabilization in Iraq or a weakening of Turkey, which might
strengthen Iran's position and pose the paramount threat in the
Middle East." Others worry about Russia's possible sale to Iran
of missile technology and scientific knowledge about weapons of
mass destruction.84
In and beyond the Middle East, the Kurdish question looms
76. Georgia: Quitting Defense Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, at A6.
77. Michael Wines, Struggling Ukraine Teeters Between East and West, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 1999, at Al, A4. As the economy spirals downward, threats to re-enter the weapons
market and to restore economic ties with Mother Russia are heard, as Communist legis-
lators block effective reforms for privatization and overhauling the tax system. Id.
78. Change in Morocco, INr'L HERALD T~aB.,July 24, 1999, at 6. Further change with
the death of Moroccan President Hassan in July, 1999, "who earned a reputation far
beyond his region for moderation and reason... [a] longtime behind-the-scenes peace
broker." Id.
79. William Safire, The Phantom Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, at A27.
80. Douglas Jehl, Old Order Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at A5. "For decades
the very durability of Arab leadership has been a steadying force in one of the world's
most volatile regions. Not since 1982, in Saudi Arabia, has power in a major Arab coun-
try passed from one leader to another." Id.
81. Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr was shot to death on
February 18, and unconfirmed reports announced clashes in the streets of Bagdad be-
tween government security forces and civilians. Douglas Jehr, Assassination of Shiite
Cleric Threatens Further Iraqi Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1999, at A8.
82. Iraq Admits Rioting Occurred in March and Blames Iran, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1999,
at A8.
83. An Ancient Tragedy, ECONOMIST, Feb. 20, 1999, at 50.
84. William Drozdiak, START-3 Talks in the New Year, INT'L HERALD TRaB., Dec. 10,
1998, at 1 (explaining that "U.S. officials expressed concern over reports that Iran has
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large, with significant cross-border Kurdish populations-twenty-
five million Kurds in Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey are
"the world's most numerous stateless people"8 5
-restless for
political status. These large Kurdish populations constitute an-
other destabilizing aspect of the volatile Turkish and Iraqi re-
gions." The widespread Kurdish protests across European
capitals after the capture of Ocalan in 1999 demonstrate the
Kurdish political determination for change in the European and
Central Asian political order.
Turkish domestic stability suffered from Kurdish activity and
other conflicts in 1999: "Parliament in open rebellion against
the political establishment, murderous terrorist attacks being
mounted against civilians and the trial of a hated Kurdish gue-
rilla leader approaching, Turkey suddenly finds itself facing
deep uncertainties."8  Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has stated
that "[a] chaos is now awaiting Turkey," as the rump Parliament
session was simmering against the government, and a third fatal
terrorist attack of the month signaled a possible shift of the
Kurdish separatist war from the southeast to the urban cities of
the west.8 9 Later in 1999, the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party (or
"PKK") took responsibility for three suicide bomb attacks, one in
Istanbul that killed eleven, and another wounding the provincial
been able to gain access to critical expertise and technology ... and [has lured] some
scientists to Tehran.').
85. Robert D. Kaplan, Redrawing the Mideast Map, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, at 17;
see Gavin A. Symes, Note, Seeking a Legal Justification for the 1996 U.S. Military Intervention
in Iraq, 19 MICH.J. INT'L L. 581, 584, n.12 (1998) ("The Kurds are 'a non-Arab people
with distinctive linguistic and cultural characteristics and an undimmed national con-
sciousness . . . [who] have lived in a territory straddling present-day Iraq, Turkey, and
Iran for over 4000 years."').
86. Fuller, supra note 34, at 172-73.
87. Alessandra Stanley, Top Kurd's Arrest Unleashes Rioting All Across Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at Al. Some 850,000 Kurds and 3 million Turks live in the EU,
with 500,000 Kurds and 2 million Turks in Germany alone. Turks, Kurds, and the Outside
World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999, at A26; see An Ancient Tragedy, supra note 83, at 50
(reporting that "supporters stormed 21 Greek embassies and consulates, three Kenyan
ones and two United Nations buildings.").
88. Stephen Kinzer, Turkey's Political Turmoil Deepens as National Election Nears, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1999, at All. The war "has cost Turkey more than $100 billion and the
lives of more than 30,000 people over 15 years, tearing the country apart." Stepehen
Kinzer, Turkey's Views on Minority Rights Make a Kurdish Peace Unlikely, INT'L. HERALD
TRm. July 6, 1999, at 1.
89. Kinzer, Turkey's Political Turmoil, supra note 88, at All.
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governor of Hakkari in southeast Turkey.9 °
Observers are taking note of a power shift in the politics of
the region, a developing but unspoken "phantom alliance" be-
tween Israel, Turkey, and the United States.91 A military cooper-
ation pact signed between Turkey and Israel in 1996 has evolved
into "one of the Middle East's most serious geopolitical axes.
9 2
Both the United States and Israel appreciate Turkey for its mili-
tary value, and the three-way trading partnership effectively
moves raw material to manufacturers and then to market.93 In-
deed, the PKK presence in Syria posed an intractable problem
for Turkey until recent military cooperation with Israel changed
the entire calculus of the region, squeezing Syria's northern and
southern borders.94 This pressure dislodged Kurdish strongman
Ocalan from his secret Damascus headquarters, sending him in
flight and, ultimately, in his capture.95
The same geography that positions Turkey so strategically
for military purposes has long offered superior economic posi-
tioning.96 Turkey controls the vital water passage between the
Black and Mediterranean Seas, as well as the land passage be-
tween the Middle East and Europe, including valuable avenues
90. Four Killed in Bomb Blast in Southern Turkey, AGENCE FRANCE PR., Apr. 11, 1999,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, AFP File.
91. Safire, supra note 79, at A27 ("Turks, unfairly kept out of the European Union
by Germany and Greece, see America as making the world go round and Israelis as the
key to American support.")
92. The Turkish-Israeli Affair, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1998, at 57 (stating that their
navies and air forces engage in joint exercises in the Mediterranean, their intelligence
services exchange information, they buy and sell military equipment, and bilateral busi-
ness agreements nurture trade between both countries).
93. See Safire, supra note 79, at A27 (illustrating that trade "boosts the Turkish
economy, which hires Israeli companies to construct power plants, and develop irriga-
tion projects ... [and] the U.S. leans on oil companies to build a pipeline from the
Caspian Sea through Turkey rather than Iran.").
94. Turks, Kurds, and the Outside World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999, at A26 (arguing
that arrangement strengthened both allies diplomatically and militarily).
95. Tim Weiner, U.S. Helped Turkey Find and Capture Kurd Rebel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
1999, at Al, A4. Five months later, in July 1999, another Kurdish rebel leader, Cevat
Soysal, was handed over to Turkish authorities by Moldova. Kurdish Rebel Chief Arrested,
Turkey Says, Iwr'L HERALD TuaB., July 22, 1999, at 5.
96. Archaeologists report evidence of flourishing trade and technological develop-
ment in the copper age (circa. 2500-200 B.C.) and onward, with the Troy of Homer's
Iliad recognized as having been on the Anatolian side of the Aegean. TuiTv. A CoUN-
TRY STUDY 6-28 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1996). For broad treatment of ancient origins
in the region, see LEwis, supra note 46, at 1-55.
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for oil and gas transportation.97 In addition, the headwaters of
the historic Tigris River, pouring forth water that Iraq desper-
ately needs, are also within Turkey's borders.98 Thus, Turkey's
"pivotal resource position, both as a conduit for.., oil ... and as
a source for water for its Middle East neighbors,"99 contributes to
its importance. Ultimately, Turkey's size as a market and a pro-
ducer make it an important member of the global trading sys-
tem. Ambassador Michael Lake, Head of the Representation of
the European Commission to Turkey, noted in 1997 that Turkey
was "the sixth biggest trading partner of the EU, worldwide, with
a total two-way trade of $35 billion a year."100 The Customs
Union between Turkey and the EU came into effect in 1996,
lowering barriers and promoting the flow of commerce, and the
EU became the main supplier of Turkish imports, with fifty-one
percent in 1997.101 Turkey's overall exports and imports grew to
US$74 billion in 1997.102 Many observers express confidence
that Turkey will become "a major regional and international in-
dustrial power. ''a10
Turkey's current Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, explained
his nation's geographic and economic positioning:
We no longer perceive ourselves as a country on the outer
97. Today the same geographical-commercial positioning also includes linking the
oil rich Caspian Sea region to the Mediterranean, as Turkey may offer the safest route
for exploiting these vast oil reserves. Turkey's President Offers His Support for Caspian Pipe-
line, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at A9. Negotiations are under way among a 1999 consor-
tium to build a US$2.5 billion gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, through the Caspian
Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, to Turkey. Id.; see Robert Corzine, US. Is Urged To Step in
to Kickstart Caspian Gas Project, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1999, at 4 (explaining that "[t]he
U.S. favors such an energy export corridor" that bypasses Russia and Iran, which are two
dominant powers in region).
98. Kaplan, supra note 85, at 17.
99. Lesser, supra note 2, at xiv.
100. Press Release, Representation of the European Commission to Turkey, (visited May
10, 1998) <http://www.eureptr.org.tr/english/flash/flash5.html> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal).
101. See Customs Union with the European Union (visited April 11, 1999) <http://
www.foreigntrade.gov.tr/Englishh/EU/customs.htm> (on file witht the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal) (holding that EU's share in Turkey's overall volume of trade was
49.6% in 1997). Germany was Turkey's most significant trading partner in 1997, with
Germany sending US$8 billion in exports to Turkey and US$5.2 billion flowing the
other way. Id. at 9.
102. Foreign Trade (visited April 11, 1999) <http://www.foreigntrade.gov.tr/Eng-
lish/treconomy/balance/2foreign.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal).
103. TURKEY, A CouNTRY STUDY, supra note 96, at 230.
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periphery of Europe. Of course, we are a part of Europe. But
now we see ourselves as a pivotal country in the emerging ge-
ography of Eurasia .... Enormous amounts of oil and gas are
beginning to flow out of the Caspian region. China is emerg-
ing as an economic giant. Goods will soon be moving in huge
volumes around this region. You only have to look at a map,
and to understand the size of the Turkish economy, to realize
that we are in a very new and very important position.' 0 4
This geographical positioning has long led to other connec-
tions. As is often the case, political, cultural, and legal systems
develop through commercial interaction, and the resulting his-
torical links to Europe have been no less than epochal:10 Istan-
bul, Turkey's leading city, was the capital of the Roman Empire
for twelve centuries, previously as Constantinople, later Byzan-
tium, serving as the seat of government for Constantine, Justin-
ian, and the Byzantine rulers that succeeded them.'0 6 In 324,
Constantine first recognized the importance of this area as a
means of linking the fragmented Roman Empire. 10 7 Yet, it was
Justinian in the sixth century who would make the more lasting
contribution to history, through the compilation of classical Ro-
man law in the Corpus Juris Civilis, "the most influential collec-
tion of secular legal materials the world has ever known."'0 8 This
legal masterpiece created a structure and system that would
serve as the foundation for the civil law tradition. 09 This histori-
104. Kinzer, supra note 49, at 9.
105. From the time before Christ was born to the Byzantine Empire, Turkey linked
the classical world to the Renaissance and the modern history of Europe, with "much to
teach us today about the origins and antecedents of our own world." GLANVILLE Dow-
NEY, CONSTANTINOPLE IN THE AGE OF JUSTINIAN V, Vi (1960).
106. MICHAEL MACLAGAN, THE CITY OF CONSTANTINOPLE 74-82 (1968).
107. Constantinople was founded because of its obvious geographical and military
advantages over other possible capitals for the empire. Because it neatly linked the
Eastern and Western fringes of the Roman Empire, Constantinople became the true
center of the Roman Empire. DowNEY, supra 105, at 9-10 (1960).
108. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN xxiii (Alan Watson ed., 1998). Justinian's work
offered legal models for subsequent civil and common law scholars, including Black-
stone and others. Alan Watson, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 97 YALE LJ.
795, 796 (1998). For interesting, concise commentary on Roman law, its connection to
modern law, and role in legal education, see Peter Stein, Justinian's Compilation: Classi-
cal Legacy and Legal Source, 8 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 1 (1993).
109. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIL LAw TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 7-10 (2d ed. 1985). It was to
rescue the older Roman law, cleanse it of imperfect accretions over time, and organize
the result into a useful system. Id. at 7.
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cal legacy and cultural connection with Europe should not be
lightly dismissed.
In the twentieth century, Turkey's connection with Europe
was strengthened with the well-known reforms of Kemal Atatfirk
in the 1920s, 11° aggressively importing and imposing Western
European cultural, economic, legal norms-while vigorously re-
sisting Islamic fundamentalist models."' In the 1990s, "Turkey
retains a strong interest in the European connection for polit-
ical, economic, and security reasons ... [and] the Turkish elite
remains firmly committed to the Western-looking Atatfirkist tra-
dition in cultural and intellectual terms.1 12 Today, the Turkish
people display an eagerness for Western ideas as shown by their
appetite for U.S. foods, films, and music.11
In addition to these connections with Europe, Turkey has
special significance because it is the only secular democratic
state with a market economy in the vast Islamic region. This fact
takes on increasing importance with the current intensification
of Islamic politics in key Arab countries.'1 4 Since its founding as
a modern state, Turkey's leaders have embraced principles of
republicanism and secularism." 5 "Although a commitment to
secularism [is] almost a prerequisite for membership in the
110. More radical legal and cultural changes are rarely found, including proclama-
tion of the Republic, abolition of the Caliphate, introduction of the Latin alphabet,
emancipation of women, and other reforms aimed directly at westernizing the society,
including even banning the Turkish headgear. See LOaD KINROSS, ATATfiRK, THE RE-
BIRTH OF A NATION 1904. Reforms also included enactment of European law codes,
counting calendar years from the birth of Christ rather than the flight of Mohammed,
and the introduction of Sunday as the day of rest, rather than Friday. Dankwart A.
Rustow, Atatiirk as an Institution Builder, in ATATORK: FOUNDER OF A MODERN STATE 60
(Ali Kazancigil & Ergun Ozbudun eds., 1981). The "reformer, prophet, statesman"
would "transform Turkish society ... sweep away a medieval social system, based on
centuries of Islam, and replace it with a new one based on modern, western civiliza-
tion." KINROSS, supra, at 377.
111. "Turkey continues its evolution toward a legal system modeled largely upon
continental European systems." Gotleib, supra note 2, at 671-72.
112. LESSER, supra note 2, at 99. Turkish elite take pride in "being part of a
broadly European culture and Western political orientation." FULLER, supra note 34, at
169.
113. Stephen Kinzer, You Want a Black Olive Bagel? Come to Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 1999, at A4.
114. Fuller, supra note 34, at 167-68. Turkey is a model in the Islamic world for its
"increasingly free market, democratic governance, and secularist outlook." Id. at 185.
115. Named after its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatfirk, the governmental dogma of
Kemalism was founded on the cardinal "principles of republicanism, nationalism, popu-
lism, secularism, etatism and revolutionism." ATATORK, supra note 110, at 16.
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country's political elite, Turkey has experienced several popular
movements of Islamic political activism. The most recent . . .
began in the mid-1980s and . . . has threatened secularism in
ways the republic's founders could not have imagined .... 116
The "most dynamic political movement in Turkey now is the Is-
lamic Fazilet (Virtue) Party, whose appeal to Muslims rather
than specifically to ethnic Turks makes it popular among Kurds.
So Kurdish nationalism and Muslim fundamentalism are fusing
together in Turkey in an anti-military alliance." '117 As Graham
Fuller explains, the religious element cannot be ignored, as Tur-
key's relative success in integrating Islam with democracy offers a
viable example for other emerging Islamic states. 1
The Middle East was dominated by the Arab-Israeli conflict
in this century, but "It]he early 2 1 st century may well be domi-
nated by tumultuous change in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, in which
the stateless Kurds will play the pivotal role.""' Turkey occupies
a central position, energized with modem conflicts: Israelis,
Jordanians, and Turks on one side, with Armenia, Greeks, the
Kurds, Iraq, and Syria on the other.120 From many perspectives,
Turkey's position for leadership amid the moving religious,
political, and economic currents renders it too valuable to rele-
gate to some marginal third tier. In every context, volatility and
uncertainty are only worsened by Europe's further isolation of
Turkey.1 21 Ultimately, European and world peace in general are
best served by Turkey continuing "as a stable, democratic, secu-
116. TuRKEY. A CouNTRY STUDY, supra note 96. The revival of religiously moti-
vated political activity began in the early 1980s, with the organization of the new Wel-
fare Party in 1983, having strong appeal in lower middle class. Id. at xxxi-xxxii.
117. Kaplan, supra note 85, at 17.
118. Fuller, supra note 34, at 168.
119. Kaplan, supra note 85, at 17 ("Act I of the New Middle East ends with a Turk-
ish-Israeli victory over Syria... [but] Act II could be more complex, bloody, and unpre-
dictable . . . because Turkey and Syria are each, in their own way, unstable.").
120. Id. The author explains that
On one side are the Turks, their fellow Azeri Turks in Azerbaijan, the Israelis
and the Jordanians (whose ruling Hashemites have had a long and not-alto-
gether-unpleasant relationship with the Ottoman Turkish sultans and their
successors). On the other side are those who suffered the most historically
from Turkish rule: the Syrian and Iraqi Arabs, the Armenians, the Greeks and
the Kurds.
Id.
121. Especially in the context of today's tension between Muslims and Christians-
in the Balkans, on Cyprus, Germany, and in Greece. FULLER, supra note 34, at xv. Two
million Muslims in Kosovo today and another half million in Macedonia, nine million
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lar, and economically dynamic state in a region that will remain
turbulent for a long time to come."122
II. CONCENTRIC CONFLICTS
The rapidly changing geopolitics described above naturally
reflect many different world influences, working in diverse direc-
tions and on multiple levels. The specific scope of this analysis-
Turkey's unsettled relationship with Europe-likewise implicates
many contributing sources of conflict, some of which are deep
and ancient while others are less severe and modern. Two in
particular combine to dominate all others. The centuries-old
conflict between Europe's Christianity and Asia Minor's Islam 121
and the centuries-old conflict between Turkey and Greece,'124 es-
pecially as manifested today in Cyprus, x25 impose concentric
pressures, broadly affecting international and domestic interplay
in this region. This unusual geographical and religious intersec-
tion exerts forces on the political equilibrium in Europe and
Turkey, generating a synergistic, heightened volatility that com-
plicates the analysis. These two overarching stresses frame the
discussion of Turkey's further integration into Europe.
A. Islam and Christianity
Much of the controversy central to Europe's acceptance of
Turkey emanates from Turkey's Islamic religion and culture. 26
European resistance to the Islamic culture and the Turkish secu-
overall in the Balkans illustrate the magnitude of the issue. Lesser, supra note 2, at ix,
XV.
122. Lesser, supra note 2, at xii.
123. Islam and Christendom have long been contenders, from the seventh century
Islamic conquests, through the Crusades, to the advance of the Ottoman Empire in the
15th century. MOVEMENTS AND ISSUES IN WORLD RELIGIONS 92 (Charles Wei-hsun Fu &
Gerhard E. Spiegler, eds., 1987).
124. The troubled relations of Greece and Turkey in recent decades are the legacy
of their historical conflicts dating from Byzantine and Ottoman times. Some trace the
historical rivalry of Greeks and Turks as far back as 1071 when Turks defeated Byzan-
tine soldiers in the battle of Malazgint, thus starting the Turkish conquest of Asia Mi-
nor. The Ottoman Turks' capture of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople in 1453,
however, ushered in four centuries of Turkish rule over Greeks. TosuN BOHCHELI,
GREEK-TuRISH RELATIONS SINCE 1955 5 (1990).
125. "So bitter is the mistrust between Greeks and Turks" over Cyrpus that even
war cannot be ruled out. The Cyprus Time Bomb, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 1997, at 20.
126. See, e.g., JOHN REDMOND & GLENDA G. ROSENTHAL, THE EXPANDING EUROPEAN
UNION 179 (1998).
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lar government's struggle against Islamic fundamentalism pose
two tensions affecting the EU perception of Turkey.
Turkey's general Muslim character itself may generate the
most pervasive European bias against Turkey. 127 From general
uneasiness over cultural differences, to overt xenophobia and
religious discrimination, the Muslim and Christian worlds often
distrust one another. 28 This broad tension-easier to recognize
than to measure or justify-unavoidably instills a heavy inertia
against integration between the two spheres. The general Euro-
pean uneasiness about Islam will inevitably generate resistance
to the acceptance of Turkey.
Another Islamic tension, more concrete, focused, and in-
tense, causes more measurable and justifiable concerns about
Turkey: the increasing conflict inside Turkey between Islam and
the national secular government. 129 Any assessment of Turkey's
political functioning will include questions about its ability to
maintain a secular government, the fragility of some of its demo-
cratic institutions, its checkered human rights record, and the
repressive treatment of the Kurds. 130 All of these can be at least
partially attributed to Islamic stresses within Turkey's borders.
The strong government measures often used to safeguard
the country's commitment to secular rule, independent of reli-
gious influence, alarm many observers.' 3' Four times in its mod-
ern history, Turkey's military elite have judged state security so
127. See id. (explaining that Europe displays "settled bias toward Muslims and
Turks in particular"). Cultural and religious concerns loom large in Community per-
ceptions. REDMOND, supra note 7, at 31.
128. Data shows that EU citizens have low opinions of Turks. EMERSON, supra note
4, at 19-21. The EU, Russia, and Turkey "seem still today to be acting out the parody of
a Europe divided between Western Christendom, the Orthodox Slavs, and Islam." Id. at
18.
129. The possibility of an Islamic revival undermining Turkey's secular govern-
ment poses an obvious question about its orientation to Europe. REDMOND, supra note
7, at 23, 45-47.
130. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Agenda 2000, For a stronger and wider Union in
E.U. BULL., no. 12.97, 56 (Supplement 5/97), also in <http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/
off/bull/en/9712/i2001.htm#anchOO48> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
131. Concerns about military interventions into politics, restrictions on freedom of
expression, and more can be found in most assessments of Turkey's modern govern-
ment. See, e.g., U.S. DEPr. OF STATE, TURKEY COUNTRY REPORT 1998 1-2 ("intense private
and public campaign of pressure led by the military and the judiciary, with broad sup-
port from several segments of society that view 'fundamentalism to be a threat to the
secular republic.'").
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threatened by Islamic fundamentalism, or Islamic-related
threats, that it intervened in various degrees to install new gov-
ernments able to function effectively and independent of reli-
gious dominance. 3 2 Likewise, the Kurdish terrorist campaign,
imbued with Islamic fundamentalism, has prompted govern-
ment authorities to impose, in endangered regions, martial law
and other restrictions on civil rights.' 33 Well-reported are the
nationwide government efforts to subdue public criticism of its
Kurdish policy, further generating..human rights complaints.
13 4
Former Turkish President Turgut Ozal warned that the Kurdish
problem was "perhaps the most significant problem in the re-
public's history."113  In the overall context, the powerful internal
conflict among Turkey's own people, pitting the force of reli-
gious fundamentalism against protectors of the secular govern-
ment, has presented Turkey with grave challenges.'3 6
Rising Islamic fundamentalism has for some time engen-
dered dissension with the independent rule of Turkey's secular
governments, causing instability in political leadership. 137 One
132. TURKEY- A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 96, at 310-12. Playing the role of
guardians of Atatfirk's legacy, including the secularist program and national security,
top military officers have intervened in what they considered dysfunctioning govern-
ment to safeguard the integrity of the state, in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Id. at xxxii. The
fourth intervention was subtler. In 1997, "the military executed a 'soft coup' as it edged
out the Islamist government." Leyla Boulton, Disgust and Apathy, FIN TIMES, Apr. 16,
1999, at 3. Beginning in 1908, an alliance of the military and the civilian government
developed to combat absolutism by the clergy and the sultanate, a feature that became
part of the modern political culture. BARCHARD, supra note 51, at 16.
133. The Kurdish conflict has evoked deadly terrorism. In 1999, for example, a
suicide bomber-explosives strapped to his body-killed a 13 year old girl and seriously
wounded a provincial governor in the Kurdish region of Turkey. Turkey: Governor Es-
capes Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1999, at A13.
134. In addition to the numerous reports, recent examples include: a Turkish
court in 1999 sentenced 114 intellectuals and human rights activists to a year in prison
for signing a declaration calling for peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict as "separa-
tist propaganda." Turkey: 114Jailed Over Peace Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1999, at A4. In
May 1999, ajournalist was sentenced to 13 months in prison for publishing an interview
with Ocalan. Turkey: Journalist Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1999, at A8.
135. MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDs AND THE FUTURE OF TURKEY 1 (1997).
136. "Turkey's diverse ethnic, religious, and social groups" began challenging the
Atatfirk precepts of Turkish society in the mid-1990s. TURKEY. A COUNTRY STUDY, supra
note 96, at xxvi. The ubiquitous terrorist threat from Kurdish separatists and the trans-
port of illegal drugs through Turkey by organized crime force Turkish officials to bal-
ance public safety concerns with civil liberties and human rights. GOTLEIB, supra note 2,
at 690.
137. Stephen Kinzer, Sturdy Pillar of Turkey's Left Names Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
1999, at A8.
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observer asserts that the emerging Islamic fundamentalism
threatens the foundations of the Turkish state. 1 8 Atatfirk em-
phasized the secularization of the state in his post-World War I
reforms, blaming Islamic and Ottoman institutions for the fall of
the Ottoman Empire.' 9 He replaced Islamic law with European
codes and the Arabic script with Latin letters, all part of reduc-
ing religious power and substituting Islam with Turkish secular-
ism.14° The secularist doctrine, as one of the "Six Arrows" of
Kemalism, was enshrined in Article 2 of the 1937 Constitution
and became entrenched in Turkish law.' Later, the 1982 Con-
stitution amplified Article 2's explicit insistence on secularism:
"there shall be no interference whatsoever of sacred religious
feelings in state affairs and politics . "142
To ensure compliance with the secularist principle, Atatfirk
continued the Ottoman tradition of placing an elite-directed
military in power.' 43 Thus, in addition to the typical modern
democratic institutions, the new republic would have an added
safeguard-a military that views itself as guardian of the state and
thus authorized to step in to preserve Atatiirk's principles.'4
Unlike most democracies, Turkey's military is "perceived to have
the legitimate right and even duty to intervene in politics and
government in the name of the nation."' 45 This fundamental
Atatfirk principle authorizes the military to act as trustee for the
138. Id. (combining with costly war against Kurds.)
139. See Paul J. Magnarella, The Legal, Political, and Cultural Structures of Human
Rights Protections and Abuses in Turkey, 3 D.C. L.J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 439, 442 (1994) ("The
principles of Kemalist ideology-republicanism, secularism, statism, populism and re-
formism."); see also WALTER F. WEIKER, THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY, FROM ATATOfRK
TO THE PRESENT DAY 2 (arguing that Turkey must be free from some backward looking
institutions).
140. Magnarella, supra note 139, at 442.
141. WEIKER, supra note 139, at 222.
142. See Magnarella, supra note 139, at 445-47 (giving brief history of Turkish con-
stitutions). To see the original 1982 Constitution, look at 19 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, TURKEY (Albert Blaustein & Gisbert Flanz eds. 1994).
143. Magnarella, supra note 139, at 442; see also, WILLIAM HALE, TURKISH POLITICS
AND THE MILITARY (1994) (giving detailed examination of role of military in Turkey).
144. See, e.g., State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey, in POLITICAL CUL-
TURE AND DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 261 (Larry Diamond ed. 1993) ("The
armed forces should not get involved in partisan politics, but if the country or the
Kemalist principles are endangered, it is their duty to intervene.").
145. Magnarella, supra note 139, at 448.
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civilian government when parliamentary processes fail.14 6 Over
the years, through coups and other forms of intervention, this
military involvement has become legalized or institutional-
ized.1
47
This legitimized, public role of the military leadership is dis-
tinct to Turkey in Western democracies.148 While military inter-
vention in civilian governments is generally criticized by Western
notions of democracy, the Turkish military has intervened in
emergencies to limit political anarchy and economic chaos.' 4 9
Significantly, civilian rule has each time been restored when the
needed stability was re-established. 15  The military interventions
may be characterized more accurately as "interruptions" to pro-
tect and restore a functioning democratic governmental sys-
tem."'51 Thus, the Turkish public in general welcome the mili-
tary role, 152 and it has been considered a liberalizing force. 153
"[A] mong Turkish institutions, only the military has broad pub-
lic support,... as the public doubts the capacity of politicians of
whatever stripe to manage the country's affairs."'5 4 Commenta-
146. Paul B. Henze, Turkey, Toward the Twenty-first Century, in TURKEY'S NEW GEO-
POLITICS: FROM THE BALKANS TO WESTERN CHINA 8 (Fuller and Lesser eds. 1993).
147. Magnarella, supra note 139, at 449.
148. Along with the distinctive "cult of the founder of the Turkish Republic."
Barchard, supra note 51, at 7.
149. For example, in 1980, law and order problems, an economy in tatters, and a
deadlocked political system led to the takeover. ERIKJ. ZORCHER, TURKEY, A MODERN
HISTORY 280-83 (1994). In 1971, the paralyzed government and violence in the streets
prompted the military to demand an end to the anarchy and call for Kemalist reforms.
Id. at 271. In 1960, there was again political dysfunction, economic decline, and civil
unrest. WEIKER, supra note 139, at 11.
150. The 1980 coup was followed by a return to civilian rule with the elections in
1983. ZURCHER, supra note 149, at 296-99. The 1971 coup was followed by the imposi-
tion of martial law and the continuance of civilian government. WEIKER, supra note
139, at 103. In 1960, the military ruled for only 18 months, "keeping their promise to
return the country to democratic politics as soon as possible. WEIKER, supra, at 11. The
military pressure in 1997 produced no takeover, but after the Prime Minister's resigna-
tion, a caretaker government and elections were planned. Creeping Coup, FIN. TIMES,
June 23, 1997, at 15.
151. William Pfaff, Between Turks and Kurds, A History of Tension, INT'L HERALD
TmB., Apr. 3, 1999, at 8.
152. The military's duty is to prevent fratricide and to extricate the political parties
from irreconcilable situations. ZORCHER, supra note 149, at 253. The military coup of
1980 was met with explosions of public joy in the cities. Id.; see also TURKEY. A COUNTRY
STUDY, supra note 96, at 309 ("The army is always praised, never criticized, and in an
emergency, it is seen as the nation's savior.").
153. Robert L. Pollock, Turkey's Road to Prosperity, WALL ST. J.,June 3, 1999, at A26.
154. NEWHOUSE, supra note 10, at 262.
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tors assert that the military in 1998 was "the country's most pow-
erful force."155
The military's political strength contrasts with the fragility
of Turkey's "weak and fragmented" governments over the last
five years.15 6 Due again, at least for the most part, to tensions
between the rising Islamic political movement and the military's
commitment to a secular government, six different administra-
tions have come and gone since the last elections in 1995. The
military "orchestrated a campaign" in 1997 that ultimately forced
the resignation of the pro-Islamic Prime Minister Necmettin
Erbakan. 157  Subsequently, Erbakan, who had led the Islam-
based Welfare Party until it was banned in January of 1998, was
ordered to stand trial in 1998, on charges of insulting the judici-
ary.158 Erbakan was banned from politics for five years.'59 The
party subsequently regrouped, softened its rhetoric, forming the
Virtue Party, and became Parliament's largest party. 160
Military influence also extends to key security areas, such as
the Kurdish and Cyprus conflicts, and reaches into the public
prosecutor's office, encouraging prosecution of journalists and
politicians who disagree with the accepted policy.161 Further
legal measures to weaken Islamic influences have occurred re-
cently. In 1997 a law restricting religion in schools was passed,
and in 1998 the Constitutional Court banned an Islamist polit-
ical party because it undermined the secularist principle. 6 2 In
January, 1999, a new six-week old political crisis 6 ' finally abated
as a minority government was assembled by a strongly secular
155. Stephen Kinzer, Turks Hope General Will Lead Army Pullout from Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 1998, at All.
156. Id.
157. Kinzer, supra note 137 at A8. Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, the Islamic
leader who angered the military commanders for being too close to Islamist interests,
resigned under pressure after one year in office. Id.
158. Turkey Plans Trial of Islamic Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at A6.
159. Turkey, A Softer Islam?, supra note 70, at 53. The new Parliament reversed this
ban in August 1999. Id.
160. See id. (stating that new Virtue party gained membership of 310,000, 305,000
of whom were not members of more radical Welfare Party).
161. Kinzer, supra note 155, at All. See Stephen Kinzer, Mayor Guilty of Godliness:
What Next for Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1998, at A4 (describing repressive policy).
Henze, supra note 146, at 8.
162. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 72 (stating that this held true even though Islamic
party was largest in country).
163. See Kinzer, supra note 137, at A8 ("The country ha[d] been without a func-
tioning government since Nov.25 [1998]").
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politician, Bulent Ecevit.164 But the new Ecevit secularist-led gov-
ernment was forced to make concessions to acquire its political
coalition support, replacing the strong secularist education min-
ister who had taken a hard line against Islamic schools. 165 Such
tension illustrates the volatility of the religious-secular conflict.
Further examples of this conflict abound: The popular
mayor of Istanbul from 1994 until 1998, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
faces ten months in jail and a permanent ban on public office,
barring further appeal from a recent court decision upholding
his conviction for "provoking religious hatred" and encouraging
Islamic extremism. 166 Erdogan, seen as a possible future leader
of the Islamic political movement, had delivered a speech calling
for an end to the Kurdish repression.1 67 He was hauled before
the National Security Court, "a military-backed tribunal that tries
cases related to subversion, and was convicted of having called
for religious insurrection. "168 The conviction and its affirmance
are a part of the government's military-backed campaign against
religious fundamentalism.16 9
Furthermore, [t]he military officers who hold ultimate power
in Turkey believe that religious fundamentalism has become
a social and political cancer that must be excised if the secu-
lar republic is to survive. They have supported a series of anti-
fundamentalist campaigns, including an unpopular ban of
women wearing head scarves in state institutions.1 7 0
164. Kinzer, supra note 137, at A8. Bulent Ecevit, a longtime political leader of the
left, is regarded as a steadfast secularist and nationalist, who ordered the Turkish inva-
sion of Cyprus in 1974. Id.
165. Stephen Kinzer, Back to the Center of Turkish Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at
AIO. The next election in April 1999, produced stronger support for the Ecevit govern-
ment, raising hope that a more stable government will emerge from the new coalition.
166. A Jail Term Is Upheld for an Islamist in Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1998, at A12;
Kinzer, supra note 161, at A4.
167. A Jail Term, supra note 166, at A12. He faces removal from office and a life-
time ban on public office.
168. Kinzer, supra note 161, at A4. The article states that
Now Mr. Erdogan is Turkey's newest political martyr, the latest victim of a
military-backed campaign against religious fundamentalism. His ostensible
crime was making a speech last year in which he read a verse from a nationalist
poem written in the 1920s: "The mosques are our barracks, the minarets are
our spears, their domes are our helmets and the faithful are our army."
Id. at A4.
169. Kinzer, supra note 161, at A4. Prior to his prosecution, the mayor was ex-
pected to step into the leadership gap opened with the forced resignation of Prime
Minister Erbakan, pushed from power due to his own pro-Islamic political activity. Id.
170. Id.
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The latter reform led to the notorious refusal in 1999 to seat
an elected Parliamentary candidate because she appeared for
swearing-in wearing a religious scarf.17 1 Therefore, it is clear
that the tension between religious fundamentalists, secularist
government institutions, and the military merits concern. The
potential for instability is implicit, with strident fundamentalists
balking at the often repressive regime of the secularists, while
military leaders feel "duty-bound to resist what they view as ef-
forts to pull the country back to its theocratic past."1 72
Islam and the military also play key roles in the Kurdish con-
flict, and again, democratic principles come into question, espe-
cially human and civil rights. 173 Turkish authorities insist that
the Kurdish movement constitutes terrorism that threatens the
integrity of the state, and they insist that the -fighting is either by
Kurdish terrorists or the necessary defense of it. 1 74  Heavy-
handed resistance to Kurdish separatism, even Kurdish identity,
and to free speech on the issue have generated a storm of Euro-
pean discussion.'17
Since 1987, a state of emergency has been declared in the
southeastern provinces with the highest Kurdish population,
triggering restrictive laws in those areas.1 76 Using the authority
of the State of Emergency Law, the government rules by decree
in those areas, and no judicial review, even by the Constitutional
Court, is allowed. 177 These emergency powers prohibit most
forms of assembly and permits broad censorship of the press,
while providing fewer procedural safeguards, including longer
171. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
172. Kinzer, supra note 161, at A4 (explaining that leaders of Islamic groups insist
that they are merely responding to desire of many Turks for stronger religious role in
public affairs).
173. See supra note 76 and accompanying text for broad discussion of political con-
cerns, especially human rights abuses generated by the Kurdish conflict.
174. Aisling Reidy, et al., Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the European
Convention on Human Rights in the case of Turkey, 2 N.Q.H.R. 161, 162 (1997).
175. From human rights groups to the European Parliament. See supra, note 93 et
seq. and accompanying text for full discussion of human rights-civil liberties issues in
Turkey.
176. U.S. DEPr. OF STATE, supra note 131, at 1.
177. Magnarella, supra note 139, at 457. The suppressive laws forbidding Kurdish
cultural expression have been extreme, e.g., sometimes forbidding Kurdish names for
children or using their language in official settings, and the Kurds themselves are
taught that they are merely a sect of mountain Turks. Id. Turkish ideology has sought
to deny the existence of the Kurdish people. Id. at 460.
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detention prior to a hearing.178 Since the PKK began to use ter-
rorism to create a secessionist state in the 1970s and 1980s, Turk-
ish military forces have initiated mass arrests and martial law, re-
sulting in tens of thousands of deaths on both sides. 1 9 The mili-
tary has forcibly displaced noncombatants, failed to resolve
extrajudicial killings, tortured civilians, and abused freedom of
expression in its resistance to the Kurdish efforts.18
Thus, a wide range of European concerns about Turkey's
readiness for integration, from allegations of human rights
abuses to military domination of democratic institutions, stem
from the Islamic pressures innate in Turkey's history and pres-
ent uneasy religious-secular equilibrium. As is developed in the
Resolutions section, the Turkish government's ability to stabilize
and effectively cope with this internal conflict will determine its
progress toward closer integration with Europe.
B. Greece and the Cyprus Impasse"8
The second extraordinary influence on Turkish-EU rela-
tions is the long-standing conflict with Greece, especially as man-
ifested in Cyprus. Against a backdrop of "nearly a millennium of
Greek-Turkish rivalry,"'8 2 the two have fought in the modern era
over Cyprus, sovereignty over Aegean islands, minerals, and
water, and most recently over closer association with the EU.'83
The two countries were at the edge of war in 1974, when Turkey
invaded Northern Cyprus; in 1987, when Turkey threatened to
178. Id. at 458.
179. Id. at 460. Estimates often exceed 30,000. See, e.g., Flora Lewis, Time for the
Peace Preachers To Put Words into Action, INT'L HERALD TRIaB., July 9, 1999, at 6.
180. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 131, § 1; see Lewis, supra note 179, at 6 ("the
Turkish military has completely destroyed hundreds of Kurdish villages and murdered
many uninvolved civilians.").
181. "Impasse" is term used by the Greek Ambassador to the United States in his
description of the modern Greek-Turkish stalemate on the island. Tsilas, supra note 10,
at 1601. While that may be the most appropriate term for the current standoff, the
longer-standing, deeper-rooted conflict in Cyprus suggests more than a temporary
blockage. For more information on the Turkish Ambassador's views, see Nuzhet, supra
note 10, at 1851-1852 (stating that religion is fulcrum of conflict-Greece supports
Serbian Orthodox aggression and other anti-Turkish efforts in wider region.)
182. Rocks, Goats, and Hags, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 5, 1996 (on file with the au-
thor).
183. Leading up to today's armed standoff in Cyprus, the two have actually en-
gaged in armed conflict several times since the 1950s-"over Cyprus in 1955, 1964, and
1974 and over Aegean issues in 1974 and 1976, and . . . in 1987 they were on a war
footing again." REDMOND, supra note 7, at 41.
2000] THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY IN EUROPE 635
drill for oil in disputed Aegean waters; and again in 1996 over
the sovereignty of a tiny islet in the Aegean. a84 The Greek gov-
ernment repeatedly has vetoed closer cooperation between Eu-
rope and Turkey. 8 5 Because Article 0 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union requires unanimity of all Member States to permit
the entry of any new member, Greece has the ability to veto Tur-
key's accession.186 "Greece has adopted a virtually unremittingly
hostile approach to Turkish accession[,] ..."187 and this Greek
attitude has emerged as a dominant factor in developing EU-
Turkish relations.""8 The Commission's first Opinion on Tur-
key's 1987 accession application noted "the negative effects of
the dispute between Turkey and one Member State of the Com-
munity, and also the situation in Cyprus."189 The identity of that
Member State has never been in doubt.
Antagonism between the two countries escalated in 1999,
when it was discovered that Greek officials had harbored the no-
torious Kurdish terrorist leader, Ocalan. 190 Turks were predict-
184. Turkey and Greece on Alert over Islet, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1996, at 3.
185. See also REDMOND, supra note 7, at 39 (explaining that Greece voted against
Commission even preparing opinion on Turkey's 1987 accession application and
more). Greece is still vetoing US$400 million in financial aid promised in the customs
union agreement. Leyla Boulton, Turkish Party Warns on Customs Union, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
22, 1999, at 3.
186. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as
amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinaf-
ter SEA]). The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") was amended by the Treaty of
Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the
European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These amendments were incorporated into the
TEU, and the articles of the TEU were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the
Treaty on European Union, O.J. C 340/2 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 67 [hereinafter Consoli-
dated TEU], incorporating changes made by Treaty on Amsterdam, supra; Consolidated
TEU, supra note 186, art. 49, O.J. 340/2, at 171 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 31 (ex Article 0).
187. REDMOND, supra note 7, at 39. Further, the Greeks have used their power
inside the Community to blackmail Turkey over the Cyprus issue. Id.
188. See NEWHOUSE, supra note 10, at 259-68 (listing general discussion of Greek
factor in Turkey's relations); see also REDMOND, supra note 7, at 40 ("undoubtedly...
one of the key factors.").
189. See Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Commu-
nity, Sec. (89) 2290 Final, Brussels, 18 December 1989 [hereinafter 1989 Commission
Opinion].
190. Stephen Kinzer, Ocalan Capture Stokes Tensions; Greece and Turkey Trade Barbs,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 23, 1999, at 7 (stating that Turkish president calls Greece
"outlaw state" that "should be added to the list of countries which support terrorism
and harbor terrorists.").
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ably outraged that Greece would hide the terrorist, but the
Greeks were humiliated by their government's bungling role in
sheltering and then being unable to protect Ocalan, as the mat-
ter threatened to "worsen already tense relations between
Greece and Turkey."19 ' One observer claimed that, following
this incident, "Greeks have renewed loathing for Turkey. . . ."192
Meanwhile, Turkish leaders reserved the right to take whatever
measures might be necessary for self-defense, and the Greek For-
eign Minister feared that the situation was "spiraling into further
destabilization." 1 9 3
This high-strung tension escalates to concrete confrontation
on the island of Cyprus, where the patron countries support
their surrogate Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot governments
in an armed standoff that has divided the island." 4 The small
island is divided into the Greek-run Republic of Cyprus and the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, "a self-styled statelet rec-
ognized only by Turkey itself," with Nicosia, the island's capital
divided by a U.N. buffer zone separating the two sides."9 5 When
the Luxembourg Summit included Cyprus in the first group of
accession applicants, to the exclusion of Turkey, the politically
and militarily divided island became a magnified reflection of
the ancient Greek-Turkish conflict.
Cyprus's history has been one of foreign conquest, and its
people have never enjoyed a peaceful and stable sovereign
state. 1 96 Because of its superbly strategic location amid the main
191. Alessandra Stanley, 3 Greek Officials Removed over Rebel Kurd's Capture, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, at A10.
192. Alessandra Stanley, Greek Pride Is Stung by Capture of Kurd, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
1999, at A4.
193. Kinzer, supra note 190, at 7.
194. Stephen Kinzer, Greek and Turkish Jets Lead New Round of Cyprus Tension, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 1998, at A5.
195. See Letter from Nicosia, supra note 18, at 99 (stating that buffer zone offers "a
peculiar contrast of barbed wire and beauty ... [with] Venetian city walls . .. [and]
what was once one of the grandest hotels in the Mediterranean .... now the home to
the blue-bereted UN peacekeepers.").
196. See Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 1021 (giving history of Cyprus). Ehrlich notes
that
Cyprus has always been a bloody battleground. It was conquered by Egypt,
colonized by Greece, and annexed by Rome before the first century AD, and
for the next two thousand years a succession of absentee landlords ruled its
shores. The strength and wisdom of their dominion varied, but not their basic
purpose-hegemony over the Eastern Mediterranean by controlling its major
island command post.
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sailing routes between Europe and Asia, Cyprus has long been
the focus of international commerce, cultural interaction, and
political conflict.1 97 Ancient Cypriot records exist detailing oc-
cupations by the Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Vene-
tians, and then the conquest by the Ottoman Turks in 1571.198
The Ottomans allowed the Greek Cypriots self-government and
permitted the Greek Orthodox Church to regulate social and
religious affairs, contributing to the cohesion of the ethnic
Greek population.'99 As would be expected during the three
centuries of Ottoman rule, many Turks settled on the island,
sometimes numbering almost as many as the Greeks. 20 0
In 1878, Turkey granted administrative control of the island
to Great Britain in return for British assistance against Russia.20 1
At the start of World War I, Britain abrogated the agreement
and assumed full claim to the island when Turkey allied with
Germany.20 2 After the war, in 1923, both Turkey and Greece
recognized British sovereignty over the island under the terms of
the Treaty of Lausanne.2 °3 Two years later, Cyprus became a
British Crown Colony and retained that status until indepen-
dence in 1960.204
Under British rule, popular support for Greek unification
grew, and in the 1930s and 1940s demonstrations and even riots
became commonplace.20 5 While "a particularly vocal contingent
Id. Ehrlich recommends the definitive historical source on Cyrpus, in SIR GEORGE
FRANCIS HILL, A HISTORY OF CYPRUS (1949), which is in four volumes. For a more re-
cent, full history of Cyprus, see H.D. PURCELL, CYPRUS (1968).
197. See ZAIM M NECATIGIL, THE CYPRUS QUESTION AND THE TURKISH POSITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (2d ed. 1996) ("It has been invaded, bought and sold, and trans-
ferred from one ruler to another without the inhabitants ever being consulted. The
island has, however, benefitted as a centre for trade and commerce.").
198. NECATIGIL, supra note 197, at 1.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Wippman, supra note 20, at 144. The Sultan received tribute and The United
Kingdom's alliance against Russia, but Cyprus was assured return to Turkish power after
Turkey regained certain territories in Armenia. Id.; see The, Convention of Defensive
Alliance Between Great Britain and Turkey With Respect to the Asiatic Provinces of
Turkey, June 4, 1878, art. I, in 82 ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS 3-4 (1878).
202. Wippman, supra note 20, at 144.
203. Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, art. 20, 28 L.N.T.S. 12, 25 (1924).
204. Wippman, supra note 20, at 144.
205. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 1026. Dating even from 1830, support was shown for
enosis, and this sentiment enlarged continuously culminating in a 1949 plebiscite re-
vealing 96% of the registered voters favored enosis. Id. at 1025-26.
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of Greek Cypriots began demanding enosis, or union with Greece
... , [s] imultaneously many of the Turkish Cypriots made taksim,
or partition, their rallying call."20 6 Greece forcefully advocated
for unification, and "in the 1950s found a new forum, the
United Nations, and a new formula, 'self-determination,' to ad-
vocate her Hellenic dream."217 The question of self-determina-
tion and independence was debated in the United Nations ex-
tensively but fruitlessly, and attempts to reconcile the British and
the Enosists with a new constitution granting some measure of
local autonomy failed. °8 World opinion and continued fighting
pressured the parties to act.20 9
An agreement was soon reached among all the parties-Brit-
ain, Greece, Turkey, and the soon-to-be-created Republic of Cy-
prus-and the various treaties of Alliance and Guaranty known
as the Accords, were signed at Nicosia in August, 1960.210 Unfor-
tunately, the nascent state was not to enjoy the blessings of an
effective, unified polity for long.211 The Turkish Cypriot and the
Greek Cypriot sides erected high walls, maintaining their sepa-
rate subnational identities.212 Each community maintained its
own educational system, its own language, its own distinct reli-
gious culture, and the two sides jealously protected against cul-
tural interchange. 213 Post-independence efforts to erect a consti-
206. Schmidt, supra note 11, at 22.
207. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 1027. The Greek Prime Minister argued in 1954 to
the U.N. Secretary-General that "Cyrpus is Greece itself." Id.
208. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 1026-29.
209. Id. at 1030-31.
210. Negotiations in 1959 opened with the expected polar positions: Greece de-
manded enosis because the majority of islanders favored it; Turkey would agree to parti-
tion, but insisted that it had rights to the whole island, due to its original sovereignty
over the island and Cyprus's proximity 40 times closer to Turkey than to Greece. Ehr-
lich, supra note 9, at 1031-33. The governments of Turkey and Greece negotiated a
settlement in the form of three Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, to construct a con-
stitutional system of balance of power between the communities. Wippman, supra note
20, at 144-45. See generally Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, Feb. 11, 1959,
reprinted in ABRAM CRAvES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN
INTRODUCTORY COURSE 559 (1959); Treaty of Guarantee, Aug. 16, 1960, 382 U.N.T.S. 3;
Treaty of Alliance Between the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey, and the
Republic of Cyprus, Aug. 16, 1960, 397 U.N.T.S. 289.
211. The new compromise government worked reasonably well for about two and
a half years. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 1040.
212. Wippman, supra note 20, at 142.
213. NECATIGIL, supra note 197, at 2 ("There is no intermarriage between the two
communities, who have maintained and jealously guarded their respective cultural and
national heritages over four centuries of coexistence.").
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tutional structure thus were designed to accommodate the dif-
ferent communities intermixed in a single state.214 The
resulting agreements and, ultimately, the Constitution were intri-
cately designed and incredibly detailed 211 to balance the power
and to manage the ethnic conflict between the two communi-
ties.2 16 Greek Cypriots, constituting eighty percent of the popu-
lation, favored uniting with Greece, while the minority of Turk-
ish Cypriots, fearing domination by the Greeks, advocated parti-
tion and unity with Turkey.217 The new country adopted a
constitution reflecting the agreements' principal purpose to es-
tablish a constitutional equilibrium between the Greek and
Turkish interests. 218
Transposing that equilibrium from paper to practice proved
difficult; numerous disputes soon caused governmental gridlock.
When Prime Minister Makarios219 promoted controversial con-
stitutional revisions, civil disorder broke out at the end of
1963.22' A seemingly trivial incident of Greek Cypriot policemen
asking for identity cards from reluctant Turkish Cypriot locals
exploded into shootings and deaths, and the virtual siege of
214. Id. at 17.
215. THOMAS EHRLICH, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND THE ROLE OF LAW: CYPRUS 1958-
1967 38 (Oxford 1974).
216. NECATIGIL, supra note 197, at 17; Wippman, supra note 20, at 144.
217. Wippman, supra note 20, at 144. As would be expected, both Greece and
Turkey promoted the efforts to protect their constituents. Id.
218. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 1033. It was designed to prevent the larger Greek
component from dominating the smaller Turkish community. Id. at 1039-40. At least
one Cypriot official complained that the constitution and treaties were imposed on the
Cypriots by outside powers, ultimately stifling constitutional and political development
of Cyprus as a sovereign state. Palmer, supra note 12, at 431 (citing then Foreign Minis-
ter of Cyprus).
219. Archbishop Makarios, the political and ecclesiastical leader of the Greek
Cypriots, supported Cypriot unification with Greece. Palmer, supra note 12, at 429.
220. Wippman, supra note 20, at 146. It has been noted that
Unfortunately, the spirit of compromise was clearly missing. Greek Cypriots,
convinced that the Constitution conferred disproportionate benefits on the
Turkish population, objected to rigid application of the mandatory... ratio
for filling civil service positions. Turkish Cypriots responded by blocking pas-
sage of important legislation . . . . The resulting governmental stalemate
prompted prime Minister Makarios to propose substantial revisions to the
Constitution that would have diluted the ability of the Turkish community to
block action by the majority. Civil disorder erupted shortly thereafter, just
before Christmas 1963.
Id. at 146. For further examples of the lack of cooperation, see NECATIGIL, supra note
197, at 20-23.
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Turkish parts of the capital city followed.22 1 "[A]fter fighting
broke out on the island,... act[ing] unilaterally under article IV
of the Treaty of Guarantee," 222 Turkey flew warning flights over
Greek Cypriot installations, and both sides, including paramili-
tary groups, prepared for further conflict.223
The violence caused many to retreat to areas held by their
communities, and partitioning intensified with road blocks,
trenches, fortified emplacements, and guards on rooftops.224
U.N. reports show that hundreds of villages, most of them Turk-
ish, were destroyed or severely damaged. Hundreds of people
were killed on both sides, and some 25,000 Turkish Cypriots
were made "refugees in their own country."225 The conflict en-
sued into early 1964, when Turkey threatened military interven-
tion in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots, 226 Pressure from
the United Nations and others restrained the Turks, but the ten-
sion remained, as a Greek blockade cut off Turkish Cypriot sup-
plies.
2 2 7
The United States reacted to the unstable situation, actively
supporting a British proposal to install a peacekeeping mission
to separate the two sides. This measure ultimately was approved
by the United Nations Security Council in March, 1964.22' But
the dispute was too entrenched for the peacekeeping efforts 229
221. NECATIGIL, supra note 197, at 32-33. Heavy firing led to evacuation by the
Turkish Cypriots and the area was secured by the Greek Cypriot forces. Id.
222. Palmer, supra note 12, at 434.
223. Id.; see Wippman, supra note 20, at 146; Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 1044-45;
NECATIGIL, supra note 197, at 34.
224. See Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the Security
Council on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus, UN SCOR, 16th Sess, Doc. S/
5950 of 10 Sept. 1964.
225. NECATIGIL, supra note 197, at 35-37. Anarchy ruled, correspondents witnessed
Greeks burning Turkish homes within view of the police, and the terror spread to other
villages beyond Nicosia. Id. at 37-39.
226. Id. at 39.
227. Id. at 38-40. U.S. President Lyndon Johnson pressured Turkey in June 1964.
Id. at 40.
228. Palmer, supra note 12, at 434-35.
229. Seven thousand peacekeepers established calm on the island, though only in
degree. Wrong acts on both sides led to atrocities: 20,000 Turkish Cypriots were alleg-
edly forced out of their homes and into the Turkish side; the Cypriot government then
imposed an economic blockade on the refugees' camps; neither side allowed free
movement of people between the two sides, and the constitutional balance dis-
integrated, as most Turkish Cypriot officials left or were forced from the government;
ultimately culminating in Greek Cypriot attacks on several Turkish Cypriot villages, fol-
lowed by Turkish air force bombing. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 1051-54.
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to resolve, and continuing conflict prompted negotiations
among all the major powers, the United Nations, and NATO
throughout the next three years.230 In 1967, Greece precipitated
another crisis by "stationing 10,000 Greek troops on the island,
far exceeding the number allowed" by treaty.23' Again, interna-
tional pressure produced a settlement, reducing troop levels and
increasing peacekeeping forces, but the conflict continued to
simmer.23 2 The conflict erupted a third time in 1974 when
Greek officers commanding Greek Cypriot national guardsmen
staged a coup, replacing Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios
III with enosist Nikos Sampson.233 The coup alarmed many, and
leading powers entered negotiations, searching for a way out.234
Commentators noted that,
[t]he situation degenerated when Turkey invaded the island
in response. "With the Turkish invasion, 150,000 Greeks fled
from their homes and land in the north, while 46,000 Turks
fled from the south. The present dividing line, monitored by
the UN, amounts to a Berlin wall, with a complete separation
of the populations. 2
35
Today, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot government insist
that two separate states exist on the island, while the Greeks and
Greek Cypriots maintain that present-day Cyprus is one state
with two components, a Greek majority and a Turkish minor-
ity.236 This divided, armed island continues today to reflect the
hostility between the Turkish and Greek communities, threaten-
ing the accession of both Turkey and Cyprus.237
230. NECATIGIL, supra note 197, at 49-51. At one point the U.S. Sixth Fleet was
positioned between the island and Turkey's mainland to calm the tension, and subse-
quently the Acheson Plan (after then U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson) recom-
mended a compromise enosis with Greece, with concessions to the Turks, but neither
side would agree to the concessions included. Id.
231. Palmer, supra note 12, at 436.
232. Id. at 436-37.
233. Schmidt, supra note 11, at 23.
234. Palmer, supra note 12, at 438.
235. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 72. While Greeks and Turkish Cypriots had been
interspersed throughout the island, the 1974 invasion "radically transformed" the popu-
lation distribution, as thousands of Greek Cypriots fled the northern area. Large scale
population exchanges occurred, and the island was on its way to partition into two
homogeneous ethnic zones. Wippman, supra note 20, at 171. President Richard
Nixon's administration denounced the Turkish invasion, but acknowledged the Greek
cause of it. Palmer, supra note 12, at 438.
236. NECATIGIL, supra note 197, at 108-10.
237. The situation is anomalous. Greece has made clear that it will not allow Tur-
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Major powers share serious concern over Cyprus. Long files
of special envoys usually hover around the island, trying to move
the immovable. In 1996, for example, London, Paris, Washing-
ton, and the United Nations all had special negotiators working
away at lessening the threats to peace.238 In 1998, talks broke
down, as U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke complained that he
had been unable to make progress in three days of mediating
the Cyprus unification issue, observing that Turkish Cypriot de-
mands made "meaningful exchange" impossible. 239 The Turkish
Cypriots had demanded that their country be recognized as an
independent state and that EU membership talks with Greek-
controlled Cyprus be canceled. 24" A month later, conflict
threatened again as the Turkish government dispatched six
strike jets to the Turkish section of Cyprus to match six Greek
fighter planes that had arrived. 24 1 "The six [Turkish] F-16 fight-
ers roared low over both the Greek and Turkish sectors of the
capital ... as well as the United Nations buffer zone splitting the
rest of the island."242
Later in 1998, Turkey became alarmed about Russian mis-
siles en route to Greek Cyprus. 243 Turkey threatened to bomb
any installation of the missiles, and the Greek Cypriots avoided
the conflict by canceling the installation. 244 The European Com-
missioner for External Relations, Hans van den Brock, praised
key's accession until the Cyprus conflict is improved, and Turkey threatens to annex
Northern Cyprus, among other things, if Cyprus progresses as a candidate. EMERSON,
supra note 4, at 73. Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl commented privately
that a divided Cyprus would not be allowed accession. NEWH-OUSE, supra note 10, at
258. The division continues to render Cyprus "a difficult case" for accession in 1999.
Peter Norman, Bonn Upbeat About EU enlargement, FIN. TIMES, June 23, 1999, at 2.
238. NEWHOUSE, supra note 10, at 252.
239. U.S. Envoy Drops Talks on Reunifying Cyprus, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1998, at A12.
240. Id.
241. Politics This Week, ECONOMIST (U.S.), June 20, 1998, at 4. Six Greek F-16
fighter jets and a C-130 transport arrived onJune 15, 1998 at the newly constructed air
base in western Paphos. Greece Sends Warplanes to New Base on Cyprus, N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 1998, at All.
242. Alex Efty, Turkey Sends Jets over Cyprus in Warning to Rival Government, Assoc-
ATED PR., June 18, 1998.
243. Kinzer, supra note 194, at 5.
244. Kinzer, supra note 56, at 5. U.S. and other European countries pressured
Cyprus as well. Id. Even Greece Joined in Criticizing the Greek-Cypriot Decision To Purchase the
Missiles, Cyprus Thinks Again, Irrr'L HERALD TRIB, Dec. 31, 1998, at 6. The President of
Greek Cyprus announced the decision to install the missiles rather on the Greek island
of Crete, from which they could not strike Turkey. Joseph Fitchett, Deployment of Missiles
Is Scrapped by Cyprus, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 30, 1998, at 1.
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the Cypriot decision not to install the missile system, and then
urged Turkey to contribute as well to the resolution of the con-
flict.245 Van den Broek "expressed satisfaction" on the progress
of the Cyprus accession negotiations and "reiterated the offer to
the Turkish Cypriot community.. . to join the Cypriot delega-
tion negotiating EU accession." 24 6
In that same year, Rauf Denktash, president of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus ("TRNC"), suggested that a con-
federation of the island's two parts would end the partition, but
both Greek Cyprus and Greece rejected it. 24 7 Outside observers
believe that the best answer for Cyprus is a double rule under
one sovereignty.2 48 The present U.N. efforts to negotiate a reso-
lution to the impasse involves shuttle diplomacy between the two
sides. This freedom of ideas generally promotes a "set of ideas"
first promulgated through the U.N. in 1992, which includes a
"framework for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation."249
Such cooperation may prove difficult, especially considering
the 1997 Turkish-TRNC joint declaration proposing northern
Cyprus' gradual integration into Turkey, rather than into the
EU .2 " The joint statement denounced the Cyprus-EU accession
negotiations as a "historic mistake" that "will speed up the inte-
gration process between the TRNC and Turkey."2 1 Subse-
quently that year, the two countries signed an Association Agree-
ment establishing a council to frame measures to encourage fur-
ther integration in economic, defense, and foreign policy.2 2
The EU has declared that the proposed integration is "incompat-
245. EU/Cyprus: Union Seeks Gesture from Turkey, EUROPE INFORMATION SERVICE, Eu-
ROPEAN REPORT, Feb. 3, 1999, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, EUROPE file,
EURRPT sub-file.
246. Id.
247. Politics This Week, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1998, at 4.
248. Even Greece Joined, supra note 244, at 6.
249. See UN Envoy to Cyprus Resumes Shuttle Talks, AGENCE FRANCE PR., Feb. 4, 1999,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, Agence France Presse File (stating that U.N. envoy to
Cyprus resumes shuttle talks in 1999 as part of ongoing bid by United Nations to solve
division of island).
250. DIRECTORATE GENERAL 1, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REGULAR REPORT FROM THE
COMMISSION ON PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION, (Nov. 4, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/
comm/enlargement/turkey/rep_11_98/blO.htm> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) part B(1.3) The Cyprus Issue, 5 [hereinafter REGULAR REPORT ON
TuRKEY's PROGRESS].
251. Id.
252. Id.
20001
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ible with international law as expressed in the relevant UN reso-
lutions. 25 3
The TRNC's refusal to participate in accession negotiations
between Cyprus and the EU is also troublesome.254 Although
Mr. Denktash does not oppose accession involving the Greek
Cypriots, he has refused to meet with EU representatives since
December 1997, claiming that the issue of accession involves
Greek Cypriots only.255 The European Commission faults the
Turkish Cypriots' intransigence for the continuing delay in Cy-
prus's accession negotiations, though such a divided polity
hardly represents a fertile ground for integration and harmoni-
zation of any type.2 56
Some have taken the position that accession of a divided
Cyprus will lead to a resolution of the conflict, but others disa-
gree.2 57 In 1999, the Greek Cypriot government proposed de-
militarizing the island with the deployment of an international
peace force. 258 Turkish Cypriots condemned the suggestion as
"political hypocrisy" because it is the Greek Cypriots who are mil-
itarizing the island.259 Subsequently, Greek officials offered to
lift objections to Turkey's EU membership if the EU would per-
mit Cyprus's accession without first requiring a settlement of the
divided island. 26" Days later, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit pro-
claimed at a rally in northern Cyprus that the island could never
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. DIRECTORATE GENERAL 1, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REGULAR REPORT FROM THE
COMMISSION ON CYPRUS' PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION, (visited on Mar. 17, 2000)
<http://europa.eu.int/comm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal),
§§ c.3 & 1.3. The Regular Report on Cyprus noted that "because of the political situa-
tion . .. the 'acquis' (screening) could not cover Cyprus as a whole and... [i]t regret-
ted that it had not been possible to achieve a political solution to the continuing divi-
sion of Cyprus in time for the accession negotiations." Id.
257. Greek Cypriots should not see EC accession as contributing much to healing
the division of their island. REDMOND, supra note 7, at 14.
258. Turkish Cypriots Reject Proposal for International Peace Force, AGENCE FRANCE PR.,
Feb. 5, 1999, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, Agence France Presse File. Cypriot
Foreign Minister loannis Kasoulides recently repeated the request for a NATO interna-
tional force, with U.N. Security Council mandate, and the consent of Turkey, to stabi-
lize the island and allow all Greek and Turkish forces to be withdrawn. Cypriot Accession
Talks To Proceed as Planned, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Feb. 4, 1999 (on file with the author)
("The U.N. has been trying for decades to reunite the island through a bicommunal
federation formula.").
259. Id.
260. Greece Offers Deal for Turkey in EU, IN-r'L HERALD TRIB., July 13, 1999, at 7.
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be reunited.261 Thus, the impasse continues.
III. EU-TURKISH RELATIONS
A. Prelude to Luxembourg
Turkey's historic connections with the European continent
inevitably led to modern cooperation and interchange with the
European integration movement. Not long after its formation in
1957,262 negotiations between Turkey and the fledgling Euro-
pean Economic Community (or "EEC") began in 1959 when the
Republic submitted to the European Commission its request for
association.263 After lengthy negotiations, the EC-Turkey Associ-
ation Agreement (or "Agreement") was signed in 1963 and en-
tered into effect on December 1, 1964.264
The Agreement articulated the purposes to encourage
trade, promote economic development, help Turkey achieve Eu-
ropean standards, and ultimately enter the European Commu-
nity (or "Community" or "EC").265 The Agreement envisioned
the establishment of a customs union between the EU and the
Republic, to be implemented in stages, and an Association
Council to shape the course of the relations among the coun-
tries.2 6 6
While the Agreement served as a model for the Association
Agreements later signed with Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public, Hungary, and Poland,267 critics claim that Turkey's asso-
ciation agreement was hardly a success. 268 Although disillusion-
ment was the eventual outcome, Turkey's reasons for applying
for EU membership were clear in the beginning: a desire to
261. Ecevit Bars a United Cyprus, INr'L HERALD TRIB., July 21, 1999, at 6. Though a
loose confederation might be possible, he explained. Id.
262. The now famous Treaty of Rome, initiating the broader European integration
project, was signed in 1957 and entered into effect in January, 1958. See EEC Treaty,
supra note 186. For discussion of relations between the newly-created EC and Turkey,
see generally, REDMOND, supra note 7, at 23-31.
263. REGULAR REPORT ON TuRKEV's PROGRESS, supra note 250, at 5.
264. See EC-Turkey Association Agreement, Council Decision No. 64/372, O.J. 217
at 3987 (1964). For details of the negotiations and signing, see REGULAR REPORT ON
TuRKVy's PROGRESS, supra note 250, at 5.
265. REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY's PROGRESS, supra note 250, at 5.
266. Id. Financial and technical protocols followed to prepare for the Customs
Union over the following 22 years. Id.
267. David Kennedy & David E. Webb, The Limits of Integration: Eastern Europe and
the European Communities, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1095, 1104 (1993).
268. REDMOND, supra note 7, at 24.
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complete Turkey's orientation to the West; a need to avoid dis-
crimination in favor of Greece that had applied for an Associa-
tion Agreement; a desire to obtain a firm trade agreement that
would attract external financial aid, and even provide an exter-
nal outlet for Turkey's large labor force. 269 Economic difficul-
ties undermined progress toward cooperation in the 1970s, and
political upheaval did the same in the 1980s.
2 71
In 1980, following the military coup in Turkey, the Commu-
nity froze relations with Turkey and blocked the Fourth Finan-
cial Protocol. 271 Relations were gradually normalized following
the return to civilian government after 1983, but the financial
protocol was not approved. 72
In 1987, at a time when the government was optimistic
about Turkey's economic development and integration into
world trade, Turkey formally applied for accession to the EC.2 7 1
Some twenty months later, the Commission promulgated a tepid
opinion, concluding that negotiations should wait due to eco-
nomic and political reasons,274 specifically noting the dispute
with Greece and the situation in Cyprus.275 The opinion recom-
mended that the Community continue its cooperation with Tur-
key, promoting efforts of "economic and political moderniza-
269. Id.
270. Id. Economic crises, and most notably the twin oil shocks in the 1970s,
caused government instability toward the end of the decade. ZORCHER, supra note 149,
at 280. In 1980, the political system fell into gridlock, the economy spiraled downward,
and law and order were threatened, resulting in the military intervention from 1980-
1983. ZORCHER, supra, at 282.
271. REGULAR REPORT ON TuRKEY's PROGRESS, supra note 250, at A(b).
272. Id.
273. Birol Yesilada, The Mediterranean Challenge, in THE EXPANDING EUROPEAN
UNION 178 (Redmond and Rosenthal eds. 1998); REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY'S PRO-
GRESS, supra note 250, at 5. On April 14, 1987, Turkey presented its application for
membership of the Community. REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY'S PROGRESS, SUpra.
274. The European Commission adopted its opinion on the application on De-
cember 18, 1989. It concluded "that it would not be useful to open accession negotia-
tions with Turkey straight away." The European Commission gave both economic and
political reasons. It also noted "the negative effects" of the dispute between Greece and
Turkey and "the situation in Cyprus." See 1989 Commission Opinion, supra note 189, at 4-
8; see also Yesilada, supra note 273, at 178-79 (stating that Turkey's economy lagged
behind EC countries', and human rights and unemployment also posed concerns).
275. REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY'S PROGRESS, supra note 250; see Yesilada, supra
note 273, at 179 ("[T]he Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, the Aegean airspace and
territorial waters, the continental shelf, and the rights of the Greek and Turkish minori-
ties in the respective countries meant that Greeks would object to Turkey's membership
in the EC/EU.").
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"1276 I etion. in February 1990, the Council adopted the Commis-
sion opinion and requested the Commission to further propose
detailed recommendations for cooperation. 77 The Commission
did so in June, suggesting in the "Matutes Package" the comple-
tion of the customs union, and further financial, industrial, and
technological cooperation. 278 The Council did not adopt the
package.279
Progress toward the actual creation of the customs union
proved difficult. In 1994, as Turkey and the EU were preparing
to adopt the customs union, Greece vetoed the plan, thus dis-
rupting the project.28 Although Greece articulated concern
about Turkish human rights abuse, it appeared that Greece
wanted concessions from other EU countries in return for ap-
proval of the customs union.2 8 ' Subsequently, concessions were
granted by the EU, including an expedited timetable to begin
negotiations with Cyprus for EU membership, equal participa-
tion by Cyprus regarding accessions, and compensation to the
Greek textile industry due to increased competition through the
customs union from Turkey.282 After tense negotiations with
Greece, the EU belatedly approved the proposal for the estab-
lishment of the customs union.28 3 In March 1995, the EU-Tur-
key Association Council finally concurred in the completion of
the customs union and intensifying other areas of coopera-
284tion. In December 1995, the European Parliament con-
sented, and the final decision on the customs union came into
force on December 31, 1995.285
In January 1996, just days following the achievement of the
historic agreement, Turkey and Greece caused international
alarm by stumbling into an embarrassing naval confrontation
276. 1989 Commission Opinion, supra note 189, at 8.
277. REGULAR REPORT ON TuRKEiY's PROGRESS, supra note 250.
278. Id at A(b).
279. Id.
280. SeeYesilada, supra note 273, at 181 (causing estimated financial loss to Turkey
of some 400 million ECUs).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. REGULAR REPORT ON Tuiav's PROGRESS, supra note 250, at A(b).
285. TuRKEv. A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 96, at 295. The completion of the EC-
Turkey customs union amounts to the implementation of the main features of the asso-
ciation agreement, as revised by an additional protocol. REDMOND, supra note 7, at 49.
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over a tiny uninhabited Aegean islet, that nearly led to war.28 6
Unable to agree on sovereignty over the atoll, Turkish and
Greek warships circled, and their diplomats threatened the use
of force, as world leaders labored finally to defuse the threaten-
ing situation.287 In September, the European Parliament slowed
cooperation with Turkey, prompted primarily by human rights,
passing a resolution to block any EU appropriations to Turkey
except for those fostering democracy, human rights, and civil
society.288
Yet in April 1997, the EU announced at the Association
Council meeting that Turkey would remain eligible for accession
to the Community and that it would be considered based on the
same criteria as all other applicants. 289 The Commission was
called upon to prepare recommendations for the further devel-
opment of relations between the parties.21' The Association
Council confirmed the 1995 customs union financial agreement,
and a "Committee of Wisemen" was ordained to discuss
problems in the Aegean. 291 The EU continued to support Tur-
key's efforts to resolve its problems and forge closer links with
the EU, but unfortunately the "Wisemen" never convened.29 2 In
June 1997, the outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference
cleared the way for launching further enlargement, and in July,
"[c]oncrete preparations for the enlargement process opened
with the presentation by the Commission to the Council ... of
the so-called Agenda 2000. "298
286. Urgent telephone calls from U.S. President Bill Clinton pulled the two coun-
tries back from war over two uninhabited rocks-four hectares of rocky outcroppings
whose only inhabitants are 12 goats. Rocks, Goats, Flags, supra note 182.
287. Moves To Calm Aegean Dispute, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1996, at 2.
288. E.U. BULL., supra note 130.
289. Id. at 56.
290. Id.
291. Id. Commentators have noted that
The customs union [was] working satisfactorily and provide[d] a sound basis
for the further development of relations between the EU and Turkey. How-
ever, political circumstances have not so far allowed for the pursuit of financial
cooperation and political dialogue, as agreed when the customs union deci-
sion was taken on 5 March 1995.
Id.
292. Id.
293. Giorgio Maganza, The Treaty of Amsterdam's Changes to the Common Foreign and
Security Policy Chapter and an Overview of the Opening of the Enlargement Process, 22 FoRD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 174, 183-84 (1999).
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B. The Luxembourg Exclusion
It has been stated that
If the European summit [at Luxembourg] last weekend ever
comes to be regarded as historic, it is likely to be because of a
historic mistake. Unless matters are put right .... historians
may look at the Luxembourg meeting and judge it to be the
occasion when Europe needlessly offended Turkey, thus in-
creasing that country's sense of exclusion, its ... reluctance
to reform, its awkwardness over Cyprus and NATO and per-
haps its readiness to embrace either Islamic or quasi-military
rule. Not bad for two days' work.294
Resounding reports from Luxembourg repeated the same
themes: "exclusion, resentment, defiance, trouble."295 Critics
feared that the summit had done as much to divide Europe as to
unite it. Indeed, one commentator added that the meeting had
"created a one-country ghetto for Turkey," which had been try-
ing to get closer to Europe for thirty-four years.29 6 Turkish lead-
ers cried foul at the discriminatory result, as only Turkey was left
out of the announced negotiations. 297 Calling for fair treatment,
Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz and others questioned how Bulga-
ria and Romania-countries with less developed economies and
far shorter histories of democracy-could begin EU negotiations
before Turkey.298 Yilmaz declared that those "who want to
change the EU into a Christian Union have won. "299 French
President Jacques Chirac admitted that more should have been
done for Turkey,3 °° and other critics accused EU leaders of mak-
294. The Luxembourg Rebuff supra note 5, at 17. For official recitation of the Lux-
embourg decision, see Conclusions of the Presidency, supra note 4.
295. The Luxembourg Rebuff supra note 5, at 17. See, e.g., Stephen Kinzer, Turkey,
Rejected, Will Freeze Ties to European Union, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at A3 ("Stung by the
European Union's rejection over the weekend."); Barry James, Turkey Is Rejected for EU
Membership, INr'L HERALD TItU., Dec. 15, 1997, at 1 ("Anger boiled up in Ankara ....");
Turkey and the EU, supra note 3, at 74 ("[I] t would be wrong to underestimate what the
rebuff in Luxembourg has done to the Turks.").
296. Unsafe at Many Speeds, supra note 17, at 73.
297. Kinzer, supra note 295, at A3.
298. Id.; see, Emma Tucker, Turkey Dispute Hangs over Expansion Talks, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1997, at 2; Turkey-EU: No Way Out?, TURKISH DAILY NEws, available in 1998 WL
9591661 (stating discriminatory application of Copenhagen criteria: goals during nego-
tiations for other applicants, but preconditions for Turkish candidacy).
299. John Barham, Turks Threaten To Break Links with EU, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1997,
at 2; see Turkey and the EU, supra note 3, at 74 ("A new cultural Berlin Wall is being
erected between Christian Europe and Muslim Turkey.").
300. Unsafe at Many Speeds, supra note 17, at 73.
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ing "an unholy mess of relations with... longstanding Turkish
allies . . . ." "Shameless" and "shortsighted" were some of the
kinder words used to describe the EU's approach. 30 ' Another
critic flatly characterized the selection process as "clumsily han-
dled. 302
Exacerbating the decision to exclude Turkey, official EU
statements cast the decision in naively benign terms. To read
the official Conclusions of the Luxembourg Summit is to see viv-
idly the insensitive treatment of the Turkish application. While
the purpose was articulated that the overall enlargement process
would be "a comprehensive, inclusive, and ongoing process, "303
the plain language of the introductory announcement welcom-
ing the applicants omitted any reference to Turkey:
1.5.10. The European Council has considered the current sit-
uation in each of the 11 applicant states on the basis of the
Commission's opinions and the Presidency's report to the
Council. In light of the discussions, it has decided to launch
an accession process comprising the 10 central and east Euro-
pean applicant states and Cyprus.30 4
Turkey is excluded altogether from the opening statement.
Then, in the following subsection, the sanguine plans for the
coming accession negotiations are set forth for the ten Central
and East European countries and Cyprus-again omitting any
reference whatsoever to Turkey. 0 5 Some twenty-one further
paragraphs of Conclusions detail more aspects of the accession
process before the reader finally arrives at the first mention the
Republic of Turkey's fate.3 06 There the "special" strategy, in its
best light, is unfolded: Turkey requires special assistance from
the EU to make more progress toward the accession criteria
before negotiations may be seriously contemplated.30 7
Even after the initial negative reaction to the decision, EU
pronouncements continued the euphemistic position, typified
by the assertion of Luxembourg's Ambassador to the U.S. that
the EU did not flatly reject the Turkish application, but rather
301. Dale, supra note 46, at 13.
302. A Chilly Wait, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at 23.
303. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 3, at 8, pt. 2.
304. Id. pt. 1.5.10
305. Id. §(a).
306. Id. pt. 1.6.31 at 11.
307. Id. pts. 31-36.
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY IN EUROPE
"did just the opposite. ' ' The Summit, he explained, explicitly
confirmed that Turkey was eligible for accession and went so far
as to articulate a strategy to prepare Turkey for such an entry,
concluding with the parsimonious: "[w] e hope that Turkey will
respond positively to this substantial and responsible pack-
age."309
The Commission's Regular Report on Turkey's progress to-
ward accession maintained the same position:
The Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 con-
firmed at the highest level Turkey's eligibility for accession to
the European Union. The Heads of State and Government
also decided to draw up a strategy "to prepare Turkey for ac-
cession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every
field. This strategy should consist in development of the pos-
sibilities afforded by the Ankara Agreement, intensification of
the Customs Union, implementation of financial coopera-
tion, approximation of laws and adoption of the Union ac-
quis; participation, to be decided case by case, in certain
programmes and certain agencies".... The European Coun-
cil has listed a number of principles which will allow strength-
ening ties with Turkey. The European Council also indicated
that Turkey would be invited to participate in the European
Conference on the same basis as the other applicant coun-
310tries.
The Council's invitation was subject to one exception: Turkey
may notjoin every other applicant actually negotiating for acces-
sion. The context framing this nuanced message of eligibility
undermined its credibility from the start. Former communist
308. Alphonse Berns, Turkey's EU Invitation, WASH. PosT, Jan. 1, 1998, at A24.
309. Id.
310. E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 4. Another example of the lack of forthright
communication that should have preceded any decision was the public statement by
Ambassador Michael Lake, the Representative of the European Commission to Turkey,
just before the Luxembourg summit. Id. Speaking to a business leaders' group in Tur-
key, he explained that the Central and Eastern countries emerging from communism
needed special programs to help them establish democracy and prepare for accession,
while Turkey needed no such special help. Id. He continued that the Commission
would propose a special program for Turkey, digressed into an economic pep talk, then
concluded with the prediction "I believe that the Luxembourg Summit will produce
new gains for Turkey." Id. A few days later, the announcement from Luxembourg was
a much different and clearer message. Press Release, 2-4, Representation of the EU to
Turkey, No. 5, (last visited Dec. 4, 1997) <http://www.eureptr.org.tr/english/flash/
flash5.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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dictatorships Bulgaria and Romania would begin accession nego-
tiations before long-time Western ally Turkey?
The discord erupted immediately. 311 As the Summit ended,
Turkey reacted strongly, rejecting the rhetoric as discriminatory,
declaring that Turkey would "have no political dialogue with the
European Union from now on, "312 and that relations with the
EU would be based only on existing agreements. 3 13 The Turkish
government then threatened to withdraw its EU application and
even to annex northern Cyprus as a part of Turkey itself. 14
Turkish officials also suggested a boycott or a selective tax on EU
imports and possible renegotiation of the customs union. 15
Prime Minister Yilmaz made clear his intention to reshape the
country's foreign policy, no longer interested in pleasing EU
critics. 316 Soon, the government "showed its intention to pursue
political and trade ties independently of the EU by receiving
Victor Chernomyrdin, the first Russian prime minister to visit
Ankara. '317 The meeting produced a US$20 billion gas transmis-
sion deal, and one Turkish leader urged retaliation against the
EU by establishing a joint market with Russia and other central
Asian countries. 18 Yilmaz then traveled to Washington to be as-
sured by President Clinton of the importance to the United
States of such a strategic ally. 19
This anti-European result was especially unfortunate be-
cause EU leaders had labored at length to devise a diplomatic
strategy for Luxembourg that would best promote the goals of
European integration, most notably the major goals of a smooth
advance to a monetary union and future enlargement, without
creating new divisions within Europe.32 ° Unfortunately, the dif-
311. Germany Wins the Day in Luxembourg, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at 2 (stating
that there was discord immediately, but "Luxembourg was, in many ways, a summit that
stored up trouble for the future.").
312. Kinzer, supra note 295, at A3.
313. E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 4.
314. Politics This Week, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 1997, at 4.
315. Barham, supra note 299, at 2.
316. A new approach, means Turkey is "no longer fixated on Europe." Stephen
Kinzer, Turkey Turns Away from Europe Toward New Strategic Relationships, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 1997, at 5.
317. John Barham, EU Tries To Sooth Turkish Feelings, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at 2.
318. Id. at 2 (describing other suggestions of expanded ties with Russia, United
States, and Far East countries).
319. Kinzer, supra note 316, at 5.
320. EUExtends Its Embrace, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at 17. See FRIiS, supra note 8,
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ficulties of bringing so many applicants with such varying charac-
teristics into a uniform plan for accession manifested itself early
on. As early as 1993, all of the emerging democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe had been offered EU membership, though
without specific details about timing or process.3 2 1 In December
1995 at the Madrid European Council Summit, more specific
plans emerged, as Chancellor Kohl proposed that only the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland be included in the first
new accessions, but the majority of member states preferred to
delay the decision until after the 1996 IGC. 22 The Council re-
quested an assessment from the Commission of the applicants'
suitability for accession, and in July 1997 the Commission pub-
lished Agenda 2000, "the longest document in EU history."3 23
The Commission had approached its task with an objective view,
examining the economic and political facts, and then differenti-
ating among the applicants and ranking them as to suitability. 324
The objective data suggested that Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia, adequately satisfied the acces-
sion criteria, and this emerged as the Commission 5+1 model.3 25
The other new democracies, according to this scenario, would
be invited to participate in the coming European Conference on
enlargement and offered Accession Partnership. 326
A different model, proposed by Denmark, Finland, Italy,
at 3-8 (stating that lengthy negotiations preceded Luxembourg, struggling to meet com-
plex demands on Community; in these system transformative negotiations, parties
struggled with issues of past, present, and future).
321. Fts, supra note 8, at 4 (recounting insightfully of negotiating at Luxem-
bourg Summit).
322. Futs, supra note 8, at 4 (sensing German self-interest with trading partners).
323. Id. at 4-5.
324. E.U. BULL, supra note 130; see Hartnell, supra note 8, at 163 ("Emphasizing
the 'neutral and objective criteria' laid down by the European Council at its Copenha-
gen Summit in 1993."). No one suggests that the "objective" view is without some sub-
jectivity. Id. One commentator suggests that the Commission had other motives as
well: e.g., to protect "the depth of the European integration process and the managea-
bility of the forthcoming enlargement process." Fmis, supra note 8, at 6.
325. Fiuis, supra note 8, at 5. Cyprus was the "+1." The frustrations of the Amster-
dam Treaty negotiations demonstrating the Member States' unwillingness to reform
also recommended the Commission's limited approach. Id. And, the Commission's
document gave "cover" to those states who wanted to support applicants for other rea-
sons. Id. at 6.
326. Id. at 5. Though Greece threatened to block Turkey's invitation to the Con-
ference, upsetting the compromise plans. Id.; Lionel Barber, Greek Threat to Pan-Euro-
pean Meeting, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at 2.
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and Sweden, was designed more to promote stability in the
newly emerging Europe.327 Fearing that exclusion could draw
"new dividing lines," they proposed that all new applicants
should be considered together-the "regatta option." 28 As the
leaders prepared for Luxembourg, the agenda had changed
from considering just the Commission's objective criteria to con-
sidering also the stability and divisiveness issue.3 29 Amid conflict-
ing negotiating positions and time limitations, Denmark and
Sweden offered a middle course in which all applicants would be
allowed to participate in the first phase of the new enlargement
process-the screening process-while a later process would de-
termine which of the applicants would begin actual negotia-
tions .33  The Luxembourg presidency finally adopted the Dan-
ish-Swedish screening model, at least partially due to time pres-
sure and also because the group "had to sort out a major dispute
between the Member States over Turkey's position in the en-
largement process." '331 In this plan, all applicants would partici-
pate in the screening stage as a preparation for the beginning of
negotiations, with formal negotiations beginning with the Com-
mission's original 5+1.332
Thus, the summit decided to open formal negotiations with
all of the applicants (except Turkey), but only the 5+1 countries
would be invited to the actual negotiating table.3 To assuage
the feelings of those countries not put on the fast track, the Eu-
ropean Council adopted a French suggestion to hold a Euro-
pean Conference for all Member States and all applicants to con-
327. Fiuis, supra note 8, at 6.
328. See id. (holding that five countries not in inner circle for accession immedi-
ately supported this initiative). Finland defected to the Commission model; Spain,
Greece, and Portugal viewed the regatta option favorably, and it was acknowledged by
many that the peace and stability concerns were central to the enlargement challenge.
Id. at 7.
329. Id. "This model was more visionary, legitimate, linking to the core of the
EU's self-image as a club for all Europeans." Id.
330. Id. Actually, it is a re-packaging of an old Franco-German idea. Id.
331. Id. at 8. It has also been suggested that Greece, Spain, and Portugal favored
the Danish-Swedish approach because it delays accession, safeguarding the Cohesion
Funds from dilution by sharing with large, poorer countries, such as, Poland. Id. at 10,
n.5.
332. Id. at 8.
333. Id. The others would continue their negotiating process, mainly centered on
screening their adoption of the acquis. Id. As they approached more and more compli-
ance, they would be invited into the circle of more immediate candidates. Id.
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vene and discuss accession. 34 As noted above, Turkey was in-
cluded in this European Conference and promised a "special
strategy."
Luxembourg was a "high politics context, '3 3' 5 and for many
reasons the general stability strategy finally adopted after all the
negotiation did not apply to Turkey. Germany and Greece were
key opponents to Turkey's inclusion in the basic model. 33 6 EU
leaders attempted to ameliorate the insult, creating the March
1998 European Conference in London with the principal goal of
assuring Turkey that EU accession plans included Turkey at
some point.3 3 7 But the Turks refused to attend, vividly display-
ing anger over the ill treatment.3 38 Turkey complained that the
decision to exclude it from accession negotiations was inappro-
priate for several reasons. First, Turkey was not evaluated on the
same criteria as the other countries. Second, many of the steps
that the EU demanded of Turkey had not yet been implemented
by the other countries. Third, some of the assessments about
the Cyprus issue and Turkey's infrastructure were exaggerated
and prejudiced. Fourth, many of Turkey's achievements were
disregarded, the effect of which ultimately imposed unaccept-
able political conditions on Turkey.339 The government would
maintain the Association Agreements with the EU, but insisted
that this unfair treatment and mentality would not produce con-
structive dialogue, or a sound and credible basis for future rela-
334. E.U. BULL, supra note 3, at pt. 1.4. This was to be a standing council, meeting
at various levels and various frequencies, to give all applicants a feeling of inclusion,
whether they be on the fast track or some slower course. Hartnell, supra note 8, at 226
& n.213.
335. Fans, supra note 8, at 8.
336. Greece and other EU countries have taken a hard line on Turkey's demand
to be treated on an equal footing with other accession applicants. See Lionel Barber,
Inside Europe, EUR. MAG., Aug. 1998 ("Greece was a key force in the European Union's
decision . . . not to consider Turkey's application for membership .... Meanwhile,
Greece continues to block $416 million in financial aid to Turkey."). At theJune, 1998
EU Leaders' summit at Cardiff, Wales, Prime Minister Costas Simitis of Greece vetoed
plans by Britain and other countries to make a new overture to Turkey. Kinzer, supra
note 194, at 5. The Greek Prime Minister blamed the tension in the area on Turkey
alone. Kinzer, supra.
337. Mesut Yilamz, Ambivalent Turk, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1998, at 60.
338. See id. ("The Turks went into bloody-minded mode. Hence the spurning of
the London conference.").
339. Statement of the Turkish Government (visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http://www.
byegm.gov.tr/TurkeyAnd Europe/govstatementl4dec.htm> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
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tions3 4 ° Commentators have noted that
[m]any [Turks] have mixed feelings about Europe. Most
middle class Turks feel no gap between themselves and the
western world. But the world view of others, not least the
peasants of Anatolia, is shaped as much by Turkey's easterly
roots. Most Turks want to be 'in Europe' for practical eco-
nomic reasons; but they do not like the high minded, bossy-
sounding declarations of the European Union.341
Even more importantly, most Turks believe that the EU's
reaction to them is based on their Muslim faith, and that Eu-
rope's tolerance of atrocities to Muslims in Kosovo and Bosnia
demonstrates this discriminatory view.3 4 2 History shows that
once-great empires, such as the British, French, or Turkish,
often have difficulty suffering lessened status:
The sense of being the heirs of a major world empire colours
both Turkish official attitudes and, to some extent, public
opinion. The question of how a state which in its heyday was
more powerful than any kingdom in Christian Europe was
eventually reduced to "underdeveloped" status has preoccu-
pied many writers.343
In March, the opening meeting of the European Confer-
ence was conducted in London, followed later that month by the
launch of the actual accession negotiating meetings in Brussels,
which set the framework for the process.3 44 Delegations from
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia
were present in six negotiating intergovernmental conferences
between the Member States and the applicants.3 45 Turkey could
only view from the sideline as the process began in earnest. The
Luxembourg exclusion created a "political climate of national
resentment" in Turkey, leaving an unstable situation in this im-
portant nation.346
340. Id.
341. Yilamz, supra note 337, at 60.
342. See id. (including accusations of German condescension and racial arro-
gance). The EU treatment "has sharpened a Turkish inferiority complex." Id.
343. BARcHARD, supra note 132, at 11.
344. Maganza, supra note 293, at 186.
345. See id. (stating that conferences at deputy level were begun on April 23-24,
1998, where specific details of negotiations were agreed).
346. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 72.
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IV. DECEPTIVE DIALOGUE DISSERVES THE
INTEGRATION PROCESS
Many justifications have been proffered for Turkey's "spe-
cial" treatment in the accession application process: some
plainly legitimate and logical, others plainly not; often the dia-
logue has been enveloped with a shadowed vagueness, generat-
ing suspicion and distrust.34 7 Veiled motives and whispered fears
breed further suspicion and distrust. This contrasts with the
goal of today's enlightened European cooperation of trans-
parency and forthrightness, confronting the truth and adapting
to accommodate differences.
Justifications for and against Turkey's further integration
into Europe encompass the full spectrum, as the debate con-
cerning Turkey's accession has been "more extensive than in any
other enlargement discussion, including economic, political,
strategic, cultural and religious issues." One commentator has
said that:
Turkish candidature for the EC raises very large issues which
many in Europe prefer to treat as unrealistic or simply to ig-
nore. Turkey's land area is exactly half that of the old Nine
.... Its population... by the end of the century will be larger
than any Community state .... There are obvious cultural
differences which are far stronger than between, say, Portugal
and the Community; moreover, Turkey, apart from its small
border with Greece, will never be contiguous with the EC. It
is considerably poorer than any of the other Mediterranean
countries that [have joined] .... The implications for the
regional and social funds of the Community are literally un-
thinkable, unless membership is treated simply in terms of
being part of a "political block."34
8
347. Prof. Weiler refers to the "whispering" and "taboos" surrounding discussion
of enlargement. J.H.H. Weiler, Legal Framework: Bread and Circus: The State of European
Union, 4 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 223, 225 (1998). Other scholars suggest that the objections
to Turkey's accession are "hidden" in religious and cultural issues. Yesilada, supra note
273, at 179. Prime Minister Yilmaz complained after Luxembourg that the reasons
posed by the Summit were not the real reasons for Turkey's exclusion, rather that reli-
gious discrimination was creating a new, cultural Berlin Wall. Id. In particular, cultural
concerns are "frequently unspoken and perhaps rather distasteful but nonetheless are
very deeply felt." REDMOND, supra note 7, at 45. As noted in the previous section, the
Conclusions of the Luxembourg Summit are notable for the manner by which the ex-
clusion was announced and for what was left unsaid. REDMOND, supra.
348. REDMOND, supra note 7, at 17-18.
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Another commentator criticized the "dubious reasons" for the
Luxembourg exclusion as "distressingly obvious," including
"fears of being swamped by Turkish immigrants, widespread re-
luctance to accept a Muslim country as 'European,' ill-informed
posturing on human rights by the European parliament, and
Greek obstructionism. ' 349
This broad range of concerns may be ordered and clarified
by classifying them in two abstract categories: first, the more for-
mal, objective standards, such as Agenda 2000 accession criteria
and quantifiable economic or demographic data; and second,
the less formal, more subjective factors, such as culture and reli-
gion, often discussed sotto voce. Public and official dialogue cen-
ters foremost on the first group, leaving the latter often for com-
mentary or private discussion.
Problematically, these diverse concerns often intermix, gen-
erating entirely new tensions. Thus, the discussion of both for-
mal and informal issues simultaneously can create the danger
that emotional fears and prejudices might mask, or even distort
reasonable, more objective analysis. One noted scholar has ob-
served the tendency in times of radical change for emphasis on
dogma and the passion of the historical moment to create an
atmosphere of exaggeration, in which ideology displaces reason
and the challenges of reform can be oversimplified.3 5 0 The cen-
tral tenet of this analysis proposes that Turkey should not be so
hastily shunted away from Europe, and especially not in a con-
text of emotional or furtive reasons, such as its Muslim charac-
ter, its size, or its geopolitical neighborhood. Basing decisions of
such import on emotional and nonobjective motivations would
violate much of the post-war European cooperation ethos.351 Ra-
349. Dale, supra note 46, at 13.
350. MERRYMAN, supra note 109, at 18 (describing intellectual revolution in West-
ern world beginning in 1776).
351. For insightful essays on European citizenship, Enlightenment values, and
more, see J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, in THE CONsTrrUTION OF EUROPE
90-96 (1999). Weiler holds that
The unique contribution of the European Community to the civilization of
international relations ... derives from the very tensions among the state ac-
tors and between each state actor and the Community .... [and] from each
state actors need to reconcile the reflexes and the ethos of the "sovereign"
national state with new modes of discourse and a new discipline of solidarity.
Id. at 93. Challenging tensions between national consciousness and multicultural sensi-
bility take place not only within classical state but also at transnational level. Id. at 324-
57.
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tionalism, fairness, consistency, and openness are essential ele-
ments in the integration deliberations.
A. The "Official" Concerns
The full "official" list of accession criteria is long, developed
over the years as the Union evolved. Typically, discussion of Tur-
key's inclusion in Europe opens with the two traditional criteria
for EU membership: a "European" geographical position 5 2 and
a democratic government."' Additional criteria have been for-
malized since the original treaties elaborated upon the basic
qualifications, most famously at the 1993 Copenhagen Summit:
The candidates' must achieve stability of institutions guaran-
teeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect
for the protection of minorities; the existence of a function-
ing market economy as well as the capacity to cope with com-
petitive pressure and market forces within the union; [and
finally] the ability to take on the obligations of membership,
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and
monetary union.
3 5 4
These so-called "Copenhagen guidelines" represent the first
time that specific conditions were placed on applicant coun-
tries.3 5 5
Further, the newly effective Treaty of Amsterdam "en-
shrined in Article F a constitutional principle that '[t]he Union
is founded on principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms and rule of law.'" 3 56
352. The "European" requirement is directly from the language of the Treaty of
Rome, see EEC Treaty, supra note 186, art. 237, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 92, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1 (Cmd.5179-II), and subsequently brought into the TEU. The term "European" as
it applies to merging land and water is not entirely clear, and the requirement has only
been tested once when Morocco applied and was refused in the 1970s. BarryJames, EU
Spectre: New Version of the Old East West Line, INr'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 28, 1998, at 1.
353. "The effective functioning of democracy is a primordial question in assessing
the application of a country for membership of the Union." E.U. BULL., supra note 130,
at 40. Dual European and democracy requirements are frequent starting points for
Turkey accession discussion. REDMOND, supra note 7, at 18.
354. E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 39. Tracking the language of the Copenhagen
Summit, see Conclusions of the Presidency (Copenhagen European Council, June
1993), E.U. BULL, June 1993, pt. 1.13.
355. Yesilada, supra note 273, at 159.
356. Consolidated TEU, supra note 186, art. 6, O.J. 340/2, at 153 (1997), 37 I.L.M.
at 13 (ex Article F). The Treaty of Amsterdam became effective on May 1, 1999.
Michael Smith, Amsterdam Treaty Will Come into Force in May, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at
3. Several assessments of the new treaty have been published. See e.g., Laurens Jan
2000]
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Accordingly, the Intergovernmental Conference and subse-
quently the Commission have decided that this formal statement
enlarges the Copenhagen requirements to include these princi-
ples.357 This explicit strengthening in treaty form may serve to
impress future members with less democratic histories, and it
may also assuage Member State anxieties.
Commentators have explained that the prospective Member
State must exhibit "a solid democracy, a proper democracy, a
functioning civil service, a real market economy, and a library of
EU rules embedded in its own law."358 The acquis requirement
presents a moving target, as new legislation and new agreements,
such as the Treaty of Amsterdam, come into force and expand in
scope.3 5 9 Finally, an effective administration to implement the
acquis and to administer the judicial system are mandatory pre-
requisites.360 Significant to any discussion of Turkey's compli-
ance is the implicit requirement that judicial processes be in-
dependent.
61
The fitness of applicant countries for accession is but one
side of the equation; new members cannot be brought in until
the existing Union is willing and able to accept them.3 6 2 Adding
Brinkhorst, An Appraisal of the Treaty of Amsterdam from the Perspective of a Member of the
European Parliament, 22 FoPDHtAM INT'L L.J. 85.
357. E.U. BULL, supra note 130, at 40.
358. Hans van den Broek, Europe's Expander, ECONOMIST, June 6, 1998, at 54; Bern-
hard Schloh, Implications of Widening the European Union, 18 Foa DHAM INT'L LJ. 1251,
1251-52 (1995). The "acquis" translates into the "what the Community has achieved"
and thus requires that the body of regulations in the Community must be adopted in
the applicant state. Schloh, supra at 1252-53. "Hans van den Broek, the European
Commissioner for foreign affairs estimated that... the new members must be able and
willing to adopt and implement 80,000 pages of laws." Craig Whitney, Will East Meet
West?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1999, at A10.
359. See Hartnell supra note 8, at 167 ("[A] moving target in the substantive sense,
as well as in the temporal sense . . .including for example new emphasis on the ex-
panding Third Pillar creation of an area for freedom, justice, and security.").
360. E.U. BULL, supra note 130, at, at 44-46; see also Hartnell, supra note 8, at 167-
68, n.230 (stating that 30% of Eastern Europe development funds will be reserved for
institution building).
361. Hartnell, supra note 8, at 168.
362. See E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at pt. 1.13 ("The Union's capacity to absorb
new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an
important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate
countries."); see also id., at 11-15 ("[T]he sheer number of applicants and the very large
differences which they will bring with them, will present the Union with institutional
and political challenges far greater than ever before."). The Community's internal
agenda can dominate over considerations of applicant countries' political and eco-
nomic development. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 267, at 1099.
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new members implicates existing problems in Europe, repre-
senting the "major concerns of the citizens," including high un-
employment, social exclusion, environmental harm, drug abuse
and organized crime, strain on social protection systems, the
structural funds, and the Common Agricultural Policy, many of
which need reform before enlargement.36 3 A workable Union
with twenty Member States will require consensus on key institu-
tional and constitutional changes. 64
1. Political Concerns
Agenda 2000 articulates substantial political concerns over
Turkey's readiness for accession, listing first human rights and
freedom of expression problems, followed by the need for re-
straint in the fight against terrorism. 65 The Commission ex-
presses further concern about the role of the military in Turkish
society and the special role of the National Security Council, all
posing ambiguities over the civilian control of the military and
rule of law.36 6 As discussed previously, Turkey has endured re-
volving governments over the past four years-with seven differ-
ent administrations attempting to stabilize leadership since 1995.
The military has intervened four times in Turkey's modern his-
tory, generally to restore order, raising Western fears about a
functioning civilian democracy. Likewise, the military domi-
nance and strong measures in the fight against the Kurds raise
concerns about an independent judiciary and protection of fun-
damental liberties. Finally, the Commission encourages compro-
mise to reduce tensions with the Greeks in the Aegean and on
Cyprus. 367
Human rights, the Commission's first concern and one of
the most frequently cited,3 68 encompasses many of the other is-
sues relating to democratic government. Turkey's human rights
363. E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 4.
364. Weiler, supra note 347, at 224.
365. E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 56.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See, e.g., REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY's PROGRESS, supra note 250, § A, B, and
C (repeating references to persistent human rights violations and need for human
rights improvement in Turkey); E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 56; REDMOND & ROSEN-
THAL, supra note 126, at 179; Enlarging the Union, The Intergovernmental Conference of the
European Union 1996, FEDERAL TRUST PAPERS NUMBER FIVE 13 (1996).
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record has been "fiercely criticized"369 by the European Commis-
sion, the European Court of Human Rights, the United Nations,
the U.S. Department of State, and numerous advocacy groups.3 7 0
The situation has been monitored by the Council of Europe
since 1996.371 Hundreds of cases have been brought before the
European Human Rights Commission and many before the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights. 72  In 1999, the Strasbourg
court cited Turkey for violations of the Human Rights Conven-
tion in fifteen separate cases. 373 The court also agreed to hear a
369. Leyla Boulton, Turkey Grapples with Opportunity To Clean up Image on Human
Rights, FIN. TIMES, May 3, 1999, at 2. Turkey repeatedly is listed among the traditional
human rights abusers: "such havens of human rights as Mexico, Turkey, South Korea,
and Slovakia." Falkland Islands. Them? They just Live There., ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 1999,
at 32.
370. See, e.g., E.U. BULL., supra note 130. For more information, look at Oren
Gross, "Once More Unto The Breach:" The Systemic Failure of Applying the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights To Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 437, 484 (1998). For
an in-depth discussion of abuses, including judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights, look at I HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT (1999), Turkey, Human
Rights Developments (1999) (visited Apr. 27, 1999) <http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/
europe/turkey.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (discussing
fully allegations of abuse and judgments of European Court of Human Rights); Com-
mission on Human Rights Starts Debate on Civil and Political Rights, Press Release HR/
CN/904 (visited May 2, 1999) <http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) (torture remains problem in Turkey); U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, TURKEY COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998 1 (visited Apr.
29, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/1998-hrp-report/
Turkeyhtml> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (giving in-depth report
on all classes of alleged human rights abuses); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 1998 ANNUAL
REPORT ON TURKEY (visited on May 4, 1999) <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/
ar98/eur44.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); Turkey's own
Human Rights Foundation reports that torture is "systemic and widespread," and simi-
lar reports are repeated by credible groups such as the European Commission for the
Prevention of Torture (set up by the Council of Europe), and the Helsinki Watch re-
ports electrical shocks to prisoners and other inhuman practices. Human Rights in Tur-
key. Rotten, but Getting Less so, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1999, at 46.
371. REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY'S PROGRESS, supra note 250, § B.1.2 (giving full
exposition of Commission's views on Turkey's progress on all accession criteria, includ-
ing human rights.).
372. Magnarella, supra note 139, at 465.
373. Elizabeth Olson, Europe Human Rights Court Challenged by Turkish Cases, INT'L
HERALD TRIB.,July 22, 1999, at 4. Turkey is by no means the only country to be accused
of human rights violations or torture. A balanced analysis must also consider com-
plaints against other European governments, for example the Court's 1999 conviction
of France for torturing a Dutch defendant in a drug prosecution. Craig R. Whitney,
France Found Guilty of Torture, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 29, 1999, at 1. Or the 1999
complaints of gross abuses by the New York City police (including torture, unjustified
shootings, and other abuses). See e.g., Bob Herbert, In America; Protesting Police Behavior,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at 21.
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suit filed by Denmark, alleging torture of a Danish national in
1996, the first time the Court of Human Rights has taken a suit
by a Council of Europe member against another member. 4 In-
depth inquiry shows substantial basis for these concerns, as
the record reveals an ongoing practice of human rights viola-
tions.3 76 One international news journalist recently introduced
her report with the following recitation: "A politician is in jail
for reciting a poem. Trade unionists are detained on their way
to court to identify policemen accused of torturing them. A
human rights advocate is sent to prison while his would-be assas-
sins roam free."3 77 This dramatic depiction reports actual cases
and, though such extremes are not common, a general environ-
ment tolerating human rights abuse appears to exist in Tur-
key. 378
Most of the complaints of abuse emanate from the govern-
ment's response to the Kurdish threat.3 79 Since 1987, a state of
emergency has existed in Turkey's six southeast provinces,
where the government has engaged in armed combat against the
terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party. 380 Estimates of the number of
deaths caused by this conflict vary from 20,000 to over 30,000.81
The PKK had proclaimed its goal as the forcible creation of an
independent state, and it has shown its willingness to use ex-
treme terrorism in its efforts to fight the Turkish government:
The PKK committed widespread abuses as part of its terror-
374. Dane Claims Torture in Turkey, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 1999, at 3.
375. The evidence of serious abuse abounds, including reports of extreme cases,
e.g., 10 unarmed prisoners bludgeoned to death in 1996 by police; 15 teenagers ar-
rested and tortured for distributing left-wing pamphlets in the same year. Human Rights
in Turkey, supra note 370 at 46.
376. Gross, supra note 370, at 443, 484-90 (including references to numerous cases
and reports involving extensive human rights abuses).
377. Boulton, supra note 369, at 2.
378. Id. "[A] climate of impunity... remains the single largest obstacle to reduc-
ing human rights abuses." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 370, at 2.
379. Gross, supra note 370, at 484. For full treatment of this threat to "the very
existence of Turkey" see GuNTER, supra note 135, at 1. The terrorist threat is deadly
serious: for example in March 1999, 13 people died from the fire bombing of a
crowded Istanbul shopping mall-the third fatal act of terrorism in the month. Ste-
phen Kinzer, Turkey's Political Turmoil Deepens as National Election Nears, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 1999, at All.
380. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 370, at 1.
381. GUNTER, supra note 135, at 19 (holding that another 2,000,000 people have
been displaced and 2000 villages destroyed); The Tragedy of the Kurds, ECONOMIST, Feb.
20, 1999, at 16 (stating that more than 30,000 are dead).
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ism against the Government and civilians, mostly Kurds. PKK
terrorists frequently killed noncombatants, targeting village
officials, village guards, teachers and other perceived repre-
sentatives of the state .... The PKK terrorists also committed
random killings, including in tourist areas, in their effort to
intimidate the populace. Late in the year [1998], after its
leader Abdullah Ocalan was detained in Italy, the PKK inten-
sified its campaign of suicide bombings that caused several
deaths and many injuries. 38 2
The Turkish political and military response to this internal se-
curity threat has compounded the tragedy due to its overwhelm-
ing force: beyond imposition of certain quasi-martial law restric-
tions on the press and the free movement of people, extreme
abuses have been reported, such as torture and incommunicado
detention of suspects, and mysterious deaths 383
In 1998, Turkey's most prominent rights advocate was shot
in an obvious assassination attempt, as gunmen walked into his
office and shot him in the arms, chest, and legs.384 Many specu-
lated that the gunmen had ties to security agencies and ultrana-
tionalist groups; the victim, Akin Birdal, had been prosecuted
frequently for outspoken remarks critical of Turkish policies, in
particular regarding the Kurdish conflict and in support of the
382. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 370, at, 1.3. "The PKK has much blood on its
hands." Human Rights in Turkey, supra note 370, at 46. The future course of the PKK
struggle is unclear. Id. PKK leaders announced in August 1999 that they would obey
Ocalan's call for a cease fire and would leave the country (though not laying down their
arms). Id. The Turkish authorities have typically ignored such cease-fires, considering
them "tactical ruses." Kurd Rebels. Heeding Jailed Chief Say They'll Leave Turkey, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 1999, at A8.
383. One political leader explained the stance toward the separatist PKK "We are
ready to improve human rights, but not to endanger the unity of the state." David
Buchan, A Cautiously Mainstream Party, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 1999, at 14. But the line
between proper defense of the state and improper abuse is often unclear. Id. For ex-
ample, some people fear that human rights advocates have been "killed by unknown
assailants believed to be working in complicity with Turkish security forces."
Magnarella, supra note 139, at 465. Human rights advocates allege that over 4000 polit-
ical killings have taken place since 1991, most reportedly Kurdish guerillas and outspo-
ken critics of the state or police. Stephen Kinzer, Fugitive's Arrest Revives Turkish Crime
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at AS. Since 1970, Turkey has repeatedly invoked
Article 15 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953),
which authorizes derogations from the convention's standards. In some circumstances,
an "emergency" situation may justify relaxation of legal process. Gross, supra note 376,
at 439, 486.
384. Stephen Kinzer, Assassination Attempt Taints Turkish Politics, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 1998, at A14.
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Human Rights Association, which he leads.385
The 1999 U.S. Department of State Country Report de-
scribes the government abuses extensively, noting the military's
special guardian role of national security and its campaign
against the two groups deemed to threaten the state: the "reac-
tionaries" (Islamists) and the "separatists" (the Kurds).386 The
principal legal measures authorizing the repressive practices
were the 1991 Anti-Terror Law, with broad and ambiguous defi-
nitions of terrorism, used to discourage anyone whose acts,
words, or ideas could be said to constitute separatist propa-
ganda; Criminal Code Article 312, which punishes incitement to
racial or ethnic enmity; and Article 159, wiich prohibits insults
to the army or other organs of the state. These measures,
among other provisions, are all used to create the environment
of restricted human rights. 387
Human Rights Watch reports in its World Report 1999 that
laws relating to freedom of expression and assembly were en-
forced arbitrarily in 1998.388 Examples of abuse include pro-
Kurdish and pro-Islamic parties being harassed or disbanded, vi-
olent assaults on human rights advocates, abusive police action
and legal prosecutions of demonstrators, writers, and journal-
ists.3 89 Other human rights abuses involve the military's inappro-
priate influence over politics in the country, the use of torture by
police, poor prison conditions, and leniency for those accused of
385. Id. "In the days after the shooting, thousands of demonstrators took to the
streets in Ankara and Istanbul to repudiate the attack and show solidarity with the
Human Rights Association. They chanted "Murderer State!" and carried banners accus-
ing state-sponsored gangs of involvement." Id. In April 1999, the Turkish Supreme
Court affirmed Akin Birdal's conviction for uttering "separatist comments on the Kurd-
ish issue," and he faces three years imprisonment. Boulton, supra note 369, at 3.
386. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 370, at 2. You will also find an in-depth,
occasionally gruesome, description of each category of human rights concern. The
campaign has broadened against mainstream journalists, human rights advocates, poli-
ticians, and business leaders. Id.
387. Id. The current situation is best described as
At present the rights of political association are very much more limited than
in other European countries, and the Constitutional Court has the right to
shut down political parties on a wide range of grounds, some of them simply
administrative or procedural. Discussion of a range of topics-seen as critical
to the national unity or the survival of the state-is explicitly forbidden by the
1983 Political Parties Law.
BAiRcARD, supra note 51, at 15.
388. HumAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 370.
389. Id.
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committing these human rights violations.390
The concerns about civilian rule, independent courts, and
protecting fundamental liberties center around the special gov-
ernmental council and courts that deal with matters considered
threatening to national security, known as the National Secuity
Council (or "NSC"). In its 1998 Regular Report on Turkey's pro-
gress toward accession, the Commission describes the key role of
the NSC in security and political matters:
The NSC is chaired by the president of the Republic and is
composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General
Staff, the Ministers of National Defence, Internal Affairs and
Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air
Force and the general Commander of the gendarmerie. The
recommendations of the NSC are not legally binding, but
have strong influence on government policy. The existence
of this body shows that, despite a basic democratic structure,
the Turkish constitution allows the Army to play a civil role
and to intervene in every area of political life.39
The problem also involves the special State Security Courts,
which adjudicate cases involving subversive activity, especially the
dissemination of ideas subversive of the state, such as insulting
the president, terrorism, and drug smuggling, for example.392
The State Security Courts' special rules of criminal procedure
afford less human rights protection: hearings may be closed,
counsel denied (in extreme cases), and detention may be twice
as long as in normal investigations.3 93 Numerous journalists and
political advocates of Kurdish rights have been prosecuted in
these special courts in conformity with the broad laws prohibit-
ing any insult against the state or incitement to separatism. 94
390. Id.; see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 370, at 1-18.
391. REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY'S PROGRESS, supra note 250, § B(3). This section
is entided "Criteria for Membership, 1.1 Democracy and the Rule of Law."
392. Magnarella, supra note 139, at 454. For a full description of the eight State
Security Courts, their jurisdictions, and powers, see GUNTER, supra note 135, at 14.
393. Magnarella, supra note 139, at 454.
394. Id. at 455-56. Criticizing the Kurdish war has produced "insulting the military
or state" and other charges, which has resulted in convictions and imprisonment for
hundreds of activists, and detention of many more. Id. at 456. "Turkey routinely jails
Kurdish politicians for activities that would be protected speech in democratic coun-
tries." Peter W. Galbraith, How the Turks Helped Their Enemies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999
at A27. "Leyla Zana who was a member of Parliament for a Kurdish party that is now
banned, is now serving a 15 year prison sentence for such offenses as appearing before
an American congressional panel." Galbraith, supra.
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The role of the military, acting powerfully to fight terrorism and
what it perceives as seditious speech, naturally calls into question
the full applicability of the democratic rule of law and protection
of minorities. The special State Security Courts likewise impli-
cate similar issues, including judicial autonomy. The military su-
pervision and potential for political intervention undoubtedly
reverses Western notions of civilian control of government.
Thus, political concerns comprise a broad range of serious is-
sues.
2. Economic Concerns
Economic concerns focus on Turkey's lesser economic per-
formance, its high population growth, and the potential massive
influx of Turkish workers into the European economic sys-
tem.395 In fact, that fear and Turkey's high unemployment rate
caused EU leaders to default on commitments in previous eco-
nomic cooperation agreements in 1963 and 1970, especially re-
garding the free movement of workers.396 More recently, the
Commission's assessment in Agenda 2000 recognized the pro-
gress gained in Turkey's developing economy, but it also raised
more fully the economic problems inherent in further integra-
tion with Europe.397
Agenda 2000 acknowledges the magnitude of Turkey's
trade with the EU, estimated at US$27 billion dollars in 1996,
especially following the implementation of the customs union.398
The Commission concluded that the customs union is "working
satisfactorily and provides a sound basis for further development
between the EU and Turkey. '3 99 The report continues that, in
spite of political difficulties, the success of the customs union
"has demonstrated the Turkish economy's ability to cope with
the competitive challenge of free trade in manufactured goods,
395. TuRKEY. A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 96, at 285. For full, updated economic
analysis of Turkey, see INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, STAFF COUNTRY REPORT No. 98/
104, TURKEY- RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND SELECTED ISSUES (1998), and OR-
GANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC SURVEY OF TUR-
KEY, JUNE 1997, Executive Summary (visited May 13, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/eco/
surv/esu-tur.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
396. Yesilada, supra note 273, at 180. Unemployment stood at 6.0% in 1996 and
increased to 6.4% in 1997. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 395, at 15.
397. E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 56.
398. Id.
399. Id.
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as well as the trade, competition, and intellectual property com-
ponents of the acquis commaunitaire."400
Balancing that favorable review is Agenda 2000's recitation
of the needs for further economic development. In particular,
"macroeconomic instability continues to give cause for con-
cern." 4 1 Citing specifically the difficulty Turkey has exper-
ienced over the past decade with inflation, public spending defi-
cits, and currency depreciation, the report calls for structural im-
provements, such as improved tax collection, the restructuring
and privatization of public sector enterprises, reform of the so-
cial security system, and review of public expenditures. 40 2 1999
reports specify pension reform as one of the most important.4°3
Further, efforts are needed to improve social cohesion, modern-
ize agriculture, and invest more in infrastructure and human
capital.40 4
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment's ("OECD") latest evaluation of the Turkish economy not
only validates these conclusions, acknowledging the size and
growth of the Turkish economy, but also cites chronic deficits
and high inflation, amid growing macroeconomic imbalances.40 5
That survey also recommended reforms similar to those in
Agenda 2000, including creation of a more effective and equita-
ble tax system, more spending on infrastructure and human cap-
ital, improving the social security funding and administration,
and finally streamlining state-owned enterprises for efficiency
and further privatization of government owned enterprises.40 6
Additional evidence of Turkey's economic performance was
published in the most recent annual report by the International
400. Id. "However political circumstances have not so far allowed for the pursuit
of financial cooperation and political dialogue," as intended when the customs union
was agreed upon. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. See David Buchan, Cross-purposes Cramp Dialogue, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 1999, at
14 (explaining that women can draw pensions at 38 and men at 42). "This is nonsense
when the life expectancy in Turkey is now 69 for men and 74 for women." Id. Recently
recommended reforms include regulating the banking sector, reducing soft agricul-
tural credit to state banks, reducing farm price supports, and slashing the social security
deficit. Id.
404. E.U. BULL, supra note 130, at 56.
405. ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note
395.
406. Id. at 5-8.
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Monetary Fund (or "IMF"). The IMF cites Turkey's economic
accomplishments as a seven percent growth in gross national
product (or "GNP") for the years 1995-97, a reduction in infla-
tion to fifty percent in 1998, and substantial wage increases in
both the public and the private sectors.4 °7 Additionally, specific
sectors of the Turkish economy experienced significant growth
during this same time period: private manufacturing was up by
14.2%, industry by 10.4%, and trade services by 11.1%.408
Inflation has presented a major economic problem, since at
least the early 197 0s, and has for some time tended to increase
sharply and then stabilize at high plateaus following economic
crises.4 09 Inflation increased from 79.8% in 1996 to 99.1% in
1997 due to a 117% increase in food prices.41° "Persistent public
sector deficits, entrenched inflationary expectations, and an ac-
commodating monetary policy are at the heart of the inflation-
ary process" in Turkey.411
Another key concern raised by the Union is the potential
impact of opening the internal market gates to Turkey's vast ag-
ricultural and labor resources.41 2 Typical of the fears expressed
about the influx is German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's
recent prediction that the accession of large agricultural-produc-
ing countries could cause "the system [to] explode."413 The
movement of workers from Turkey to the EU has also contrib-
uted to this concern.414 Since the 1960s, when large numbers of
Turkish guest workers solved Germany's labor shortage, this fric-
tion has been exacerbated by high Turkish birth rates-in Tur-
407. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 395, at 6.
408. Id. at 7.
409. Id. at at 12-13. Inflation remained at 40% for the period 1981-87, rose after
the 1988 crisis and stabilized at 65%. Id. It increased again following the 1994 crisis
and settled at the 85% mark after the crisis subsided. Id.
410. Id. Consumption has increased dramatically in Turkey in the past several
years due mainly to the increase in private and public sector wages. Id. Some fear that
this dramatic increase in consumption will give way to further inflation. Id.
411. Id.
412. E.U. BULL, supra note 130, at 58. Agriculture remains the central economic
argument against allowing Turkey to join the European Union. REGULAR REPORT ON
TURKEY's PROGRESS, supra note 250, § 2.3. Turkey's accession would enlarge its usable
farm area by 22%, its number of farms by 41%, and almost double the number of farm
workers. REDMOND, supra note 7, at 34.
413. Roger Cohen, Germany's Pragmatic Ex-Radical Thinks Globally, N.Y. TIMES, Janu-
ary 28, 1999, at A3 (referring specifically to Poland).
414. REDMOND, supra note 7, at 36.
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key and in the EU.4 1
5
Large numbers of farmers in the applicant countries and
continued supportive subsidies for such expansive farming sec-
tors pose serious questions of the feasibility of full integration.41 6
This is especially true for Turkey where, "although agriculture's
share of GNP fell from 33% in 1968 to 14% in 1996, the sector
still accounts for 42% of the active population (of workers).,,417
"Turkey would qualify for 5.4 billion ECU's from the EU budget
as regional aid."418  Similarly, German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder has expressed concern over the "low-paid labor from
the East, and.., about how much Germany will have to pay..."
toward new additions to the Union.419  Germany contributes
about US$25 billion to the EU annual budget of US$100 billion,
of which nearly half is spent on farm programs, "probably [the
budget's] most politically sensitive component."42° And, recent
strikes by radical farmers in Poland illustrate the turmoil when
increased imports cause agricultural prices to fall below previous
low levels.421 The concern of Turkish workers flooding the Eu-
ropean labor market is heightened by the increase in the
number of actively employed workers in Turkey. 422 The assimila-
tion of so many poor immigrants traveling into the West seeking
jobs that do not exist, and lowering wages beyond sustainable
415. Id. This is particularly true when contrasted with the declining birth rate in
Germany and other EU countries. Id.
416. The looming problem, of course, is the integration of so many East European
farmers, for example, from Poland where farm workers represent 25% of the popula-
tion, and still keep the budget intact. Michael Smith, Brussels in Triumphal Mood After
Deal on Farm Aid Regime, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1999, at 2. The costs of integrating so
many farmers into the agricultural market-so supported (by US$44 billion in 1998)
and protected-are imposing. Whitney, supra note 358, at A10.
417. REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY'S PROGRESS, supra note 250, at 1, § 2.3. This is
because the vast majority of farmers produce only for themselves and not sell at market.
Id.
418. Yesilada, supra note 273, at 180. For fuller description of expected economic
costs of Turkey joining the EU, see REDMOND, supra note 7, at 38-39.
419. Roy Denman, EU's Journey to the Future Might Take Much Longer, INT'L HERALD
TmuB., Nov. 11, 1999, at 8 (reviewing Member States' attitudes about enlargement sug-
gests delay).
420. Edmund L. Andrews, No Agreement on Reducing Europe Farm Subsidies. N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at BI.
421. Poland Opens Talks with Bitter Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999, at A5. Farmers
caused disruption by blocking some 100 roads "to press demands for Government subsi-
dies and an end to cheap imports." Id.
422. REGULAR REPORT ON TuRKE's PROGRESS, supra note 250, at 2. "Total employ-
ment rose from 19.7 million in 1993 to 21.9 million in 1997." Id.
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levels, alarms some observers.423
Exacerbating this fear is the expected increase in number of
active workers in Turkey over the coming years due to Turkey's
high population growth, the young age of the population, and
an increase in the number of women in the labor market.
424
Furthermore, workers in Turkey retire at an early age due to
generous social security retirement benefits. 425 Taken together,
these factors imply that the number of active workers in Turkey
will increase for the foreseeable future, and coping with that in-
crease would pose a serious challenge for the EU.42 6
These practical problems relating to agriculture illustrate
the need for fundamental reform of the Common Agricultural
Policy ("CAP") in the EU to accommodate the reality of markets
and the modem abilities of many farmers to produce agricul-
tural products.427 Volumes have been printed about the need
for institutional reform in the EU, especially including the
CAP.428 The CAP is described by some as one of "the world's
most protectionist farm aid regimes."429 In the 1950s, the goal of
the CAP was to support the French farmers while opening
French markets to German industry.43 0 As envisioned by the EU,
the CAP was to be a small subsidy to encourage trade among
423. The deaths of three Kurdish protestors in Berlin following the Ocalan cap-
ture deepens the "intense debate in Germany over the large number of foreigners"
there and feeds the uneasiness. Roger Cohen, 3 Kurds Shot Dead by Israeli Guards at
Berlin Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at A8. Approximately two million Turks and
one half million Kurds live in Germany in 1999. Id.
424. REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY's PROGRESS, supra note 250, § 2.2, Economic Cri-
teria at 1- 2. Turkey has an average 1.6% annual increase in its population. Id. Thirty-
three percent of the population is under 14 years of age. Id. Additionally, women can
be expected to increase in the labor market as they are more able to obtain education.
Id.
425. Id. at 2. Just over half the workers in Turkey are covered by the social security
system. Id.
426. Id. at 3.
427. E.U. BULL, supra note 130, at 27-29. "The European Union's Common Agri-
culture Policy is responsible for 85 per cent of the world's agriculture subsidies." Nancy
Dunne, Washington Takes Aim at EU Agriculture Policy, FIN. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at A6.
428. See E.U. BULL, supra note 130, at 28; Agenda 1999, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 1998,
at 16; for the Turkish context, see REDMOND, supra note 7, at 34-36 (explaining uncer-
tainties involved with Turkish entrance to Common Agriculture Policy ("CAP") and
pressures to reform CAP).
429. Smith, supra note 415, at 2. U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky
calls the CAP as an "immense and unfair" subsidy scheme. Dunne, supra note 427, at
A6.
430. Whitney, supra note 358, at A10.
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partners, but it has, since that time, ballooned into a subsidy that
consumes nearly half of the EU budget.431 Without reform in
CAP, the regional infrastructure funds, and in the cumbersome
voting procedures, many EU leaders fear that any future enlarge-
ment would lead to disastrous consequences.43 2 The Commis-
sion insists that CAP reform is needed prior to the accession of
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland-applicant countries
in which farm prices are far below those in Western Europe.433
Inclusion of those lower priced goods into the free trade zone
would produce "unmanageable imbalances."4
4
Reallocating the agricultural and the structural funds will
pose politically sensitive and difficult choices because some
eighty to ninety percent of the Community budget is allocated
for these projects. 435 Member States clashed early on over the
sacrifices required to absorb the poorer, agricultural applicants
in the East, with the Southern Member States, notably Spain and
Greece, resisting cuts in their own subsidies to finance assistance
for the new neighbor-members in the East. 4 3 6 And two years
later, the prospect of cuts to the CAP touched off protests in
several EU Member States. 4 7
An additional concern for the EU is the government protec-
tion of Turkey's agricultural sector.43 ' Agricultural prices in
Turkey are not set by market forces, and this sector enjoys wide-
431. E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 26.
432. Whitney, supra note 358, at A10.
433. Andrews, supra note 420, at B1.
434. Id.
435. Directorate General X cites these as the two major challenges to enlargement.
Hartnell, supra note 8. See also Andrews, supra note 420, at B1. Schroeder "is pushing
hard to scale back the subsidies and production quotas for milk, beef, and scores of
other products that help farmers but keep consumer products artificially high." An-
drews, supra. But France's President Jacques Chirac, whose country receives the most
farm subsidies, and Spain, which receives more than 11 billion euros in regional and
cohesion aid (contributes only 5 billion euros to overall EU budget) fight the cutbacks.
Id. at B2.
436. EUEnlargement Plan Costs Attacked, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at 2; See A Chilly
Wait, supra note 302, at 23 (curbing excesses from existing farm policy and slimming
regional and social subsidies is needed to make whole enlargement process financially
manageable).
437. Belgium deployed thousands of extra police to prepare for massive demon-
strations from farmers. Barry James, EU Aims Its Scythe at Farm Subsidies, INrr'L HERALD
TRIB., Feb. 22, 1999, at 1. Germany argues that enlargement cannot proceed without
reform of budget issues. Id.
438. REGULAR REPORT ON TuREu's PROGRESS, supra note 250, at 1, § 2.3-Turkish
Economy in the Perspective of Membership.
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spread government intervention and price supports.43 9 Tariffs as
high as 145% on some products and bans on the importation of
live animals and plants illustrate why the EU is alarmed at Tur-
key's agricultural policies.44 °
The political and economic concerns noted above, in con-
junction with the Greece-Cyprus conflict and the Islamic ten-
sions, dominate the official European Commission concerns.
B. The Sotto Voce Concerns
In contrast to the more formal criteria described above,
some of the more potent objections to Turkey's further integra-
tion with Europe are less objective and less easily defined. These
concerns focus on religious and cultural considerations, as well
as national self-interest. Turkey's addition to the EU, for exam-
ple, would alter the existing political and demographic balance
substantially, diluting the present power of certain governments
and political groups. Likewise, spreading or sharing resources
and markets with any new members will generate opposition
from those protecting their constituencies. These concerns are
aired less comfortably in public in today's cooperative, commu-
nity-minded Europe.
Perhaps the most difficult of these concerns to discuss
openly is the European perception that Turkey has an alien cul-
ture and religious identity, and this fear stands as one of the ma-
jor barriers to Turkish accession.441 Some in the EU insist that
Turkey "does not share the common European culture"4 4 2 or,
even worse, that Turkey's Islamic heritage would "poison" the
Christian European culture.443 Many observers have noted the
bias in Europe against Muslims.44 4 In 1997, some Christian
Democrats "notoriously declared that the EU was for Christian
nations . . . .-4 Former Prime Minister Yilmaz openly com-
plained that "religious discrimination" was the reason behind
the exclusion of Turkey.446
439. Id. at 2.
440. Id.
441. REDMOND, supra note 7, at 54; Yesilada, supra note 273.
442. LEWIS, supra note 46, at ix.
443. Yesilada, supra note 273, at 179.
444. Id.
445. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 15.
446. Kinzer, supra note 295, at 3.
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As described more fully in the discussion of Islamic influ-
ences, the region around Turkey and the Balkans includes a
fault line separating people not only by religion, but also by basic
assumptions of government and by general distrust.44 7 Islam
frightens many in Europe because some of its basic principles
oppose primary tenets of the Western democratic model, for ex-
ample, the equal treatment of women, or the separation of
church, personal morality, and the state.448 Some Europeans
fear that Turkey's weak governments may yield to Islamic influ-
ences, producing a potentially radical fundamentalist regime-
one not in harmony with EU democratic principles. The rise of
Islamic fundamentalism and the political successes of Islamic-ori-
entated parties in the mid-1990s feed these fears. 449 European
and Western powers can be justifiably uneasy about the threat of
Islamic fundamentalism,45 ° especially since Islamic fundamental-
ism was on the rise in the region.45 1 The recent notoriety sur-
rounding the defiant Islamic member of Parliament who ap-
peared for swearing-in wearing the forbidden religious head-
scarf, and the government efforts to prosecute her, illustrate
vividly the tension.452
447. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 15-21, 35. EU citizens record a low trust in the
Turkish people. Id. at 21.
448. Id. at 35. Emerson explains
This is why the question of Turkish accession to the EU is so sensitive. From a
west European point of view it is an extraordinary chance, and a positive one,
that a large Islamic state should have made itself a lay state. It helps break
down the risks of a generalized tension or confrontation with Islam. On the
other hand it is observed that within Turkey there is a real political struggle
over maintenance of the legacy of Atat6rk. This is a case where the dynamics
of either integration on the one hand, or exclusion or ideological divergence
on the other, could be strong."
Id.
449. See NEWHOUSE, supra note 10, at 259-68 (giving detailed discussion of Islamic
politics in 1990s).
450. Aras, supra note 24, at 93.
451. Russia felt the sting of "Islamic fanaticism" with the fierce battle in Chechnya
in 1995. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 16. The tension persists. Id. In February 1999, the
president of Chechnya ordered the installation of Islamic law and the adoption of an
Islamic constitution. Id.; Russia: Islamic Law in Chechnya, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A8
("Chechens have traditionally practiced a moderate version of Islam, but a militant
group has grown in influence recently.").
452. Merve Kavak appeared for the oath-swearing wearing a headscarf, violating a
ban on Islamic dress in state offices, and a subsequent government decree has taken
away her citizenship, ostensibly because she obtained dual citizenship in the United
States and Turkey without prior government approval. Rebel MP Loses Citizenship, FIN.
TIMES, May 17, 1999, at 3.
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY IN EUROPE
The second primary concern may be simply Turkey's size.
The massive landmass and population may just be too large-
and especially with so many poor people, which implicates eco-
nomic concerns discussed in the previous section. Turkey's area
of 301,000 sq. miles, more than doubles Germany's size of
138,000 sq. miles. 53 Turkey's 61,303,000 inhabitants rank it the
second most populous country in Europe, only behind Ger-
many's eighty-two million people. This enormous size dwarfs the
lesser states, such as Austria with eight million people in 32,400
sq. miles. 454 It may be politically unrealistic to ask the smaller
European countries to admit such a large and populous country.
When the economic aspects of these numbers are added to the
equation, with Turkey's high unemployment and soaring infla-
tion, the acceptance problems become equally apparent and
acute.
The potential immigration problems have been publicly dis-
cussed, amid fears of new waves of immigrants as key issues in
accession.455 As noted previously, the impact of religious and
cultural prejudice may amplify the economic and political con-
cerns immeasurably. The 1990s has witnessed "a rise in anti-im-
migration feeling.., against Muslim workers from North Africa
and Turkey ... [and] for the most part, EU governments have
not developed policies to combat this resurgence of preju-
dice."456 How heavily this prejudice weighs in the judgments of
the decision-makers is difficult to discern.
Turkey's proximity to the Arab world, and the as yet less-
than-stable emerging Turk republics, may also cause concern.
Turkey can be said to live in a rough neighborhood.45 7 Turkey's
large peninsula provides a generous buffer to the Muslim East.
453. It is about the size of Montana. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS 1 (1996).
454. France comprises 213,000 sq. miles and has 58,286,000 inhabitants, and the
United Kingdom has 94,000 sq. miles and 58,306,000 inhabitants. OXFORD ATLAS OF
THE WORLD (5th Ed., 1997).
455. Turkey would become the second largest country in the EU after Germany,
says Ambassador Michael Lake in a speech to Turkish business group. Press Release 2,
(December 4, 1997) <http://www.eureptr.org.tr/english/flash/flash5.html> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) (explicitly describing EU fears of new wave
of Turkish migration as key issue).
456. TURKEY. A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 96, at 295-96.
457. This is in "one of the planet's most dangerous neighborhoods." Dale, supra
note 46.
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The EU may be reluctant to share borders with Armenia, Geor-
gia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
The potential for these less tangible, sometimes emotional
concerns, cloud the more objective concerns and further com-
plicates any analysis.
C. Testing the Viability of the Concerns
Here lies the central purpose of this analysis: to penetrate
the discourse of Turkey's integration with Europe and to evalu-
ate fully the concerns for and against increased integration. As
Prof. Joseph Weiler has observed, the laws of different countries
can be "embedded in different social and political cultures," ren-
dering their transmutation difficult. Further, the concerns and
criteria should be separated from the intense atmosphere of pre-
vailing ideology, and examined in a broad, long-term pragmatic
perspective, with a careful view toward the future. Thus, evaluat-
ing different political constructs is not easily achieved and must
be approached with restraint and respect. Neither cross-cultural
comparisons nor integration will typically be neat "plug-in"
processes. Common values and principles of government may
well be shared between polities, but rarely will they be shaped as
mirror images, more often reflecting different forms. The impe-
tus of this analysis is the search for approximation more in sub-
stance and spirit, and less in form and appearance. This search
will find much common ground, though it will substantially di-
verge in some crucial aspects.
Assessing the twin fundamentals that Turkey enjoys a demo-
cratic government and constitutes a European geographical en-
tity illustrates the less formal, more penetrating approach. In
both cases, persuasive arguments can be made that Turkey does
or does not satisfy the requirements. Only by searching beyond
the forms does one achieve a satisfying resolution. For example,
a cursory evaluation of the "European" requirement produces a
mixed result. To reach meaningful assessment, upon which to
base resolution of an important question, the inquiry must delve
deeper into the substance and spirit. Turkey's toehold in Eu-
rope at Istanbul gives it an indisputable claim to being a part of
Europe. At the same time, this European area represents only a
minute percentage of its mammoth landmass, which lies over-
whelmingly in Asia Minor. Accordingly, judging this criteria
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fully requires deeper inquiry into Turkey's connection to Eu-
rope or participation in European endeavors. One author ar-
gues that since, in terms of geography, Turkey is already a mem-
ber of most of the European intergovernmental organizations-
from the Council of Europe to associate member status in the
WEU-the issue should be settled.4"8 This may be the prudent
view, especially considering Turkey's quarter century Associate
status with the Community, with such visible manifestations as
the Agenda 2000 and the Luxembourg Presidency Conclusions
explicitly contemplating future EU accession for Turkey.459
Weighing Turkey's long history of involvement with Europe, its
physical connection, and the official positions taken by the EU,
the geography considerations appears realistically to balance in
favor of Turkey's inclusion.
Beyond this rational assessment, issues of principle suggest
the same conclusion: when the analysis includes Turkey's func-
tional and convenient role for European defense over the past
fifty years, it would be unseemly to claim now that it is not "Euro-
pean" in sufficient measure and substance to qualify as a mem-
ber of the general European community. It is surely too late
now to assert that geography itself stands in the way of accession.
Finally, if geography were to stand truly as a concern, the ongo-
ing accession negotiations with Cyprus would need to be re-eval-
uated because of its close proximity to Turkey and sizable dis-
tance from Greece.
In addition, the social and cultural interchange between
Turkey and Western Europe over the years render "bright line"
divisions unhelpful. Full analysis demonstrates that, after centu-
ries of varied interaction, no firm wall separates Turkey from Eu-
rope. Hence, upon full view, considering the substance and the
spirit of the European requirement, this criteria should be
deemed sufficiently satisfied.
The primary "European" objection that might remain is the
unofficial broad concern about sharing the "European" culture.
This non-objective, cultural concern, while understandable in
458. Yesilada, supra note 273, at 179. Turkeyjoined the OECD in 1948, the Coun-
cil of Europe in 1949, NATO in 1952, EU associate member status in 1963, and associ-
ate member of WEU in 1992. Id.
459. E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 56; see E.U. BULL., supra note 3, at pt. 31 (in-
cluding European Commission statements long classifying Turkey as "European coun-
try" and explicitly assuring its place in Union).
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the context of human relations, should not be accepted as a via-
ble reason to exclude any applicant to the Community. Cultural
diversity and pluralism can strengthen a community.
Evaluation of the second fundamental requirement, that of
exhibiting a basic democratic government, also yields a mixed
result. Turkey has for years enjoyed such a basic democracy-
though perhaps at times a "fragile"460 one with substantial
shortfalls, as more fully developed in the previous discussion of
human rights and the special role of the military. Turkey's dem-
ocratic form of government has been in place far longer than
most of the Central and Eastern European countries now negoti-
ating for accession. Yet, certain deficiencies in Turkey's democ-
racy unquestionably reveal both structural and policy flaws that
cry out for reform. As the only functioning democratic regime
in the midst of the Middle East and Central Asia, its significance
as a model of integrating Islam and democracy should not be
ignored. Agenda 2000 observes that "Turkey has a government
and parliament resulting from multi-party, democratic elections
and an administration capable of framing and applying legisla-
tion compatible with the acquis .... ,,46' An operative parliamen-
tary system, with a functioning judiciary and civil service, appears
to meet the requirement, yet the military supervisory authority
qualifies its democratic quality, as shown by the four interven-
tions in the modern era to stabilize the government.4 62 Turkey's
"civilian governments have made significant moves toward de-
mocracy," and constitutional reforms have gradually been en-
acted to strengthen the democratic institutions.463 For example,
recent reforms include granting trade unions the right to en-
gage in political activity, granting civil servants the right to form
unions, lowering the voting age to eighteen, permitting profes-
sional organizations, university staff, and students to engage in
politics. 464
The human rights problem is, as noted above, grievous, but
460. Turkey: Dully-go-round, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1999, at 47.
461. E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 56.
462. While the military has not intervened for the purpose of seizing the govern-
ment, but rather has intervened to preserve the rule of law amid chaotic, destabilizing
political turmoil, such authority raises fundamental questions about the democratic
functioning in Turkey.
463. Yesilada, supra note 273, at 179-80.
464. Id. at 182.
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not hopeless as some improvement has occurred, and pressure
for reform is growing within Turkey.4 61 In response, the govern-
ment has increased the human rights training of the military and
mandates such training in primary and secondary schools.
4 6 6
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, who recently visited
Turkey, reported that, while abusive practices continue in some
parts of the country, the situation "had improved significantly"
and did not appear to be widespread and systematic.4 6 7 In fact,
Turkey's acceptance of the Special Rapporteur's inquiry suggests
some readiness to cooperate with others to improve the human
rights situation.
Turkish leaders insist that their human rights record is un-
fairly represented by those who wish to discredit their country.4 6 8
The state minister in charge of human rights cites the creation
of the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission and the
Human Rights Coordinating High Committee that has issued
over 100 decisions implementing many regulations to enforce
human rights principles.4 69  Additionally, the Turkish Parlia-
ment has enacted extraordinary legislation to conform police
practices with the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.4
The Human Rights Watch report also suggests that state of-
ficials and judges have begun to raise questions about such con-
cerns.4 71 In fact, reforms in the human rights area rose to the
forefront of Turkish political debate in 1998, when then Prime
Minister Mesut Yilmaz designated that year as the "year of
465. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 370, at 1-3 (describing reforms); see Boul-
ton, supra note 369, at 2-3 (stating that there is reduction of human rights violations
and growing public pressure for continued reforms).
466. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 370, at 1.
467. UN PRESS RELEASE HR/CN/904, at 1, 3.
468. See, e.g., Statement by H.E. Mr. Hikmet Sami Turk, State Minister of Human
Rights in Turkey to the 54th session of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights, Mar. 18, 1998, 2 (visited Apr. 27, 1999) <http://www.unchr.ch/html/menu2/
2/54chr/54turkey.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
469. See United Nations Commission on Human Rights 3, (Mar. 18, 1998), <http:/
/www.unchr.org> (on file with the Fordham International LawJournal) (stating draft legis-
lation that has been submitted to Parliament in several areas and human rights educa-
tion is being promoted in schools and through media).
470. Magnarela, supra note 139, at 450. This includes a Miranda type rule, coun-
sel for indigents, and prohibitions against torture or any form of ill treatment during
interrogation. Id. at 451.
471. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 370, at 1.
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law. '47 2 Other leaders have urged reform as well, most notably
in 1999 the president of the Constitutional Court forcefully
urged relaxation of rigid anti-terrorist restrictions.473 Reports
suggest that public and political opinion, due in part to more
daring debates on private television, has become more sensitive,
and legislative changes have contributed too, as new laws have
shortened the time allowed for pre-trial detention and have
speeded access to a lawyer.474
Principles of fairness recommend that past failures of demo-
cratic principles should not be held too strongly against an
emerging country for too long, as exemplified by the East Ger-
man experience. Like the former German Democratic Repub-
lic, other applicant countries presently ahead of Turkey in acces-
sion negotiations, such as Albania, Romania, and Slovakia, en-
dured totalitarian regimes in the not-so-distant past. Further,
modern historical experience, from the rise of fascism, to the
difficulty of the decolonization period, through the horror of
the Holocaust, to the massive-scaled Stalinism and the Cold War
totalitarianism4 75 recommend a measure of restraint in judging
other political regimes too hastily. Ideology must be tempered
with both reason and realism.
David Kennedy has argued that the fundamental require-
ment of "democracy" is disserved by a European inclusion pro-
cess that is fraught with arbitrariness, secrecy, and unidirectional
decision making.4 76 He argues that the democratic model is nec-
essary for application, but does not exist in the vaunted internal
market, and the EU's rhetoric of democracy and human rights,
so essential in the accession criteria, is accompanied by a waning
of these values within the Community, as EU legislative compe-
tence has migrated from the parliaments to the executives, and
472. See id. (stating that "the ongoing scandal about the state security forces using
ultra-nationalists and members of organized crime-so called 'illegal gangs'-to com-
mit human rights abuses.").
473. Boulton, supra note 369, at 2.
474. Human Rights in Turkey, supra note 370, at 46.
475. This comparison is more fully explored by former President Turgut Ozal in
his book, see LEwiS, supra note 46, at 299 et seq. On a smaller scale is the recent shock
of the European Commission's en masse resignation. Id. The EU's accession criteria for
efficiently running government may be diluted considering the resignation of all 20
Commissioners on March 15,1999, and the European Parliament's calls for immediate
replacement, following a damning report of mismanagement and cronyism. Id.
476. Kennedy, supra note 1.
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the democratic participation demanded of the applicants is less-
ened in the EU.47 7 Europe would be better served employing a
broader basic view of "functioning democracy."
Full assessment of the political criteria for Turkey is diffi-
cult, considering its unique history and all of the relevant fac-
tors. Ultimately, as with the other considerations, careful analy-
sis results in a mixed review. A functioning parliament, judici-
ary, and executive, operating under the rule of law, have been in
place for decades. Yet, the special role of the military as guard-
ian of the constitution contravenes Western patterns of demo-
cratic structure. Historically, military interventions have brought
the country needed stability. This form is different, but-consid-
ering the diverse forces opposing stability in this region-the
purposes, the substance, and spirit of the military role may be
viewed as beneficial, not despotic or otherwise anti-democratic.
Indeed, most people in Turkey already view the military role as
good.
Yet, this authority must be deemed excessive and threaten-
ing to democratic rule, and Turkish leaders would do well to
consider moderating this military power. The ongoing military
influence on the National Security Council is difficult to mea-
sure, but it must be assessed as substantial. This influence ap-
pears to jeopardize the military-civilian balance, weighing too
heavily toward excessive military authority. The military role and
the sometimes repressive function of the NSC further implicate
important issues of civil rights and the protection of minority
rights. "Security" prosecutions in these special tribunals are
often conducted with fewer due process protections than pre-
scribed by most Western norms. Unquestionably, the use of tor-
ture and other harsh police tactics, as described above, unac-
ceptably violate democratic standards. Considering the full pic-
ture of democratic structures, processes, and practices in
Turkey, the conclusion emerges that the democratic basics
clearly appear to be present in Turkey, while some basic reforms
are essential to bring the overall democratic environment into
compatibility with reasonable requirements of a balanced, effec-
tive democracy.
Similarly, evaluating the economic concerns produces con-
477. Id. at 394-395, 384-86. Applicants may achieve market democracy just as the
EU departs for "the post-industrial society." Id. at 396.
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siderable positive data, though mixed with some negative factors
as well. "The Turkish economy is highly developed, and its mar-
ket is strategic, linking the EU and emerging markets of the Mid-
dle East and central Asia. '4 7 8 Turkey's economy enjoys one of
the highest growth rates in the world. 47' The customs union is
generally a success, and the Turkish business community inte-
grates impressively with the European market. 48 0 Yet, as the
Commission reports, economic performance is not at the level of
the EU Member States. As detailed previously, chronic deficits
and high inflation amid growing macroeconomic imbalances de-
mand remedial action.48' Thus, Turkey's size, strength, and ro-
bust economy are balanced by the considerable need for reform
and further economic development in order to prepare it for
full accession.
One author has stated that "[u]nlike most emerging mar-
kets Turkey successfully withstood the negative effects of the in-
ternational financial crisis and the flight of capital," yet some
economic slowdown is inevitable as the country faces reces-
sion. 482 The collapse of the economy in Russia, a major trading
partner, marked the end of the Turkish economy's "near-mythi-
cal resilience. ' 483 Even with some slow-down considered, the
scale and strategic location of this market requires that it not be
excluded from expanding economic planning.
Turkey, as a market, is virtually untapped by the West.484
The very size of the Turkish economy must be considered when
evaluating Turkey's application for membership in the EU.4 85
478. Yesilada, supra note 273, at 180
479. Pollack, supra note 29, at A26; Metin Munir, Days of Resilience May Be Num-
bered, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 1999, at 14 (stating that it is one of highest in OECD in recent
years-and official numbers ignore strength added by strong black market economy,
suggesting much higher per capita GDP than reported). "A large unrecorded economy
suggests wealth and financial flexibility in excess of what the various statistics indicate."
Munir, supra.
480. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 72.
481. Tax reforms introduced in 1998 resulted in an 81% increase in expenditures,
but only a 44% increase in revenue, alluding to the ineffectiveness of the reforms.
Munir, supra note 479, at 14.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Edward C. Schultz, Turkey Listed One of World's 10 Big Emerging Markets, Boul-
DER CrrY BUSINESS REp., Mar. 1993.
485. Turkey's gross national product was US$382.5 billion in 1996 and exper-
ienced an average annual growth rate of 5.5% since the mid-1980s. Additionally, Tur-
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Additionally, Turkish exports have increased dramatically in the
past few years.48 6 These factors suggest that the current weak-
nesses in the Turkish economy, while substantial, are surmount-
able.
Turkey has taken affirmative steps to combat its inflation
problem,48 7 including the adoption of an anti-inflation program
in cooperation with the IMF.4 ss The goal is to reduce the infla-
tion rate to less than ten percent by the end of the year 2000.489
While this may be unrealistic, these measures have reduced infla-
tion in the last two years."' Additionally, Turkey, in accordance
with IMF recommendations, has passed much needed legislation
aimed at regulating the banking sector.49 '
While it is too early to make a final judgment on the infla-
tion stabilization program, early signals from the economy are
encouraging. 2 In the first half of 1998, the rate of privatization
of industry, tax revenue, and efforts at tax collection all in-
creased substantially.493 Although these trends slowed somewhat
in the second half of 1998, data suggests further increases in eco-
nomic growth and decreases in inflation for the future.49 4
The fears about a flood of agricultural goods and workers
key's population of over 60 million presently has little access to Western goods. REGU-
LAR REPORT ON TURKEY's PROGRESS, supra note 250, § 2.2 at 1.
486. Id at 2. Turkish exports grew by 10% annually in both 1995 and 1996 and by
15% in 1997. Id.
487. Id. The Turkish Lira ("TL") was devalued by over 500% following the eco-
nomic downturn of 1994. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 3. The key components of this plan are: restructuring of the budget
and the limiting of the money supply to the economy, launching the reforms needed to
strengthen public finances (especially Social Security), and speeding up privatization so
as to reduce the borrowing requirement. Id.
490. Inflation was 102% in 1996, 99.1% in 1997, and 79.6% in 1998. INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 395, at 12. Inflation is projected to be between 60-
70% for 1999 as opposed to the government target of 40%. Munir, supra note 479, at
14.
491. Leyla Boulton, Turkey Strengthens Bank Laws, FIN. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at A2.
The reforms are aimed at reducing political interference with banking regulation and
limit the banks' ability to lend to related companies and hold stakes in non-financial
sector companies. Id.
492. REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY'S PROGRESS, supra note 250, at 3, § 2.2. The IMF
monitors Turkey's progress quarterly, with the most recent one being in March, 1999.
In that assessment, the IMF promised "strong and concrete support" if Turkey contin-
ues in its progress. Munir, supra note 479, at 14.
493. REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY's PROGRESS, supra note 250, at 3, § 2.2.
494. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 395, at 13.
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into the Community are legitimate. These market factors must
be considered and accommodated. As Turkey's economy devel-
ops, the imbalances should lessen to some extent. For example,
the shift in emphasis from agriculture to goods and services
should alleviate some of the pressure.495 Agriculture's share of
Gross National Product has fallen from thirty-three percent in
1968 to fourteen percent in 1996, while industry increased its
share to 27.7% from 17.1%, and services increased its share to
58.3% from 49.8%.496 These trends are expected to continue
into the foreseeable future.497 Thus, continued planning and
the passage of time should work in favor of gradual integration.
Similarly, the fears regarding immigration of a large labor
force are well-founded, but they do not erect an insurmountable
barrier to further integration with Europe, in varying stages at
later dates. 498 This immigration of workers from all of the acces-
sion candidates will likely require special transition periods to
allow for manageable integration. Turkey has initiated steps to
ameliorate integration problems and to align itself with EU pol-
icy, such as increasing the number of years of mandatory basic
education, opening the labor market to women, and reducing
agriculture's share of the GNP.490
As mentioned above, agriculture remains the principal eco-
nomic concern about Turkey in the EU.500 The share of workers
employed by agriculture remains disproportionate to agricul-
ture's share of Turkey's GNP, evidencing low productivity in the
agricultural sector.510 "The low productivity of farming is mainly
attributable to the great number of small holdings using ineffi-
cient production techniques," draining the economy as a
whole.5 °2 These farms would not likely withstand competition
from the EU countries.5 0 3 Finally, the Turkish economy would
have a difficult time absorbing the displaced farm workers result-
495. REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY'S PROGRESS, supra note 250, at 1, § 2.2.
496. Id.
497. INTErNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 395, at 15. As mentioned previ-
ously, most farming is for self-consumption, so their true impact on the labor market as
a whole is negligible. Id.
498. Id. at 17.
499. REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY'S PROGRESS, supra note 250, at 4, § 3.2.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 1.
503. Id.
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ing from modernizing this sector of the economy. 50 4 Also of
concern is the interventionist posture of Turkey's agriculture
policy, which relies on "massive domestic support in the form of
intervention pricing, subsidized inputs, investment credit, spe-
cial payments and production premiums."50 5 Attempts to re-
duce agricultural subsidies have met with little success.50 6
A balanced evaluation of this sector must also note that
some of these challenges posed by outdated agriculture policies
are shared by many EU countries.5° While Turkey's own poli-
cies are heavily interventionist, so are those of other EU coun-
tries.50 s Some reform of the CAP was achieved recently, though
it was less comprehensive and rigorous than some had hoped.50 9
The reform of the CAP likely will begin seriously before the next
wave of accessions and will be further developed by the time Tur-
key is ready, so the agricultural concerns require further consid-
eration.51 0 The European Commission has already proposed a
program similar to the approach used for the central European
countries to allow Turkey to bring its agricultural policy into line
with the CAP.5 H Significantly, the EU is Turkey's main partner
for agricultural products.51 2 Turkey's exports to EU countries is
over 1.5 billion ECUs annually. 513 Turkey also imports over 500
million ECUs annually of EU agricultural products. 51 '4 This mas-
sive trade and Turkey's strong functioning market economy sug-
gest further cooperation.
Evaluating the sotto voce concerns can be more difficult be-
cause they are less easily measured. Yet as a matter of principle,
some of them may be readily dismissed. For example, few would
504. Id. at 5.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 27-29.
508. Id.
509. Smith, supra note 416, at 2. The reforms lowered guaranteed prices of cereals
by 20%, of milk by 15%, and beef by 20%, all over a period of years, and included a
spending curb to limit the expansion every year of the CAP budget. Id. The Gang of
Four-Denmark, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom-criticized the reforms fail-
ure to reduce direct subsidy payments to farmers. Id.
510. E.U. BULL., supra note 130, at 28.
511. REGULAR REPORT ON TuRKEV's PROGRESS, supra note 250, at 5, § 3.2. This pro-
gram commenced in December 1998. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id.
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be so bold as to suggest that religion could possibly provide a
legitimate basis for any applicant's rejection. No EU legal pre-
cept of any type refers to Christianity or any other religion as a
condition for inclusion, and it is significant that Turkey is help-
ing its neighbors in central Asia establish secular states. 15 This
aspect of the relationship between Turkey and Europe merits
emphasis as militant Islamic forces continue to take more force-
ful roles in this region. In August 1999, another new Russian
Prime Minister unveiled plans to bring under control renewed
Islamic militants fighting for independence in the Caucasus.516
The lesson is plain that Turkey's leadership as a secular Muslim
state has immeasurable value, and rejection or disdain from the
West likely will offer impetus to those in Turkey who would pro-
mote a greater role for Islam in the governments of the region.
The expressed concern that Islam may overcome Turkey's
secular government is not realistic at this time. While EU lead-
ers reasonably fear some instability and further change in this
region, Turkey has offered a viable example of productive co-
existence of Islam and the modern secular state. Secularism is
still "the foundation stone of Turkish constitutional theory and
political life."5 17 The modern Turkish government has long re-
sisted the scope of Islamic influence in the government and
state. Though Turkey has become more "overtly" religious over
the past two decades, 18 the most recent election weakened the
Islamic party's strength. Further, the government has intro-
duced added measures to restrict Islamic political power. In
1999, for example, "Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecvit an-
nounced a nationwide crackdown on Islamic activity, saying he
was instructing the police and judiciary to take legal action
against any threats to the secular order." Past crackdowns in
Turkey have led to prosecution of politicians and journalists
515. See Yesilada, supra note 273, at 179 (noting that "several European member
states have significant Muslim minorities.").
516. The latest crisis has militants crossing the Chechen border into the neighbor-
ing state of Dagestan, with the director of the Center for Strategic Studies in Moscow
observing that the problem was not a military one, but rather "a political problem, the
same one every Muslim state faces with its fundamentalists." Celestine Bohlen, New
Russian Premier Has Plan To Quell Rebellion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1999, at A3.
517. Serif Mardin, Religion and Secularism in Turkey, in ATATTORK: FOUNDER OF A
MODERN STATE 191 (Ali Kazancigil & Ergun Ozbudun eds., 1981).
518. Lesser, supra note 2, at 101.
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"deemed to have encouraged religious militancy."519 In 1998, an
administrative court raised the age requirement from twelve to
fifteen before children could attend religious schools.5 20 The
Constitutional Court previously had banned the main Islam-
based Welfare Party and prohibited its leader, a former Prime
Minister, from political leadership for five years.521 As noted
previously, the military stepped in to protect the government
from excessive Islamic power in 1997.522 Thus, Turkey stands as
an example-though imperfect to be sure-of the advantages of
democracy over theocracy in a changing region.
The argument that Islam or Turkish influences might
poison or corrupt European culture reflects multiple forms of
vanity, at least, and perhaps racism or xenophobia. Beyond dis-
missing these inappropriate influences, full analysis must not ig-
nore the interchange and cultural sharing over the years. First,
many rich contributions have been imported to Europe through
Turkey.523 Second, the westernization begun by Atatfirk, escalat-
ing through today's global commerce and communication, has
brought Turkey closer to Europe in many cultural ways. Note
that Europe no longer shares such a homogeneous culture, and,
as has been shown in the United States, diversity can strengthen
a culture. 52 '4 This backward-looking bias should yield to the di-
versifying enrichment of globalization coming in the new cen-
tury.
Objections to Turkey's further inclusion with Europe that
are based on its massive size also seem fundamentally illogical.
Out of the context of an objective criteria relating to economic
integration, the size alone of a country or its population should
be inadequate to justify exclusion. It is understandable that na-
tional self-interest would disfavor the potential dilution of polit-
519. World Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, at A12.
520. Court Further Limits Turkey's Islamic Schools, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1998, at A7.
521. Id.
522. "The military, which opposes any increase in the role of religion in public life,
orchestrated a campaign that led to the collapse of the last Islamic-led government in
1997." Stephen Kinzer, Turkey's New Leader Vows April Elections, But Delay Is Possible, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1999, at AS. "Ever since they [the military leaders] brought about the
fall of Turkey's first Islamist-led government, they have engaged in an unremitting cam-
paign against the Islamists." Turkey. Dully-go-Round, supra note 460, at 47.
523. See LEwis, supra note 46.
524. Id. Turkey's historical culture and originality adds a richly colored strand in
the Community tapestry. Id.
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ical strength or financial return of other Member States upon
Turkey's accession to the community. Such national self-interest
may be temporarily protected by refusing entry to new members,
but the overall effort to broaden markets and promote harmoni-
zation produces greater long term benefits, as the success of the
EU demonstrates, and can only be advanced when nations share
both resources and power. Finally, if eleven new applicant coun-
tries can be accommodated in the Community, it becomes more
difficult to justify excluding one larger country based on size
alone.
Likewise, objections based on Turkey's geopolitical neigh-
borhood should have little weight. Turkey's buffer for Europe
against rough neighbors Armenia, Georgia, Iraq, Iran, and Syria,
may be a practical reason to hold Turkey at arms length, but it
seems a highly inappropriate and unfair motivation, and in some
ways a usurpation of Turkey.
Reflecting the overall tensions of the region, the Greece-Cy-
prus conflict mixes cultural, religious, military, and political is-
sues, presenting fundamentally intractable problem, as in the
Middle East or Ireland. As is discussed in the following Resolu-
tion section, the intensity of the conflict and its complexity leave
few avenues for successful negotiation out of the present im-
passe, and new approaches offer the only real chance of im-
provement. Evaluating the concerns about Turkey's accession
that arise from this conflict produces the conclusion that Turkey
and Greece, as well as their surrogate governments on Cyprus,
must both share the responsibility for this tragic stand-off.
Final synthesis of these assessments reflects foremost the
mixed conclusions described above. Many of the objective acces-
sion criteria are satisfied, though a few essential requirement
must be judged absent. The functioning democracy and func-
tioning market economy are balanced with deficiencies that
must be remedied to promote further harmonization. On the
other hand, the cultural and religious objections should be rec-
ognized as inappropriate bases to hinder Turkey's progressive
cooperation with Europe.
Whether Turkey satisfies the EU membership requirements
depends on whom one asks and when . . . Often at times of
serious security concerns, when Turkey can play a major role
in protecting Western interests, the answer is an uncondi-
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tional yes. However, when security interests are absent, the
Europeans tend to view the Turks as part of the Middle
East.
5 2 5
At this juncture of political and economic maturity in Europe,
the discussion should transcend the old forms and look for new
approaches to resolve the issues in a manner promoting further
cooperation.
V. RESOLUTION
The keys to a productive resolution of the tensions between
Turkey and Europe are the same as the keys to European re-
newal in general: the planned advancement toward interdepen-
dence and cooperation 526 This means exploring new paradigms
to match new challenges, translating common core values
among diverse cultures, and forsaking "outmoded ideological
commitments," as David Kennedy suggests. 527 The vision must
focus above specific social and political cultures. Theoretically
and pragmatically, a functionalist approach to continued ad-
vancement toward prosperity and peace should be the focus. 528
The old "classic" 529 model for European integration and ac-
cession decision-making is the product of past nationalistic ex-
periences and, in the unusual circumstances of Turkey's applica-
tion, has produced a tortured result. As Eastern enlargement
requires the EU and all applicant countries to adapt,530 so too
should the approach toward European cooperation adapt. The
525. Yesilada, supra note 273, at 179.
526. This includes "the classical modernist displacement of political struggle by
management." Kennedy, supra note 1, at 377. Emerson also recommends "that man-
agement efficiency principles developed in the private sector become also a useful para-
digm .... because the costs of malfunctioning institutions may be sufficient to offset
the theoretical gains identified in the political and economic theory of government."
EMERSON, supra note 4, at 185.
527. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 377. "The European Union, Russia, and Turkey...
seem still today to be acting out a parody of a Europe divided between Western Chris-
tendom, the Orthodox Slavs and Islam." EMERSON, supra note 4, at 18.
528. "Academics termed those early, successful processes of European integration
as pragmatic and neo-functionalist." Jo SHAw, EUROPEAN UNION LAw §1.4 (1996).
Could this approach serve the equally difficult accession process to the east and south-
east?
529. REDMOND & ROSENTHAL, supra note 126, at 217.
530. As is well discussed in current EU literature, the old Community of 9 or 15 is
not structurally prepared for 20 members. See, e.g., E.U. BULL, SUpra note 130, at 24-28,
135-36.
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accession process that worked adequately for Austria, Finland,
and Sweden works less effectively for more diverse applicants,
such as Albania, Poland, or Turkey. A broader and more inclu-
sive European strategy, with the EU at the core and as the long
range target, should be adopted to promote its common goals.
Such a flexible and variable scheme could serve all nations in the
region as they increase cooperation, stressing their strengths and
resources while encouraging progress towards harmonization.
With the EU as the core, a multi-leveled pan-European coopera-
tive should be established to formalize an overarching commu-
nity, working together and sharing ultimate aspirations. 31
Black-white and out-in dividing lines should be reserved for the
rarest cases. The continent needs common efforts more than
screening and exclusion.
As a member of this broader community, Turkey and other
developing countries would not be alienated and could continue
their constructive efforts for the future prosperity of the region.
Fostering a cooperative spirit with full dialogue, this broader
plan with flexible levels of inclusion, and allowing some measure
of democratic participation would better conduce stability in the
region. Thus, a new structure comprising a pan-European-coop-
erative could unite a new broader community of aspirants to the
common goals of peace and prosperity.
Fortunately, the necessarily gradual pace of such broad inte-
gration affords sufficient time for various phases of cooperation,
as in concentric circles, in which participants could accommo-
date the legitimate changes required for advancing harmoniza-
tion. The broader strategy should place each aspirant solidly on
track to full participation, adding the surefootedness that all of
the parties, both in and out of the EU, need for planning. The
broader plan would also enable all parties to present, in the im-
portant fora of international and domestic public relations, their
shared status in the Community.
Such gradual steps toward workable interdependence and
cooperation would also promote the essential ethos of commu-
nity. All members of any group are rarely created equal, and
everyone must accommodate the reality that different levels of
participation are, as a practical matter, inevitable. Preparedness
for integration differs among those seeking to join Europe, and
531. Perhaps it can be in the form of Emerson's Civil Society.
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economic, political, and social conditions must be steadily im-
proved and stabilized in each of the applicant countries before
full accession to the EU is practical.53 2 The issue here focuses on
how best to foster the progressive, gradual achievement in each
individual country to produce the ultimate goal of a cooperative
community.
Because of diverse circumstances, this ethos has been absent
in Europe's recent dealings with Turkey over accession. At Lux-
embourg, a less acerbic and exclusionary position toward Tur-
key's role in Europe would have been more constructive. The
rebuff at Luxembourg displayed an insensitivity and destructive-
ness toward Turkey. Reports of Turkish resistance to European
condescension are well-known.5 33 Experience has shown that
successful advancement toward the harmonizing criteria will be
hastened, especially in such vital areas as stabilizing democratic
institutions and improving human rights practices, by Western
encouragement and assistance in the spirit of colleagues, rather
than by moralizing from a distance.
Renewed cooperation implies change in both the Turkish
and the European perspectives, again transcending specific so-
cial and political cultures. Without concomitant movement to-
ward cooperative attitudes, little progress will be achieved in soft-
ening the edgy relationship between Turkey and Europe. Sensi-
tivity over special issues is nothing new to European history, and
"there is a political climate of national resentment over [Tur-
key's] stalled EU application.5 3 4 Commentators relate the obvi-
ous effect of this resentment: rejection by Europe will "lead to a
strengthening of nationalistic forces. '5 35 Graham Fuller and Ian
Lesser conclude that the potentially and most negative turn in
Turkish and Western relations may be "a frustrated Turkey drift-
ing in the direction of more ethnically chauvinistic, adventuristic
Turkish nationalism, transforming Turkey into a far less moder-
ate state in the region. '"536 And the primary reason they suggest
532. See, e.g., E.U. BuLL, supra note 130, at 4, and subsequent European Commis-
sion reports assessing each applicant.
533. Consider European history in the first half of the 20th century, and the Euro-
pean disdain for the human rights or democratic records of other countries provokes
pause.
534. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 72.
535. TuRiu c's NEW GEOPOLITICs: FROM THE BALKANS TO WESTERN CHINA 170 (Gra-
ham Fuller & Ian Lesser eds. 1993).
536. Id.
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for such a negative re-orientation is Turkey's spurning by Chris-
tian Europe.537 Europe's unfriendliness forces Turkey to aban-
don its traditional foreign policy objective-EU membership-
and to focus elsewhere for its security and prosperity.5"8 For ex-
ample, Turkish politicians have suggested that the country may
back away from the customs union with the EU.5 3 9 Thus, resolu-
tion of this unsatisfactory relationship requires a plan for coop-
eration, including Turkey participating more in Europe gradu-
ally and progressively as Turkey further achieves Community
standards.
This analysis has shown that much needs to be accom-
plished in Turkey to advance its harmonization. Specifically, the
record amply illustrates that improvement in Turkey is needed
in the areas of human rights and strengthening democratic prin-
ciples, in particular with regard to police tactics and the inde-
pendence of the political institutions and the judiciary, includ-
ing those involving alleged sedition or threats to national secur-
ity. The National Security Court should be abolished or at least
modified to provide enhanced protection for civil liberties. But,
Europe should judge carefully Turkey's progress toward the ac-
cession criteria thoroughly and on multiple levels, as suggested
previously, and to use the comparativist's lens, realizing that
some things are just different and will not relate or compare well
to the political and social experience of others, as Weiler notes
in this Article's introduction.54 A French proverb warns of the
complexity of comparisons: Comparaison n'est pas raison-trans-
lated literally: "A comparison is not an argument; it proves noth-
ing. 54 ' But the proverb also connotes that substantial differ-
ences in quality and nature can render comparisons inapposite
and fruitless, as suggested by the idiom "apples and oranges."
537. Fuller, supra note 34, at 170. Also on the list of forces: deteriorating eco-
nomics in Turkey, increased conflict with Greece, causing estrangement with Europe,
deterioration with German relations (due to the Turkish workers there,) and gains by
Islamic fundamentalists who favor an anti-Western policy shift. Id. at 167. Reinforcing
this fear is the coincidence that the visa-free zones for the EU coincide with only Chris-
tian countries; the rest of the Balkans, North Africa, the former Soviet Union, and Tur-
key are excluded. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 17.
538. The Turkish-Israeli Affair, supra note 92, at 57.
539. Boulton, supra note 185, at 3 (holding that it so far benefits EU more than
Turkey if Greece does not lift its veto of promised US$400 million financial aid that is
part of customs union agreement).
540. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
541. DICrIONNAIRE (Paul Robert ed., Societe du Nouveau Lettre, 1973).
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This applies with special force as Europe looks eastward to Tur-
key. For example, military intervention may connote right-wing
totalitarianism to most Westerners, but in Turkey, the military
intervention has been seen as a force for liberalism and democ-
racy, preserving liberty and order. This different form of checks
and balances should be examined for its substance. In viewing
the broad spectrum of official and unofficial criteria for fuller
participation in the European cooperative project and ultimately
in the EU, this approach will inform the analysis.
In reviewing the criteria, demographic and economic data
show that many pragmatic issues of integration must be squarely
faced in Turkey. Integrating potentially high numbers of work-
ers unavoidably implicates economics and related issues in the
present EU. Social assistance and public health issues cannot be
ignored. And, as with Hungary and Poland for example, Tur-
key's agricultural productivity must be considered in planning
the future of the CAP conundrum in the present EU. Unques-
tionably, the integration of the poorer, more agrarian applicants
will require existing Member States' farmers to receive less of a
subsidy from the EU.5 42 Any reduction of government benefits
in any polity raises political issues. Practically, however, these is-
sues must be faced more immediately for Hungary, Poland, and
all the other applicants who are closer to core participation than
Turkey. Thus, the CAP reform and the many other accommoda-
tions for new members should be in place before Turkey ad-
vances to this level. Hence, this should pose no special hin-
drance to increased cooperation and harmonization between
Europe and Turkey. Gradualism and careful planning are the
keys.
Timing should have only constructive effect in the case of
Turkey's integration with Europe, and meaningful, measurable
progress may be readily achieved in the near future if the ingre-
dients of cooperation can be produced. Current historical
events may now present the optimal time for building such coop-
eration, fostering economic integration, and improving demo-
cratic and human rights structures. Most notably, the 1999 cap-
ture of PKK terrorist Ocalan may present a unique opportunity
to build a stable government coalition, defuse the Kurdish crisis,
542. Slicing the EUs Shrinking Cake, ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 1998, at 57.
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and promote various other needed reforms.54 Following
Ocalan's capture, one Kurdish member of Parliament argued for
a more inclusive treatment of that large minority, stating that
"[t]his is the chance for Turkey to make the transition to full
democracy."5 44 Some see the event as a possible stimulus "to
break the stalemate on human rights [and] ... to push through
reforms that the [criminal justice] system has been resisting."5 45
Subsequently from prison, Ocalan called for a cease-fire, and the
PKK council agreed to "end the armed struggle and withdraw
their forces outside the borders of Turkey, for the sake of
peace."5 46 With three international summits scheduled in Tur-
key before the end of 1999, the opportunity to demonstrate to
world leaders its reasonableness and moderation in its Kurdish
policy could earn Turkey respect. 547
Another event has produced what some term a "golden op-
portunity" for change:5 4s the president of Turkey's Constitu-
tional Court, the country's highest ranking judge, shocked ob-
servers with recent comments sharply condemning restrictions
on freedom of speech and urging the lifting of Kurdish language
restrictions.549 He further warned the public prosecutor not to
attempt to close down political parties-such as the pro-Kurdish
Hadep party-without any legal basis.550 These remarks pro-
duced "an almost euphoric response from the media, . . . the
victims of the restrictions, and from liberal sections of public
543. One leading publication suggests that the capture may be a "turning point"
and recommends that both Turkey and the guerrillas seize the opportunity to reassess
their positions. The Tragedy of the Kurds, supra note 381, at 16. Turkey should realize
that some form of autonomy and fairness must be given the Kurds, and the Kurds must
realize that there is little political room in the Middle East right now for an independ-
ent state of Kurdistan. Id.
544. Stephen Kinzer, Turks v. Kurds: Turning Point?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, at
A8.
545. Id. But some doubt that the rise of the right-wing Nationalist Action party
bodes well for judicial reform during the next Parliamentary term. Boulton, supra note
369, at 2.
546. Leyla Boulton, Kurdish Rebels Agrees to Cease-Fire in Turkey, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1999, at 2.
547. Id.
548. Boulton, supra note 369, at 2.
549. Stephen Kinzer, Chief Judge in Turkey Urges Lifting of Curbs on Free Speech, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1999, at A5 ("The judge, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, urged Parliament to
repeal a series of restrictive laws and constitutional provisions.").
550. Boulton, supra note 369, at 2.
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opinion."55 ' Subsequently, an appeals court overturned the
State Security Court conviction of Murat Bozlak, chairman of
Hadep, and released him from jail.55 2
Ocalan's dramatic capture also produced a political gain for
stability in Turkey. In addition to hindering, at least temporar-
ily, the terrorist operation against Turkey, the celebrated cap-
ture also assured Prime Minister Ecevit of a solid victory in the
April 1999 national elections, which many hoped would enable
him to form a government with a more stable political coali-
tion.5 3 Some also hoped that the poorer showing of some of
the old-guard politicians may lead to a reshaping of the political
parties in Turkey, dislodging the routine cliques of veteran poli-
ticians and thereby increasing democracy within the parties.55 4
Financial markets soared after the election, "see [ing] such a coa-
lition as Turkey's best chance for stable government and contin-
ued economic reforms. . . . ,,55 Early indications suggested that
progress was possible, as one leader from the second-place Na-
tionalist Action party pronounced after the election that his
party favored reforms, including completing the privatization of
state enterprises within the next five years, strengthening bank-
ing legislation, and reforming the social security system. 556 Com-
mentators also recommended that this political opportunity be
used for reform, urging the Prime Minister to go forward with
fulfilling IMF conditions of cutting deficits, strengthening the
banking system, and pressing forward with privatization.5 7 Sub-
sequently, Ecevit unveiled further reforms, as the coalition sig-
551. Id. at 2.
552. Kurdish Leader Released, FIN. TIMES, July 14, 1999, at 2 (following eight months
in jail).
553. Prime Minister Ecevit polled 21% of the votes, up from 14% in the previous
election. Boulton, supra note 3, at 3. The far-right Nationalist Action Party received
18% of the vote and is the subject of debate as to its reform intentions. Both of the top
parties are hard-line opponents of Kurdish separatism. Id. The Islamic Virtue Party
slipped unexpectedly to about 16%. Stephen Kinzer, Results in Turkish Election Reflect
Kurdish War's Fault Line, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at A12.
554. Stephen Kinzer, In Light of Turkey's Vote, Party Chiefs Are Pressed To Quit, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at A1O. Deniz Baykal, leader of the center-left Republican Peo-
ple's party that did poorly in the election, recently did resign becoming "the first party
leader in recent Turkish history to resign his post." Turkish Party Chief Quits After Poor
Poll Result, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1999, at 3.
555. Leyla Boulton, Turks Ponder Coalitions and Headscarves, FIN. TIMES, May 4,
1999, at 2.
556. Boulton, supra note 369, at 3.
557. Turkish Reform, FIN. TIMES, May 4, 1999, at 13 (quoting Ecevit who said that he
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naled that it would adhere to the disinflation package agreed
upon with the IMF.55 8
The election results also showed a reversal of the rising Is-
lamic political influence, as the Islamic-oriented Virtue party
drew only sixteen percent..5 9 This pattern suggests that the Is-
lamic political movement may be no more powerful than any
other political party,560 permitting some relaxation for those in
Europe who fear fundamentalist religious regimes. Moderation
and further reforms were seen in August 1999 when the Turkish
Parliament passed legislation restoring the previously banned Is-
lamic leader Necmettin Erbakan's political rights, strengthening
the Islamic Virtue party's position against government restric-
tion.56 ' Experts viewed this move as part of a deal to insure pas-
sage of another important economic reform in Turkey: a consti-
tutional amendment allowing international arbitration in con-
tracts with foreign investors, unblocking billions of dollars of
foreign investment.562 Parliament also passed another major
constitutional change clearing the way for further privatization,
and both of these key legislative changes, seen as essential for
new IMF loans, were passed with the participation of the Islamist
Virtue party helping muster the two-thirds majority needed for
constitutional amendments.5 61
The 1999 election results also underscored the need for Eu-
rope and Turkey to begin enhanced cooperation as soon as pos-
sible. One commentator observed: "The outcome of Turkey's
general election yesterday should give a salutary shock to the
outside world, not least to the European Union."5 64 First, the
EU was responsible, at least in part, for the rise in popularity of
the two prevailing nationalist parties, Prime Minister Ecevit's
center-left Democratic Left party and the far-right Nationalist
was "[b]uoyed up by his own clean image and the capture of... Ocalan," and has
chance to provide much-needed stability to his country).
558. Turkey To Pursue Reforms, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 1999, at 2.
559. Kinzer, supra note 553, at A12.
560. Turkey's Poll, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at 15.
561. Turkish Parliament Clears Way forErbakan's Return, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at
2.
562. Id. (explaining that Parliament also began debate on social security reform,
which is condition set by IMF for further loans).
563. Funja GCiler, Key Reforms Cleared ly Ankara, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1999, at 3
(quoting Prime Minister Ecevit that "With these changes, I hope from now on Turkey
will be more open to the world.").
564. Turkey's Poll, supra note 560, at 15.
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Action party."' The writer continued that "the upsurge in na-
tionalist sentiment" following the capture of Ocalan in spite of
the EU refusal to extradite him, "reinforced a backlash against
the EU which started when Turkey was snubbed in its applica-
tion for membership in 1997."566
In fact, the rise of nationalism, manifested in the election,
was predicted following the EU rejection.
[T]he election underlines how essential it is for the EU to
pursue a coherent policy towards Ankara. Turkey is a vital
strategic partner for Europe in the Middle East, the Balkans,
and in central Asia. Yet the member states have treated it as a
second-class neighbor and allowed the relationship to be
blocked by the veto of Greece. It is in the vital interests of
both Turkey and the EU to put those relations back on a
proper footing. The new government in Ankara must not re-
lapse into further isolationism. And the EU must show
greater understanding of Turkey's national pride.567
Fortunately, some increased inclination to cooperation by cer-
tain European leaders has been demonstrated recently. German
Foreign Minister Fischer offered in August 1999 to do "every-
thing possible" to help Turkey gain acceptance in the EU, and
Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit announced in the same week that
Italy was adopting a similarly supportive position.568 More signif-
icantly, Turkish and Greek foreign ministers met in this same
period, discussing counter-terrorism cooperative efforts, while
other Greek and Turkish diplomats met to discuss other "soft
issues," thus marking Greece's reversal of its policy of minimal
contacts with Turkey.569
Overall, the encouraging recent developments enforce the
notion of an unusual opportunity for cooperation. The advance-
ment of political pluralism, human rights, and economic reform
appears likely to continue. And timing may be the most effective
element in this evolution. Since the decline of the communist,
state-dominated economy model, a convergence of political and
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Fischer Tells Turks He Backs EU Bid, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 23, 1999 at 5;
Turkey Says Italy Backs Its EU Bid, INT'L HERALD TIUB., July 29, 1999, at 4.
569. Greece Builds Ties with Turkey, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1999, at 3. (citing that parties
avoided tougher issues of Cyprus and Aegean disputes, and that this thaw in relations is
progress).
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economic values appears to pave the path for continued full Eu-
ropean integration."'
There are additional reasons that suggest this is the time for
change. The approaching fin de ciicle may present the optimum
time for redesigning the paradigm of the European order and
for redrawing its map: the new European Parliament was
elected in 1999, and the broad-based Council of Europe cele-
brates its fiftieth anniversary, thus offering a fertile time for fresh
and creative redesign. 7 '
In addition to timing, other practical circumstances contrib-
ute to the opportunity for movement toward harmonization at
this time. Existing structures and processes lend themselves to
relatively painless, yet effective new approaches to bring oppos-
ing interests together. For example, rapid reforms relating to
improvement in the Kurdish conflict-a major step in answering
democratic and human rights objections-could be straightfor-
ward and realistic. An immediate, measured response to the
PKK cease-fire would send strong, positive signals to both Kurd-
ish and Western leaders. For example, a relaxation of the mar-
tial law regulations in southeastern Turkey, a relaxation of laws
prohibiting Kurds from using their own language, and a relaxa-
tion of laws severely limiting Kurdish political parties-to allow
them to participate in a moderate political party-are the more
obvious, easy measures. Ocalan's offer to end the war and forge
a peaceful political party should be accepted.572 One commen-
tator recommends opening a dialogue with the Kurds to negoti-
ate peace in exchange for linguistic and cultural rights generally
assured other minority groups in Europe.5 7' Further, the rem-
nants of the PKK could be sought out with ajobs program, offer-
ing a constructive alternative to lying in wait to fight another
570. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 33-34. For example, any debate appears to center
less on democracy as a choice in general as on how specifically to install functioning
democratic structures in the individual countries. Id. at 182.
571. In time, it will give "a firm mandate to the new European Commission that
takes over in January 2000." See Dick Leonard in his review of Emerson's book, Redraw-
ing the Map of Europe, in Eye on the EU, EUROPE, Dec 98/Jan 99, at 4.
572. Little would be lost by trying, and substituting negotiation for violence.
Lewis, supra note 179, at 6. "[M]aking peace isn't ironic bliss or a fine abstraction, it is
making difficult decisions, recognizing that some sacrifice is inevitable, though less
than in war." Id.
573. Galbraith, supra note 394, at A15 (including rights to publish, broadcast, and
have some schooling in their own language).
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY IN EUROPE
day.574 The rebel group should be given the opportunity to
redefine itself into a peaceful political and social contributor.7 5
The theme must be the same as for the pan-European coopera-
tion that Turkey seeks from Europe: open-minded, respectful
dialogue, and fair treatment. Because such a significant im-
provement in the Kurdish problem could be achieved with rela-
tive ease and expediency, this solution should be considered an
area of unusual opportunity.
In addition to pleasing Europe, two additional significant
side-benefits would result from improved relations with the
Kurds: first, this domestic peace would reduce the principal
cause of political tension in the country; and second, the reduc-
tion of the military effort would yield enormous economic sav-
ings from lower military expenses in fighting the terrorists,
which is estimated at US$8 billion a year.576 Improvement has
begun in this area-the killings have subsided and the martial
law in several of the provinces has been lifted. 7  Showing re-
spect for the rights of its inhabitants can only bring Turkey
closer to Europe.578 Increased discussion of tolerance of the
Kurdish identity points to the growing acceptance of such plural-
ism.
579
Likewise, a strategy for defusing the Cyprus conflict could
be straightforward and realistic. Centering on the inevitable
recognition that the two opposing sides must share the island-
though they have been unable in the past to share effectively
political power-the most reasonable solution would be to ac-
cept the status quo division, demilitarize the island, and begin
building a workable basis for the future. The two Cypriot sides
in the dispute should be recognized as separate entities, allowed
to operate their separate governments, but at the same time co-
operating within a loose-fitting, functional, and flexible structure
designed to insure peace on the island and to encourage as
574. See id. (stating that it makes no sense to leave veteran guerrillas under influ-
ence of hostile neighbors in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.)
575. The Tragedy of the Kurds, supra note 381, at 16.
576. GuNTER, supra note 135, at 127. The tourism industry, which has been se-
verely hurt by the terrorist threat, could regain its financial footing. Id.
577. The Tragedy of the Kurds, supra note 381, at 16.
578. Id.
579. Ocalan's offer to lead the Kurds to peace in return for Kurdish cultural toler-
ance (not to mention sparing his life) has prompted support from the rebels. Stephen
Kinzer, Kurdish Rebels Support Leader's Call for Peace, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1999, at 4.
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much profitable interchange as is realistic. Security could be as-
sured by EU and U.N. efforts. Again, gradualism is essential to
gain credibility and to build trust for this modest, though impor-
tant, cooperative endeavor.
Repeating a theme of flexible redesign to accommodate di-
verse interests, a new, creative confederation could be formu-
lated respecting the functional independence of both sides.
This would guarantee security while drawing the parties together
in gradual steps to cooperate progressively on matters of mutual
profit first, to be followed later by more substantive governmen-
tal matters. While the two sides could primarily retain sover-
eignty, limited authority would pass to the central cooperative
enterprise over a few core matters agreed upon by representa-
tives based on unanimity. Cross-border councils, consultative
bodies, and elected assemblies, under the umbrella of a neutral
authority with carefully limited powers (perhaps like the original
Coal and Steel Community) could regulate and promote cooper-
ation on a few, non-controversial core matters, perhaps such as
developing some coordinated infrastructure, improving trans-
portation, and promoting tourism.5" ° Economies of scale on the
island, as basic as reducing duplicative utilities, could lead to
early confidence-building benefits. The mere reduction in mili-
tary expenditures immediately would benefit the two sides and
their patrons. A flexible confederation, with concentric spheres
of narrowly prescribed central authority, yielding to areas of
purely voluntary cooperation, while preserving to each side its
larger, overall autonomy could draw both parties together to be-
gin the process of reconstructing peace.
The forms and the names are less important than the sub-
stance of assuring the island's security, demilitarizing the island,
and beginning profitable economic interchange. As with the
recommended Kurdish improvements, this attempt at resolution
could be initiated with existing institutions (EU, United Nations,
and even NATO) and actors (mediators and peacekeepers).
The irresistible, visible benefits of some early fundamental im-
580. As with the emerging Communities, the discreet transfer of limited powers
viewed a part of a slow but continuing process, with one level of integration, if success-
ful, potentially leading to another. See SHAw, supra note 528, §1.4. Unifying water or
electrical systems might present easy and profitable collaborative enterprises. Facilitat-
ing the movement of people and goods by improving roads has produced many positive
effects in Europe. Missing Links, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at 15.
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provements in the quality of life on the island should lead gradu-
ally to fuller peaceful cooperation.
To ask the deeply antagonistic Cypriot factions, with their
fervid promoters in Greece and Turkey, to work closely together
on the more sensitive issues of co-government at the present
would likely be counter-productive. Thus, a flexible alternative,
allowing gradual evolution to cooperation, interchange, and
trust is more likely to work. An innovative structure using the
early experience and subsequent momentum of evolving Euro-
pean integration could combine elements of security assurance
through actors credible to all sides, with elements of economic
cooperation.
Recognizing the reality of the partitioned island is the least
problematic of the options: unification with their surrogates in
Greece and Turkey would likely only magnify the conflict, and
simply leaving the status quo with no plan or structure for pro-
gress ignores it. Europe has accommodated partitioning previ-
ously. Six of the fifteen member states and three (including Cy-
prus) of the 5+1 candidates have experienced some form of
political separation since 1900.581 But most importantly, Europe
has enjoyed the successes of creative, gradual community-build-
ing over the past fifty years. It should not hesitate to consider
variations of the theme.
The benefits of a solution of the Cyprus stand-off would be
manifold. Easing the tension between Turkey and Greece
would, of course, serve many purposes of peaceful cooperation,
581. Ireland and England were admitted as separate countries. The union be-
tween Sweden and Norway ended in 1905. Edwin D. Williamson, State Succession and
Relations with Federal States, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1, 11 (1992). Prior to Russian
rule beginning in 1809, Finland had been ruled by Sweden since the 12th Century. Id.
West Germany's accession as a divided country was cited by German former Foreign
Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher as a precedent for the admission of a divided Cyprus.
Republic of Cyprus: Genscher-There is a German Precedent to Cyprus's Accession to the EU, M2
PRusswiRE, Mar. 12, 1999, available in 1999 WL 14063651. Following World War I, the
Austro-Hungarian Empire was divided into Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungry. Paul R.
Williams, Can International Legal Principles Play a Positive Role in Resolving Central and East
European Transboundary Environmental Disputes?, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REv. 421, 431
n.40 (1995). Czechoslovakia was again divided in 1993 into the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. 'We Respected the Wish of the Slovaks and the Country Was Split peacefully,' BUSINESS
WORLD (PHILIPPINES), May 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17714611. In addition, EU
Commissioner for Foreign Relations, Hans van den Broek, has stated that Slovakian
accession talks could begin as early as the Helsinki Summit in December of 1999. EU
Indicates Slovakia May Be Invited for Talks in '99, WORLD NEWS CONNECrION, Apr. 27,
1999, available in 1999 WL 14783503.
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and enhanced economic cooperation between all of the parties
would yield the natural growth of commerce. As with the Kurd-
ish resolution, the resolution of this costly military conflict would
reduce the financial demands on the treasuries of all the coun-
tries, releasing significant sums to promote economic prosperity.
Recognition of a divided Cyprus would, of course, remove one
enormous obstacle to the accession of Turkey, as well as the
gradual accession of the Cyprus confederation. Greek and
Greek-Cypriot authorities have offered to withdraw their objec-
tion to Turkey's EU membership if the Cyprus problem can be
resolved.582 Both Turkey and the new Cyprus confederation
could take advantage of the broad, flexible accession approach
recommended in this Article. Both could be welcomed into the
European "Community," in special categories designed to foster
cooperation, leading gradually in steps to full core EU member-
ship. Creating innovative relationships and categories of inclu-
sion should threaten no one-the specific recent histories of
Turkey and Cyprus illustrate vividly the costs of exclusion and
the potential benefits of inclusion.
CONCLUSION
As illustrated in the previous evaluation of accession crite-
ria, the Republic of Turkey is "heading in the right direction '583
to satisfying legitimate criteria for increased integration with Eu-
rope, and this course should be encouraged. The successful cus-
toms union forms the basis for continued progress, as Turkey
presently enjoys a market economy, with the capacity to cope
with competitive pressure and market forces. The reforms rec-
ommended by the European Commission, the IMF, and the
OECD to improve macroeconomic stability should be promoted,
including especially the major initiatives to stabilize the cur-
rency, reduce inflation and unemployment, continue privatiza-
tion, and reform the social security system.
Other primary reform goals under way in Turkey focus on
strengthening principles of a fair trial and a free press.584 Prime
582. Based on two conditions: (1) that Cyprus be allowed to join the EU, and (2)
the EU issue a statement of solidarity on the Aegean. Cyprus, Greece To Facilitate Turkey's
EU Bid, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, July 13, 1999, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, XNA
File.
583. REGULAR REPORT ON TuRaxY's PROGRESS, supra note 250, § B(2) (2.4).
584. Gotleib, supra note 2, at 689.
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Minister Ecevit may be well-positioned to help reform human
rights abuses, as he helped shorten pre-trial detention times,
openly opposes the death penalty, and is reportedly "appalled by
Turkey's woeful reputation for tolerating torture." '585 The re-
forms described above to balance the military's role in the demo-
cratic process should also be given priority.
The keys to all these internal and external changes in Tur-
key are the same open-mindedness, interdependence, and coop-
eration needed to build the wider European community. At
every level, and in every relationship, the benefits of cooperation
contrast sharply with the negative results produced by rejection.
Thus, for Turkey's reforms, relations with its neighbors, and its
integration with Europe, the time for change is at hand.
Fortunately, there is time to find the middle ground on
which to build the ethos and structures of cooperation. The
next EU accessions are not likely to begin until the year 2005-06
at the earliest, and even then with some restrictions, especially
on labor mobility, for new members for another five or ten
years.586 Turkey, and other less developed countries, will enter
the EU "with a phased accession to the internal market, long
transition arrangements for the free movement of persons and
some environmental standards, and no hurry at all over joining
the euro."587 Turkey's economy and economic structures are
strengthening, and are likely to generate an improved standard
of living and labor market at home. So, over time, the concerns
with immigration, labor movement, and other criteria will be-
come manageable. Planning is the key to all levels of harmoniza-
tion and continued integration.
As pointedly discussed above, the advantages of Turkey's in-
clusion in a broader European Community compellingly out-
weigh the disadvantages. One scholar argues that "Turkey can
best serve a facilitating role if it is made a member of the EU-a
development that would have positive political, economic, and
security implications for the entire region."588 "There is thus an
unresolved task still ahead, to fashion a stable place in Europe
585. Human Rights in Turkey, supra note 370, at 46.
586. Widening the European Union supra note 18, at 51 (stating that all Member
States have their proteges, their narrow interests, their hang-ups and they must "all
agree on everything before anything can be done.").
587. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 230.
588. Aras, supra note 34, at 92.
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for this large and fast-growing people."5"9 While membership in
the EU itself may wait for continued progress, Turkey's inclusion
in the broader European Community should be recognized
more formally and firmly as soon as possible.
Excluding Turkey from "an effective common structure," as
seems to be the case today with the exclusive EU, leaves the fu-
ture to an unpredictable and hazardous course.590 The West
needs integration above all to prevent conflict more than to pro-
mote trade-all the profit of free economic trade in the world
will never equal the costs (human and economic) of war.59'
Ironically, Turkey's willingness to contribute to Western secur-
ity-as seen with its openness to U.S. military aircraft and most
recently in its prompt efforts to shelter 20,000 Kosovan refu-
gees 2_may cut two ways: as Turkey helps Europe reduce its
security needs, perhaps some European leaders may feel less
need to remain close to Turkey.593 Further, Turkey's willingness
to play an active role in military and political affairs in the region
may also threaten the more traditional European leaders.594 It
would be unfortunate and unfair for Europe to change course
on such matters of policy and principle just as security needs
decline and costs become more clear.
Encouraging tolerance toward Turkey is key, as one com-
mentator heralded the accomplishment of Turkey in "creating a
democratic space in a part of the world where democracy has
not prospered."59 5 Several experts have endorsed the theme
that Turkey offers a viable example for bringing together a secu-
lar system with Islam, an example for the undemocratic states in
the Middle East that should be encouraged.596 It may be diffi-
cult to overstate the value of such a model of a free market econ-
589. Id. at 72.
590. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 227.
591. Id. at 3.
592. Turkey Provides Shelter, Airlift Takes Thousands out of Macedonia, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
7, 1999, at 2.
593. The Community's early positive response to Turkey's application was politi-
cally motivated out of a concern to keep her in NATO. REDMOND, supra note 7, at 25.
594. Fuller, supra note 34, at 169-70.
595. Pfaff, supra note 151, at 8 (quoting Semih Vaner of Center for International
Studies and Research in Paris: "[T]he Turkish republic's 75 years have been a widely
underestimated accomplishment.").
596. Pollock, supra note 29, at A26.
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omy, as well as democratic and secularist government. 59 7 "[I] t is
also important for the West to recognize that a disgruntled Tur-
key has far greater implications for the region today than ever in
the past." '
Membership in the European order would reinforce Tur-
key's democratic qualities, while adding a "strong context for
Turkish foreign and security policy at a time of strategic flux."599
It is unfair to expect Turkey to stand firm in the Western
camp-taking risks in its own Arab world, without giving Turkey
some real status as a significant participant in the construction of
a new Europe.60 °
William Ratliff, senior researcher at Stanford University's
Hover Institution, warns that the 1999 Kosovo "war" increases
the urgency of resolving the tensions in southeast Europe, espe-
cially between Greece and Turkey.60 1 The Kosovo conflict chal-
lenges post-World War II assumptions about borders and en-
courages ethnic autonomy rather than integration, sending
thousands of refugees into new lands, and stimulating notions of
ethnic autonomy.60 2 But Ratliff focuses particularly on the need
to address one of the most serious contributors to the regional
volatility (the biggest problem in NATO)-the Turkish-Greek
antagonism-and he argues that the EU should concentrate "on
bringing Turkey fully into the European community."60 3 Other
commentators repeated that theme following the disastrous
Turkish earthquake in August 1999, praising the quick Greek
assistance to Turkey and urging reconciliation of Turkey to Eu-
rope, including among other specifics, by a decision to reverse
the Luxembourg Exclusion, possibly as soon as the Helsinki sum-
mit at the end of the year.60 4
597. TuRKEY's NEW GEOPOLITIcs: FROM THE BALKANS TO WESTERN CHINA 185 (Gra-
ham Fuller & Ian Lesser eds, 1993).
598. Fuller, supra note 34, at 172.
599. Lesser, supra note 2, at 106.
600. Id. at 107.
601. William Ratliff, Conflict in the Balkans/Kosovo Fallout Could Spill into Greece and
Turkey, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 29, 1999, at A23.
602. Id.
603. Id. As Greece strives to enter "euroland," it fears that the increased influx of
Albanians will undermine its economic efforts, and Turkey fears that its 15,000,000
Kurds may seek autonomy. Id.
604. And this partnership with Europe will give impetus to the needed improve-
ments in Turkey's human rights record and its democratic performance. Earthquake
Relief FIN. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at 11.
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In the final analysis, choices-political mostly-must be
carefully considered. "The map of Europe begins with geogra-
phy, later becomes economic geography but in the end is a mat-
ter of political philosophy."60 5 As Emerson urges, the wider Eu-
rope should deepen, the deeper Europe should widen.6" The
big outsider nations, including especially Turkey, must be in-
volved too, and the width and depth of Europe should begin to
converge and disappear.60 7 The answer lies, as Emerson sug-
gests, in some form of broad, pan-European cooperation, be-
yond formal and full EU accession, to bring in Turkey to a com-
mon scheme of cooperative participation-real cooperation to
promote prosperity and peace. Of the two possible scenarios for
the next twenty years in Europe-rising to a new golden age or
degenerating into savage conflict6 0 8 -the choice of further in-
clusion seems compelling.
605. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 2.
606. Id. at 6.
607. Id. at 6.
608. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
